PSQ

Political Science Quarterly

Vol. LXXXIV No. 1 March 1969

Edited for the
Academy of Political Science
by the Faculty of Political Science
of Columbia University

The Right Against Self-Incrimination: History and Judicial History
LEONARD W. LEVY

Social Mobilization, Political Participation, and the Rise of Juan Perón
PETER H. SMITH

Small Population as a Political Handicap to National Development
DONALD B. KEESING

The Negro and the New Freedom: Fighting Wilsonian Segregation
NANCY J. WEISS

Intelligentsia Versus Reason of State
ALFRED VAGTS

Reviews

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Academy of Political Science

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Douglas M. Black
Courtney C. Brown
Arthur F. Burns
John V. Connorton
Douglas Dillon
Thomas S. Gates
Roger Hull
Grayson Kirk
John A. Perkins
Charles Preusse
Harold A. Stevens
David B. Truman

Robert H. Connery, *President*
Franz Schneider and Andrew W. Cordier, *Vice Presidents*
Philip E. Mosely, *Secretary*
Alan H. Temple, *Treasurer*

HONORARY MEMBERS

W. Randolph Burgess
Lewis W. Douglas
Dwight D. Eisenhower
John J. McCloy

Members and subscribing members receive the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY and the PROCEEDINGS of the Academy.

Three years, $24	Life Member	Sustaining Member
Two years, $18	$300	$25 a year
One year, $10	Supporting Member	Contributing Member
Student, $6 a year	$50 a year	$15 a year

Contributions are tax deductible.

Libraries and institutions pay subscription dues of $10 per year.

Edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University, the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is published by The Academy of Political Science in March, June, September, and December.

Single issue, $2.50.

Printed by Capital City Press, Montpelier, Vermont 05602.

Second-class postage paid at Montpelier, Vermont 05602.

Members are urged to notify the Academy of any change in address.

The Academy of Political Science, Columbia University, 413 Fayerweather Hall, New York, New York 10027.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Academy of Political Science



Report of the President

At the end of 1968 membership was at an all-time high, activities were expanding in several directions, and generous support from members moved the Academy from a deficit operation to one of complete solvency. An expanding program, however, will continue to stretch financial resources, and continued efforts must be made to provide more adequate support. The Academy is especially grateful to the 226 persons who became contributing, sustaining, and supporting members, and included a contribution in addition to regular membership dues.

In the past, one or at the most two conferences were sponsored each year. In 1968, three were scheduled: "Urban Riots: Violence and Social Change," April 19; "The 'Atlantic Community' Reappraised" (in cooperation with the School of International Affairs), April 26; and "Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East," December 13 and 14. The conference on the "Atlantic Community" had to be cancelled because of conditions on the campus at that time, and it was impossible to reschedule it, but the papers that were to be presented have been published.

Perhaps because the topics were unusually timely, attendance at both conferences was excellent. There was standing-room only at most sessions on "Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East." The dinner and luncheon, which were held for the convenience of participants and not widely publicized, drew as many as could be accommodated. Proceedings of the conferences were recorded on tape and broadcast by WKCR, the campus station, and WBAI, a noncommercial radio station in New York. The Voice of America also recorded the conference on "Soviet-American Rivalry" for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

broadcast overseas. The New York *Times* and *The Nation* gave the published PROCEEDINGS on "Urban Riots" extended reviews. *Current History* said that the papers were "refreshingly free of cant and emotionalism."

Arrangements were made with Random House to reprint *Urban Riots* as a Vintage paperback and with Frederick A. Praeger for cloth and paperback editions of *Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East*. Promotional and distribution facilities of these publishing firms will bring the Academy's publications to the attention of many who would otherwise not be aware of them.

Editions of 11,000 copies of the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY were printed in March and June, and 12,000 in September and December, a substantial increase over the previous year. Twenty-one articles were published and 192 books were reviewed or noted in the four issues during the year.

At the end of 1968, total membership in the Academy was 10,953 in contrast with 9,595 at the end of 1967. The net increase of 1,358 was the largest by far in a single year during the past decade.

A conference on "Governing New York City: Urban Challenges and Options" will be held May 5 and 6, 1969, in Room A of the School of Law at Columbia University. Afternoon sessions are scheduled from 3:30 to 5:30 and evening sessions from 7:30 to 9:30. This case study of options available to New York City should be of interest to everyone concerned with urban problems. Later in 1969 the Academy in cooperation with the Council on Aid to Education will sponsor a conference on "Financing Higher Education." Programs for the conferences will be mailed to members in advance of the meetings, and the PROCEEDINGS will be published as expeditiously as possible.

Three new members have been added to the Board of Directors: Judge Harold Stevens, presiding justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in New York, Dr. John V. Connorton, executive vice-president of the Greater New York Hospital Association, and Charles Preusse, a partner in the law firm of Whitman, Ransom and Coulson.

Respectfully submitted,
Robert H. Connery
President

December 31, 1968

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Science Quarterly

Edited for the Academy of Political Science
by the Faculty of Political Science
of Columbia University

Managing Editor
Sigmund Diamond

Editorial Advisory Board
Peter B. Kenen
Eric L. McKitrick
Conrad M. Arensberg
Herbert H. Hyman
Herbert A. Deane

Associate Editor
Nancy Lane

The POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is a non-partisan review. Every article is signed and represents the personal view of the writer. Manuscripts, books for review, and communications regarding articles should be addressed to the Managing Editor, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 321M Fayerweather Hall, Columbia University, New York, N. Y. 10027.

Copyright © 1969, by the Editors of the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY.
All rights reserved.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Contributors to the March Issue

LEONARD W. LEVY is Earl Warren Professor of Constitutional History at Brandeis University.

PETER H. SMITH is engaged in further studies of Argentina's political history, and hopes to start work soon on the study of the development of political legitimacy in Mexico. He is assistant professor of history at the University of Wisconsin in Madison.

DONALD B. KEESING, associate professor of economics at Stanford University, specializes mainly in the areas of international trade and economic development.

NANCY J. WEISS, a doctoral candidate in American history at Harvard University, is writing her dissertation on the history of the National Urban League. Next fall she will join the history faculty at Princeton University. She is the author of *Charles Francis Murphy, 1858-1924: Respectability and Responsibility in Tammany Politics* (1968).

ALFRED VAGTS has had academic and government employment in pre-1933 Germany and the United States. His latest book is *Military Attachés* (1967).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Science Quarterly

Volume LXXXIV
Number 1
March 1969

Contents

ARTICLES

The Right Against Self-Incrimination: History and Judicial History
Leonard W. Levy 1

Social Mobilization, Political Participation, and the Rise of Juan Perón
Peter H. Smith 30

Small Population as a Political Handicap to National Development
Donald B. Keesing 50

The Negro and the New Freedom: Fighting Wilsonian Segregation
Nancy J. Weiss 61

Intelligentsia Versus Reason of State
Alfred Vagts 80

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOK REVIEWS

ROSE, ARNOLD M., Libel and Academic Freedom: A Law Suit Against Political Extremists
Osmond K. Fraenkel 106

ZEIGLER, HARMON, The Political Life of American Teachers
William C. Spragens 108

DEMERATH, NICHOLAS J., STEPHENS, RICHARD W., and TAYLOR, R. ROBB, Power, Presidents, and Professors
Amos H. Hawley 109

BLACK, ROBERT C., III, The Younger John Winthrop
Frederick B. Tolles 110

BAILYN, BERNARD, The Origins of American Politics
Caroline Robbins 111

GIPSON, LAWRENCE HENRY, The British Empire Before the American Revolution, Vol. XIII, Parts I, II, III
Alden Vaughan 113

SYRETT, HAROLD C., and COOKE, JACOB E. (eds.), The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, Vols. XII, XIII
Broadus Mitchell 114

HOHENBERG, JOHN, Between Two Worlds: Policy, Press, and Public Opinion in Asian-American Relations; RIVERS, WILLIAM L., The Opinionmakers: The Washington Press Corps
Bernard C. Cohen 116

STEBBINS, RICHARD P., The United States in World Affairs: 1966; STEBBINS, RICHARD P. (ed.), Documents on American Foreign Relations: 1966
Cecil V. Crabb Jr. 118

KNACHEL, PHILIP A., England and the Fronde: The Impact of the English Civil War and Revolution on France
Orest Ranum 119

MacRAE, DUNCAN, JR., Parliament, Parties, and Society in France: 1946-1958
Philip M. Williams 120

CARSTEN, FRANCIS L., The Rise of Fascism
Gerhard L. Weinberg 122

NOGUÈRES, HENRI, Munich: "Peace in Our Time"
Herbert Feis 123

BAER, GEORGE W., The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War
C. L. Mowat 124

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SCHWARZ, SOLOMON M., The Russian Revolution of 1905: The Workers' Movement and the Formation of Bolshevism and Menshevism; RABINOWITCH, ALEXANDER, Prelude to Revolution: The Petrograd Bolsheviks and the July 1917 Uprising
Nicholas V. Riasanovsky 126

KATKOV, GEORGE, Russia 1917: The February Revolution
Alexander Rabinowitch 127

LONDON, KURT (ed.), Eastern Europe in Transition
Henry Krisch 129

BROMKE, ADAM, Poland's Politics: Idealism vs. Realism
Joseph Rothschild 130

BURROW, J. W., Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory
Kenneth E. Bock 132

MARTIN, DAVID, A Sociology of English Religion
J. Milton Yinger 134

NUTTING, ANTHONY, No End of a Lesson: The Inside Story of the Suez Crisis
Ernest Stock 136

LAQUEUR, WALTER, The Road to Jerusalem: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967; DRAPER, THEODORE, Israel and World Politics: Roots of the Third Arab-Israeli War
O. M. Smolansky 137

AYUB KAHN, MOHAMMAD, Friends Not Masters
Wayne Wilcox 139

GOODY, JACK (ed.), Succession to High Office
Terence K. Hopkins 140

CLEGERN, WAYNE M., British Honduras: Colonial Dead End, 1859-1900
Robert J. Alexander 143

LIFTON, ROBERT JAY, Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima
Bruno Bettelheim 145

CHEN, LUNG-CHU, and LASSWELL, HAROLD D., Formosa, China, and the United Nations: Formosa in the World Community
Anonymous 147

ROSSI, PAOLO, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science
J. Bronowski 151

STAUDE, JOHN RAPHAEL, Max Scheler, 1874-1928: An Intellectual Portrait
Kurt H. Wolff 152

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As a Tale Is Told: The Autobiography of R. M. MacIver
Robert A. Nisbet 154

LUCAS, J. R., The Principles of Politics
M. M. Goldsmith 156

LIPSET, SEYMOUR M., and ROKKAN, STEIN (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives
Leon D. Epstein 158

HALLE, LOUIS J., The Cold War as History
Paul Seabury 159

JOHNSON, HARRY G. (ed.), Economic Nationalism in Old and New States
Arthur Robert Burns 160

ESMAN, MILTON J., and CHEEVER, DANIEL S., The Common Aid Effort: The Development Assistance Activities of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
Doris A. Graber 162

DEMAS, WILLIAM G., The Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the Caribbean
Lloyd Best 163

BOOK NOTES

BESHERS, JAMES M., Population Processes in Social Systems
A. J. Jaffe 166

NUGENT, WALTER T. K., The Money Question During Reconstruction
David Montgomery 166

KELLETT, RICHARD, The Merchant Banking Arena
John Chown 167

CAMPBELL, JOHN C., Tito's Separate Road: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics
† *Kaethe Mengelberg* 168

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Right Against Self-Incrimination: History and Judicial History

LEONARD W. LEVY
Brandeis University

By now we all know the notorious fact: the Supreme Court has flunked history. The justices stand censured for abusing historical evidence in a way that reflects adversely on their intellectual rectitude as well as on their historical competence. Professors of constitutional history charge that the justices frequently use "law office history," which is merely a function of *ex parte* advocacy. The Court artfully selects historical facts from one side only, ignoring contrary data, in order to support, rationalize, or give the appearance of respectability to judgments resting on other grounds. Alfred H. Kelly, who aimed his sharpest barbs at the liberal activists, claimed that the Court's historical scholarship is simplistic, manipulative, and devoid of balance or impartiality. He referred to the Court's "historical felony," "amateurish historical solecism," "mangled constitutional history," and its practice of confusing the writing of briefs with the writing of history —all of which "runs wild" in the Court's opinions. Kelly also questioned whether history as written by the Court is reconcilable with historians' history.[1]

Since Charles Fairman demolished Justice Black's opinion in the *Adamson* case[2] on the question whether the Fourteenth Amend-

[1] Alfred H. Kelly, "Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair," in Philip B. Kurland (ed.), *Supreme Court Review: 1965* (Chicago, 1965), 119-58.

[2] *Adamson* v. *California*, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment was intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights as limitations on the states, scholars have regularly criticized the Court's use of history.[3] Paul L. Murphy preceded Kelly in condemning "law office history" and described one opinion as having relied on "a shockingly inaccurate use of historical data."[4] Alexander M. Bickel negated the Court's reading of the history of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment on the question of racial segregation.[5] Historical evidence has also been mustered to disprove the Court's assertion that the free speech clause of the First Amendment was intended to supersede the common law of seditious libel.[6] Now it can be added that the Court's use of history in cases on the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause fits a pattern that might charitably be described as historical incompetence, uncharitably as law-office history.

I

The most historically-minded opinion on the Fifth Amendment was Justice Moody's in *Twining* v. *New Jersey*, decided in 1908.[7] *Twining*, which the Court recently abandoned,[8] runs counter to the general trend of decision favoring a liberal construction of the Fifth Amendment. But the Court's use of history in *Twining* is representative, not of its viewpoint but of its historical knowledge.

[3] Charles Fairman, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding," *Stanford Law Review*, II (1949), 5-139.

[4] Paul L. Murphy, "Time to Reclaim: the Current Challenge of American Constitutional History," *American Historical Review*, LXIX (1963), 64-79. Murphy referred to *United States* v. *Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*, 299 U.S. 304 (1936). He credited Howard J. Graham for the phrase "law office history."

[5] Alexander M. Bickel, "The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision," *Harvard Law Review*, LXIX (1955), 1-43.

[6] Leonard W. Levy, *Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960). For a lucid discussion, see John Wofford, "The Blinding Light: the Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation," *University of Chicago Law Review*, XXXI (1964), 502.

[7] *Twining* v. *New Jersey*, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). In my over-generalized reference to "the Fifth Amendment," I have followed the example of Erwin N. Griswold, *The 5th Amendment Today* (Cambridge, Mass., 1955), and many others. The Supreme Court has said, "Surely, in popular parlance and even in legal literature, the term 'Fifth Amendment' in the context of our time is commonly regarded as synonymous with the privilege against self-incrimination." *Quinn* v. *United States*, 349 U.S. 155, 163 (1955).

[8] *Malloy* v. *Hogan*, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The question was whether the *right* against self-incrimination[9] was "a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of free government" and therefore ought to be included within the concept of the due process of law safeguarded from state abridgment.[10] Relying on its own version of history, the Court decided against the right. Justice Moody said that he had resorted to "every historical test by which the meaning of the phrase [of the Fifth Amendment] can be tried,"[11] although he had to "pass by the meager records of early colonial time, so far as they have come to our attention, as affording light too uncertain for guidance."[12] But Moody did not pass by the 1637 trial of Anne Hutchinson which proved, he alleged, that the Massachusetts authorities were "not aware of any privilege against self-incrimination or any duty to respect it."[13] Four decades later Justice Black, in his famous *Adamson* dissent, exclaimed, "Of course not," because the court that tried Anne Hutchinson for heresy, believing that its religious convictions must be forced upon others, could not believe that dissenters had any rights worth respecting.[14] Black's outraged explanation is misleading. Incriminating interrogation was routine in 1637 on both sides of the Atlantic in all criminal cases. Nevertheless the Hutchinson case does not reveal that the judges were unaware of the right against self-incrimination or of a duty to respect it, because she did not claim it. She welcomed incriminating questions as an opportunity to reveal God's word as she saw it. What is significant is not that the court sought her incrimination but, rather, that she freely and voluntarily incriminated herself. Justice Moody did not know that the

[9] Jurists and legal commentators invariably speak of the "privilege" against self-incrimination. I refer to it as a "right" because it is one, having the same status, constitutionally, as free speech, trial by jury, benefit of counsel, and other guarantees of the Bill of Rights. A privilege is a revocable concession granted by the government to its subjects. In American constitutional theory, the rights of the people do not derive from the government; the Constitution, which secures those rights, is paramount to the government which it creates. To speak of the "privilege" against self-incrimination, degrades it, inadvertently or otherwise, in comparison to other constitutional rights.

[10] *Twining* v. *New Jersey*, 106.

[11] *Ibid.*, 110.

[12] *Ibid.*, 108.

[13] *Ibid.*, 103-04.

[14] *Adamson* v. *California*, 88.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

same Massachusetts court a few months earlier, when trying her brother-in-law John Wheelwright on similar charges, was put on the defensive by objections to its procedure and questioning. Governor Winthrop explained that his court neither meant to examine the defendant by compulsory means, such as by using an incriminating oath, nor sought to "draw matter from himselfe whereupon to proceed against him."[15] The maxim *nemo tenetur seipsum prodere*—no one is bound to accuse himself—was widely known among the Massachusetts Puritans.[16]

Moody said in *Twining* that the right was not in Magna Carta and that the practice of self-incriminatory examinations had continued for more than four centuries after 1215. That is true, but far short of the whole truth. As early as 1246, when the church introduced its inquisitional oath-procedure into England, a procedure that required self-incrimination, Henry III condemned it as "repugnant to the antient Customs of his Realm" and to "his peoples Liberties."[17] In the early fourteenth century Parliament outlawed the church's incriminatory oath-procedure,[18] and when the King's Council emulated that procedure, Parliament protested and re-enacted section 29 of Magna Carta.[19] One such re-enactment, in 1354, for the first time used the phrase "by due process of law."[20] On its face the statute said nothing about self-incrimination. Seen in its context the statute condemned incriminating examinations, when conducted outside the common-law courts, as violations of Magna Carta or denials of due process. In *Twining*

[15] *A Short Story of the Rise, Reign, and Ruine of the Antinomians, Familists and Libertines, that Infected the Churches of New England* (London, 1649), reprinted in Charles Francis Adams (ed.), *Antinomianism in the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 1636-1638* (Boston, 1894), 194, 195.

[16] (William Bradford), *Bradford's History "Of Plimoth Plantation"* (Boston, 1898), 465.

[17] E. G. Atkinson (ed.), *Close Rolls of the Reign of Henry III, 1247-51* (London, 1922), 221-22.

[18] Prohibition Formata de Statuto Articuli Cleri, in A. Luders *et al.* (eds.), *Statutes of the Realm* (London, 1810), I, 209.

[19] I. S. Leadam and J. F. Baldwin (eds.), *Select Cases before the King's Council, 1243-1482* (Cambridge, Mass., 1918), xxvi-xxvii, xliii, 33, 40, 74, 79-80, 94, 103, 105-06; James Fosdick Baldwin, *The King's Council in England during the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1913), 296-97.

[20] *Rotuli Parliamentorum; ut et petitiones, et placita in Parliamento tempore Edwardi R. I (ad finem Henrici VII)* (London, 1767-77), II, 168, no. 28 (1347); 228, no. 16 (1351); 239, no. 19 (1352); 280, no. 37 (1363). *Statutes*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Supreme Court failed to recognize that Magna Carta grew in meaning. Originally a feudal document protecting the barons, it became the talismanic symbol and source of the expanding liberties of the subject. Thus, in 1590 Robert Beale, the clerk of the Privy Council, declared that "by the Statute of Magna Carta and the olde lawes of this realme, this othe for a man to accuse himself was and is utterlie inhibited."[21] This became the view of other common-lawyers, of Chief Justice Edward Coke, and of Parliament.[22] To allege that Magna Carta did not outlaw compul-

---

of the Realm, I, 267, 5 Edw. III, chap. 9 (1331); 296, 15 Edw. III, chap. 3 (1341); 321, 25 Edw. III, chap. 4 (1352); 345, 28 Edw. III, chap. 3 (1354); 382, 37 Edw. III, chap. 18 (1363); 388, 42 Edw. III, chap. 3 (1368). On Magna Carta in the fourteenth century, see Faith Thompson, *Magna Carta, Its Role in the Making of the English Constitution, 1300-1629* (Minneapolis, 1948), chap. 3.

[21] Robert Beale, "A Collection Shewinge what Jurisdiction the Clergie Hathe Heretofore Lawfully Used," British Museum, Cotton MSS, Cleopatra F. I., no. 1, *folio* 18, *recto*.

[22] James Morice, *A briefe treatise of Oathes exacted by Ordinaries and Ecclesiasticall Judges* (n.p., 1600), 8-10, 11-18, 22, 26-31, 32, 37, 47; (Nicholas Fuller), *The Argument of Master Nicholas Fuller* (London, 1607), 7-13, 23, 28-29. Stowe MSS #424, *folios* 158a-164b (British Museum) contains seventeen unreported cases of 1609-11 in most of which Coke invoked Magna Carta to rule on the illegality of the incriminatory oath *ex officio;* for reported decisions, see *Edwards's Case*, 13 Coke's Reports 9 (1609), *Huntley* v. *Cage*, 2 Brownlow & Goldesborough 14 (1611), and *Burrowes, Cox, Dyton et al.* v. *High Commission*, 3 Bulstrode 48 (1616). See, also, "Of Oaths before an Ecclesiastical Judge *Ex Officio*," 12 Coke's Reports 26 (1607). John H. Wigmore, *A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law* (3d ed., Boston, 1940), VIII (rev. 1961 by J. T. McNaughton), 280, gives a misleading account of Coke's opposition to the oath *ex officio*. For Parliament, see the bill passed by Commons against the oath *ex officio* on June 25, 1610, in Maurice F. Bond (ed.), *Manuscripts of the House of Lords, Addenda 1514-1714*, Historical Manuscripts Commission, new series (London, 1962), XI, 125-26. During the reigns of Elizabeth and James I, the opposition to compulsory self-incrimination was, with rare exception, directed against the use of the oath *ex officio* by the ecclesiastical courts. In 1581, in the Star Chamber trial of Catholic laymen for their refusal to swear the oath *ex officio* before the Privy Council, the three leading common-law judges of England (Chief Baron Roger Manwood of the Exchequer, Chief Justice James Dyer of the Common Pleas, and Chief Justice Christopher Wray of the King's Bench) agreed, in the words of Wray, that "no man by lawe ought to sweare to accuse hymselfe when he might loose lyfe or lymme," in John Bruce (ed.), "Narrative of the Proceedings in the Star-chamber against lord Vaux, sir Thomas Tresham, sir William Catesby, and others, for a contempt in refusing to swear that they had not harboured Campion the Jesuit," *Archaeologia: or, Miscellaneous Tracts Relating to Antiquity*, XXX (London, 1844), 103-04. In

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sory self-incrimination is a mischievous oversimplification, a half-truth. The same can be said of the Court's *Twining* statement that the Petition of Right of 1628 did not address itself to the evil of compulsory self-incrimination. It did, in the passage censuring "an oath . . . not warrantable by the laws or statutes of this realm . . . ." That oath, which preceded interrogation, operated to coerce confessions from the opponents of the king's forced loan of 1626.[23]

The Court in *Twining* also found significance in the fact that compulsory self-incrimination was not condemned by the Stamp Act Congress, the First Continental Congress, or the Northwest Ordinance.[24] But the Stamp Act Congress mentioned only trial by jury among the many well-established rights of the criminally accused; failure to enumerate them all proved nothing. The Court failed to note that the First Continental Congress did claim that the colonists were "entitled to the common law of England," which had long protected the right against self-incrimination, nor did the Court note, or know, that Congress in 1778, in an investi-

---

1590 at the examination of John Udall by a special royal commission, *before* Udall was asked to take the oath, Chief Justice Edward Anderson of the Court of Common Pleas asked him whether he was the author of certain books, and Udall replied, "I think that by law I need not answer." Anderson said, "That is true if it concerned the loss of your life," in Trial of John Udall, in T. B. Howell (comp.), *A Complete Collection of State Trials* (London, 1816), I, 1274. In a 1631 case involving seditious conspiracy, the two chief justices and the chief baron ruled that no defendant was obliged to answer questions that "do not concern himself," an oblique acknowledgment of the right against self-incrimination at common law, where the oath *ex officio* was unknown, in *ibid.*, III, 420. But these cases did not rely on Magna Carta. The claim that Magna Carta vested a right against self-incrimination, wholly apart from the oath issue, originated with the Levellers. In 1645 John Lilburne, relying on chap. 29 of Magna Carta and the 1628 Petition of Right, claimed that "it is contrary to *Law*, to force a man to answer to Questions concerning himself . . ."; Lilburne, *Englands Birth-Right Justified Against all Arbitrary Usurpation, whether Regall or Parliamentary* (1645), in William Haller (ed.), *Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution, 1638-1647* (New York, 1933), III, 263.

[23] On the use of the incriminatory oath-procedure by Charles I, see "The Commission and Instructions for Raising the Forced Loan," Sept. 23, 1626, in Samuel Rawson Gardiner (ed.), *The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660* (3d ed., Oxford, 1906), 55; for the Petition of Right, see *ibid.*, 69.

[24] *Twining* v. *New Jersey*, 108.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gation of its own, did respect that right.[25] The Northwest Ordinance did contain a guarantee of "judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law."[26] Indeed, the Supreme Court itself said in *Twining*, though without proof, that by 1776 the courts recognized the right even in the states whose constitutions did not protect it. Justice Moody mentioned six states whose constitutions provided such protection; but he neglected a seventh, Delaware, and an eighth, Vermont, not then a member of the Union.[27] What Moody did not recognize was that *every* state that had a separate bill of rights protected the right against self-incrimination. He noted that only four of the original thirteen states insisted that the right be incorporated in the new national Constitution, but he failed to note that these were the only states which ratified the Constitution with comprehensive recommendations for a national bill of rights.[28] Using Moody's yardstick, one could argue that the fundamental concept of due process of law was not fundamental at all because it did not appear in any of the thirteen state constitutions and was recommended by only one state ratifying convention. Moody remarked, inaccurately, that the principle that no person could be compelled to be a witness against himself "distinguished the common law from all other systems of jurisprudence."[29] If so, and if that principle was first elevated to constitu-

[25]For the action of Congress in 1778, see below, note 98 and related text. For the Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress and the Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, see Richard L. Perry (ed.), *Sources of Our Liberties: Documentary Origins of Individual Liberties in the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights* (Chicago, 1959), 270, 288.

[26]Northwest Ordinance, Art. 2, in *ibid.*, 395.

[27]Delaware Declaration of Rights, 1776, Sect. 15, in *ibid.*, 339; Constitution of Vermont, 1777, Sect. 10, in *ibid.*, 366. The six states named by Justice Moody were North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maryland, in *Twining* v. *New Jersey*, 91.

[28]For the amendments proposed by Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island, see Moody's summary, in *Twining*, 109.

[29]*Ibid.*, 91. For a similar remark, see Wigmore, *Treatise on Evidence* (2d ed., Boston, 1923), IV, 819. In *Miranda* v. *Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966), Chief Justice Warren accurately observed that the roots of the principle "go back into ancient times," and in his footnote 27 Warren quoted Maimonides, *Mishneh Torah* (Code of Jewish Law), *Book of Judges*, Laws of the Sanhedrin, chap. 18, para. 6, in Abraham M. Hershman (ed.), *The Code of Maimonides: Book Fourteen* (New Haven, 1949), 52-53. Warren also cited Norman Lamm, "The Fifth Amendment and Its Equivalent in the Halakhah," *Judaism: A Quarterly Journal*, V (1956), 53-59. Rabbi Lamm's article is mainly a psychologi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional status in America, and if it was safeguarded by every state having a bill of rights, and if it fit the several definitions of due process that Moody offered, there is no explaining the Court's finding that the right came into existence as a rule of evidence that was not "an essential part of due process."[30]

There are many other misleading or mistaken statements of history in *Twining*, but the point has been made: the opinion was founded on inaccurate and insufficient data. Contrary to the Court's assertion, the right against self-incrimination did evolve as an essential part of due process and as a fundamental principle of liberty and justice. Thus, Ben Franklin in 1735 called it a natural right ("the common Right of Mankind"), and Baron Geoffrey Gilbert, the foremost English authority on evidence at the time, called it part of the "Law of Nature."[31]

---

cal analysis of Maimonides' statement. The same article, which praises Justice Douglas as "a great legal thinker," was quoted at length by Justice Douglas in *Garrity* v. *New Jersey*, 87 Sup. Ct. 616, 619 n. 8. The article has its merits, but slights the Talmud which is much more to the point about "ancient times" than Maimonides, who completed his *Mishneh Torah* in 1180. For Talmudic references to the right against self-incrimination with appropriate cases or illustrations, see I. Epstein *et al.* (eds.), *The Babylonian Talmud* (Soncino ed., London, 1935 ff.), *Nashim: Yebamoth* 25b, p. 154; *Nashim: Ketuboth* 18b, p. 102, and 41a, p. 228; *Nezikin: Sanhedrin* 9b, p. 39; *Nezikin: Baba Kamma* 64b, pp. 374-75, and 75b-75a, pp. 428-35; *Nezikin: Makkoth* 2b, pp. 5, 7. Among the various articles that the Court would have found useful are Haim J. Cohn, "The Privilege against Self-Incrimination: Israel," *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Political Science*, LXI (1960), 175-78; Simcha Mendelbaum, "The Privilege against Self-Incrimination in Anglo-American and Jewish Law," *American Journal of Comparative Law*, V (1956), 115-19; and George Horowitz, "The Privilege against Self-Incrimination: How Did It Originate?" *Temple Law Quarterly*, XXXI (1958), 121-44. Lamm's article was a quixotic choice for the Court to honor in splendid isolation. For an excellent discussion in Hebrew of the Talmudic right, see the entry on "ein adam meissim atamo rasha" (transliteration of the Hebrew maxim that "no one can incriminate himself") in the Hebrew *Entsiklopediyah Talmudit (Talmudic Encyclopedia: On Matters of Law)*, ed. Mayer Berlin and Solomon Joseph Zevin (3d ed., Tel Aviv, 1951), I, 355-56.

[30]*Twining* v. *New Jersey*, 106. New York was the only state to recommend a due process of law clause; see Jonathan Elliot (ed.), *The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution* (2d rev. ed., Philadelphia, 1941), I, 328. Although no state had a due process of law clause in its constitution before the Fifth Amendment, several states had a "law of the land" clause which was a historical equivalent.

[31]The *Twining* decision was reaffirmed in *Palko* v. *Connecticut*, 302 U.S. 319, 324, 325 (1937); *Adamson* v. *California*, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); and *Cohen* v.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II

Other cases reveal the justices to be equally inept as historians even when conscripting the past into service for the defense and expansion of the Fifth Amendment. The most historically-minded opinion of this kind was Justice Douglas' dissent in *Ullmann* v. *United States*, decided 1956.[32] The seven-man majority, speaking through Justice Frankfurter, sustained the constitutionality of Congress' Immunity Act of 1954. That act required that in certain cases involving national security, a federal court, on application approved by the attorney general, might require a witness to testify or produce records that might otherwise incriminate him, on condition that his revelations could not be used as evidence against him in any criminal proceeding. Frankfurter's opinion for the majority stressed the importance of history in interpreting the Fifth. History, he said, showed that it should be construed broadly, though he construed it narrowly, and he quoted Chief Judge Magruder's remark that "Our forefathers, when they wrote this provision into the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, had in mind a lot of history which has been largely forgotten today."[33] Frankfurter himself observed that, "the privilege against self-incrimination is a specific provision of which it is peculiarly true that 'a page of history is worth a volume of logic.' "[34] But Frankfurter did not provide that page of history despite his rhetorical stress on its importance. He offered only the brief line that the Fifth was aimed against a recurrence of the Inquisition and of the Star Chamber. Though Frankfurter was the best and most historically-minded scholar on the Court, he was apparently unaware

---

Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 128-29 n. 7 (1961). For earlier cases, arising in the federal courts, in which the Supreme Court treated the right against self-incrimination as a fundamental right, see *Boyd* v. *United States*, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); *Counselman* v. *Hitchcock*, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); *Brown* v. *Walker*, 161 U.S. 596 (1896); and *Bram* v. *United States*, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). The Court first held the right to be fundamental in state cases, too, in *Malloy* v. *Hogan*, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Franklin's remark is in his pamphlet, "Some Observations on the Proceedings against Mr. Hemphill" (1735), in Leonard W. Labaree *et al.* (eds.), *Papers of Benjamin Franklin* (New Haven, 1959-), I, 44. For Gilbert, see *The Law of Evidence by a Late Learned Judge* (London, 1756), 139-40.

[32] 350 U.S. 422 (1956).

[33] *Ibid.*, 426, 427.

[34] *Ibid.*, 438.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the several colonial precedents[35] in support of his argument that the right cannot be claimed if the legal peril, which is the reason for its existence, ceases.

Douglas' dissent, in which Black joined, is a splendid specimen of law-office history, yet most of his history was not even relevant to his conclusion that the Immunity Act violated the Fifth Amendment. Douglas' relevant data, which dealt with the concept of infamy, was unsound. He claimed that the act was unconstitutional because it was not broad enough: it did not protect against infamy or public disgrace. In support of this proposition he had to prove that the framers of the Fifth meant it to protect against disclosures resulting in public disgrace accompanied by non-criminal penalties like the loss of employment. Such evidence as history provides to support his proposition[36] was unknown to Douglas. *His* evidence was far-fetched, for he based his argument on the fact that protection against infamy is found in the ideas of Beccaria and *Encyclopédistes* whom Jefferson read. But the Fifth Amendment was exclusively the product of English and American colonial experience. The influence of Continental theorists was non-existent. As for Jefferson, he had nothing to do with the making of the Fifth. Indeed, he omitted protections against self-incrimination in the two model constitutions that be proposed for Virginia.[37]

Douglas' other evidence dealt not with the issue in question, immunity, but with the general origins of the Fifth. He referred to the Puritan hatred of the self-incriminatory oath *ex officio* used by the Star Chamber and its ecclesiastical counterpart, the High Commission. The hatred existed, but there were significant differences between the Star Chamber's use of the oath and the High Commission's. The High Commission required the suspect to

[35]See below, notes 90-92 and related text.

[36]See below, notes 83-86 and related text.

[37]Douglas relied on Mitchell Franklin, "The *Encyclopédiste* Origin and Meaning of the Fifth Amendment," *Lawyers Guild Review*, XV (1955), 41-62, an article wholly without merit as an explanation of the historical origins of the Fifth Amendment. For Jefferson's proposed constitutions for Virginia, in 1776 and 1783, see Julian Boyd *et al.* (eds.), *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson* (Princeton, 1950-), I, 341, 348, 359; VI, 298. At the pages cited, Jefferson recommended a ban against torture. Jefferson made no reference to the right against self-incrimination in his letters of 1787-89, when he recommended provisions that should be included in a national bill of rights.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

take that oath to tell the truth as the first step of the examination, and then interrogated him orally without telling him the charges against him or the identity of his accusers. By contrast, the Star Chamber normally provided a bill of complaint, as specific as common-law indictment, and permitted the accused to have plenty of time to answer the charges in writing and with the advice of counsel; only then did the accused have to take the oath and be interrogated.[38] However, in Archbishop Laud's time, the power of examining parties under oath, as a Star Chamber lawyer recorded, "was used like a Spanish inquisition to rack men's consciences."[39] But that was exceptional in the Star Chamber, routine in the High Commission. The same Star Chamber lawyer stated that if "the matter in charge tendeth to accuse the defendant of some crime which may be capital; in which case *nemo tenetur prodere seipsum* [no man is bound to accuse himself] . . . ." And, "neither must it question the party to accuse him of crime."[40] The same rule applied to witnesses. In the High Commission, however, the inquisitional procedure conformed to a quite different rule: any person suspected, even if only by rumor, must answer the interrogatories, however incriminating. The maxim *nemo tenetur seipsum prodere*, from which the right against self-incrimination derived, did not operate in the High Commission.[41] For these reasons common-lawyers led by Robert Beale, James Morice, and Sir Edward Coke, who supported that maxim and assaulted the oath *ex officio*, did not attack the use of the oath by the Star Chamber.[42]

[38]For the procedure of the Star Chamber, contrasting it with that of the High Commission, see Morice, *A briefe treatise of Oathes*, 38-39. For a similar contrast by Robert Beale, see John Strype, *The Life and Acts of John Whitgift* (Oxford, 1822), II, 138. The best contemporary work on the Star Chamber is William Hudson, *A Treatise of the Court of Star Chamber* (ante 1635), in Francis Hargrave (ed.), *Collectanea Juridica. Consisting of Tracts Relating to the Laws and Constitution of England* (London, 1791), I, 1-240.

[39]Hudson, *Court of Star Chamber*, 169.

[40]*Ibid.*, 208-09; see, also, *ibid.*, 64, 164.

[41]On High Commission procedure and the practice of compulsory self-incrimination, see the book by a member of that court, Richard Cosin, *An Apologie for Sundrie Proceedings Ecclesiasticall* (London, 1593), Part II, 51-52, 57-58, 104; Part III, 43, 113-16. See, also, Strype, *John Whitgift*, I, 321-22.

[42]For Beale and Morice, see note 38 above. For a similar distinction by Coke on the use of the oath by the Star Chamber and the High Commission, see 12 Coke's Reports 26 (1607). Wigmore, *Treatise on Evidence* (McNaughton rev.), VIII, 281, incorrectly traced the Star Chamber and its oath procedure to a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Too often the Star Chamber is loosely identified as the symbol of arbitrary, inquisitional procedure, the opposition to which gave rise to the right against self-incrimination. Thus Justice Black in his *Adamson* dissent spoke of the Star Chamber practice of compelling people to testify against themselves, and the same thought is in Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court in the recent *Miranda* case which extended the right against self-incrimination to the police station.[43]

Black in *Adamson*, Douglas in *Ullmann*, and Warren in *Miranda* referred to John Lilburne's Star Chamber trial of 1637 and his refusal to take the oath.[44] As these justices imply, Lilburne was more responsible than any other single individual for the recognition by the common-law courts of the right against self-incrimination. If any one man deserves to be remembered as the father of the right, it was he. But not because of his opposition to the oath in 1637. He said then, "Before I swear, I will know to what I must swear," and the court examiner replied, "As soon as you have sworn, you shall, but not before."[45] The fact is that in this case the Star Chamber had abandoned its normal procedure. Rather, it followed High Commission procedure, demanding the oath first instead of providing the written complaint first. As a result Lilburne refused the oath, claiming that he was the first ever to have done so before the Star Chamber[46]—proof that its procedure in that 1637 case was exceptional. Moreover, Lilburne remained silent only to incriminating questions that were not germane to the issue.[47] Justice Douglas' quotations from Lilburne in 1648 and 1653 against the oath[48] were redundant. Douglas should have

---

statute of 1487, misstated that procedure, and charged Coke with inconsistency in opposing the use of the oath in the High Commission. The best study of the Star Chamber is the introduction by C. G. Bayne in Bayne and W. H. Dunham (eds.), *Select Cases in the Council of Henry VII* (London, 1958, Selden Society Publications), LXXV, which corrects the common error concerning that statute of 1487.

[43] *Adamson* v. *California*, 88 n. 14; *Miranda* v. *Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436, 459 (1966).

[44] *Ibid.* for the remarks by Black and Warren; for Douglas, see *Ullmann* v. *United States*, 350 U.S. 422, 446-47 (1956).

[45] Trial of Lilburne, Howell (comp.), *State Trials*, III, 1315, 1318 (1637).

[46] Lilburne, *The Christian Mans Triall* (2d ed., London, 1641), 6.

[47] Trial of Lilburne, *State Trials*, III, 1318.

[48] The oath *ex officio* was abolished by Parliament in 1641, together with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quoted statements by Lilburne that even in the *absence* of the oath and *after* common-law indictment, Magna Carta and the Petition of Right protected a man from being examined on interrogatories concerning himself—"concerning," which is far broader than "incriminating."[49] Douglas should also have quoted Lilburne's claim, made during his trial for treason in 1649, that even after common-law indictment and without oath, he did not have to answer questions "against or concerning myself."[50] At that trial Lilburne placed the right against self-incrimination squarely in the context of what he called "fair play," "fair trial," "the due process of the law," and "the good old laws of England."[51] Justice Douglas gave to John Lilburne a page of his opinion in *Ullmann*, straining the evidence and never knowing that history provided him with stronger facts with which to construct his one-sided argument.

Douglas' respect for evidence, particularly historical evidence, has frequently been minimal when he has a libertarian theme to defend. In his *Ullmann* opinion he grossly distorted the evidence concerning an important episode in the colonial history of the right against self-incrimination. He mentioned that Governor Bradford of Plymouth sought the advice of his ministers on the question, "How farr a magistrate may extracte a confession from

---

the High Commission and Star Chamber. But in 1648, preliminary to Pride's purge of the Presbyterian members of Parliament, a special committee of Parliament conducted an investigation into the loyalty of members whose opinions were offensive to the army leaders. The committee's inquisitional conduct and its requirement that witnesses take an oath to tell the truth provoked opponents to condemn what they regarded as a revival of Star Chamber tactics. As a result, Leveller protests, like Lilburne's, were matched by those of their Presbyterian enemies, the new victims of Parliament. See J. Howldin, *The Lawes Subversion* (London, 1648), 6, 16; Theodorus Verax, *Anarchia Anglicana* (London, 1648), 53-60.

[49] Lilburne, *A Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel John Lilburne to a friend* (London, 1645), 2, 14; Lilburne, *Englands Birth-Right Justified Against all Arbitrary Usurpations* (London, 1645); in Haller (ed.), *Tracts on Liberty*, III, 263. The Presbyterians made a similar claim. Thus, Clement Walker declared, "... and our accusation beginneth with the examination of our persons, to make us state a charge against ourselves, to betray ourselves, and cut our owne throats with our tongues, contrary to Magna Carta, the Petition of Right," in Verax, *Anarchia Anglicana*, 57.

[50] Trial of Lilburne, *State Trials*, IV, 1269, 1292, 1340, 1341 (1649).

[51] *Ibid.*, 1292, 1340, 1341.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a delinquente, to acuse himselfe of a capitall crime, seeing *Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum.*"[52] Inexplicably, Douglas omitted the Latin phrase that both supported his argument and invalidated the generalization in *Twining*, based on the Anne Hutchinson case, that the right against self-incrimination was unknown. Three Plymouth ministers, Douglas said, were unanimous in concluding that the oath was illegal, and he quoted as "typical" only the answer of Ralph Partrich that the magistrate might not extract a confession "by any violent means," whether by oath or "punishment."[53] Douglas concealed the answer of Charles Chauncy who said,

> But now, if the question be mente of inflicting bodly torments to extract a confession from a mallefactor, I conceive that in maters of higest consequence, such as doe conceirne the saftie or ruine of stats or countries, magistrats may proceede so farr to bodily torments, as racks, hote-irons, &c. to extracte a confession, espetially wher presumptions are strounge; but otherwise by no means.[54]

Chauncy would not force self-incrimination by oath, but he would employ torture in matters such as sedition or treason and perhaps heresy. Douglas' account also omits the fact that John Winthrop, who received the opinions of the elders and magistrates of Massachusetts Bay, New Haven, and Connecticut, as well as of Plymouth, recorded that "most" answered that in a capital case if one witness or "strong presumptions" pointed to the suspect, the judge could examine him "strictly, and he is bound to answer directly, though to the peril of his life."[55] Douglas stressed the Puritan opposition to the oath, yet Samuel Maverick, when petitioning the General Court of Massachusetts in 1649 for a remission of the fines imposed on him for his part in the Robert Child Remonstrance, declared, "your whole proceeding against us seemes to depend on our refusall to answer Interrogatories upon oath."[56]

[52] *Bradford's History*, 465.

[53] Douglas said, "Partrich's answer is typical"; *Ullmann* v. *United States*, 448, and he cited the book by Bradford.

[54] *Bradford's History*, 472-73.

[55] James Savage (ed.), *The History of New England from 1630 to 1649. By John Winthrop* (Boston, 1853), II, 56.

[56] Maverick's petition is quoted in George Lyman Kittredge, "Dr. Robert Child the Remonstrant," *Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts*, XXI, Transactions, 1919, 58-59, n. 5, citing Massachusetts Archives (MS) B xxviii, 228a, dated May 8, 1649.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

However inept, ignorant, biased, or dishonest some justices may be as historians, the blame is less theirs than that of the professional historians. The Bill of Rights epitomizes one of our history's most noble and enduringly important themes, the triumph of individual liberty, yet has been one of the most neglected subjects of historical scholarship. There is no satisfactory study of the origins and framing of the first state bills of rights, nor of the national Bill of Rights; there are few studies of particular rights; and there was no book on the origins of the right against self-incrimination until 1968.[57] That latter fact is especially striking because the Court has assured us again and again that our understanding of the right is quite dependent upon history. Chief Justice Warren, for example, noting that the right "was hard-earned by our forefathers," declared that the "reasons for its inclusion in the Constitution—and the necessities for its preservation—are to be found in the lessons of history."[58] Yet the members of the Court, who understandably lack either the time or competence to do their own research, must turn to the work of lawyers for whatever illumination history might offer, because historians have defaulted. Chief Justice Warren, who denied—correctly, I think—that the Fifth is a historical relic, has had to rely primarily on the chapter in Wigmore's *Treatise on Evidence*, an unsympathetic account by one who regarded the Fifth as a historical relic.[59] Frankfurter's description of this classic, first published in 1904, as "a masterpiece of scholarship,"[60] is well deserved; yet Wigmore made many errors and ignored the American origins of the Fifth. An excellent corrective, the essay by Mary H. Maguire,[61] which also treats only the English side of the story, was long the only account by a historian until Levy and Leder published an article in a journal of history, the *William and Mary Quarterly*,[62]

[57] Leonard W. Levy, *Origins of the Fifth Amendment: The Right against Self-Incrimination* (New York, 1968).

[58] *Quinn* v. *United States*, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955).

[59] *Ibid.*, 162; Wigmore, *Treatise on Evidence* (2d ed.), IV, 819.

[60] Philip B. Kurland (ed.), *Of Law and Life and Other Things That Matter: Papers and Addresses of Felix Frankfurter, 1956-1963* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), 256.

[61] Mary Hume Maguire, "Attack of the Common Lawyers on the Oath *Ex Officio* As Administered in the Ecclesiastical Courts of England," in *Essays in Honor of Charles H. McIlwain* (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), 199-229.

[62] Leonard W. Levy and Lawrence H. Leder, "'Exotic Fruit': The Right

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which the Court apparently does not read. The justices read the law reviews. Except for the Levy-Leder article, the only account of the colonial background of the Fifth is the suggestive and much-cited, but shallow and unreliable, article published in 1935 in the *Virginia Law Review* by R. Carter Pittman of the Virginia bar.[63] Such is the scholarly literature on which the Court has based its own accounts.[64]

III

What illumination is available from the face of the Fifth? Its words include more than merely a right against self-incrimination, a phrase of modern origin. The clause in the Fifth is, "no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." In some respects that formulation is quite broad, because it protects against more than just compulsory self-incrimination or even disclosures merely tending to provide a link in a chain of circumstantial evidence that might be the basis of a prosecution. A person can also be a witness against himself in ways that do not incriminate him. He may, in a criminal case, injure his civil interests or disgrace himself in the public mind. Thus the Fifth could be construed on its face to protect against disclosures that expose one to either civil liability or infamy. The Fifth could also be construed to apply to an ordinary witness as well as to the

---

against Compulsory Self-Incrimination in Colonial New York," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., XX (1963), 3-32.

[63] R. Carter Pittman, "The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege against Self-Incrimination in America," *Virginia Law Review*, XXI (1935), 763-89.

[64] Other studies treating the background of the Fifth Amendment are either derivative or repetitive. The best of these is Edmund M. Morgan, "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination," *Minnesota Law Review*, XXXIV (1949), 1-45. See, also, John A. Kemp, "The Background of the Fifth Amendment in English Law," *William and Mary Law Review*, I (1958), 247-86; Charles H. Randall, "Sir Edward Coke and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination," *South Carolina Law Quarterly*, VIII (1956), 417-53; Stephan A. Riesenfeld, "Law-Making and Legislative Precedent in American Legal History," *Minnesota Law Review*, XXXIII (1949), 103-44; Lewis Mayers, "The Federal Witness' Privilege against Self-Incrimination: Constitutional or Common Law?" *American Journal of Legal History*, IV (1960), 107-41; Edward S. Corwin, "The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause," *Michigan Law Review*, XXIX (1930), 1-27; Franklin, "Encyclopédiste Origin," *Lawyers Guild Review*, XV, 41-62.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

criminal defendant himself. In Virginia, where the right against self-incrimination first received constitutional status, it appeared in a paragraph relating to the accused only.[65] But the Fifth Amendment is not similarly restrictive, unlike its Virginia precedent and unlike the Sixth Amendment which explicitly refers to the accused, protecting him alone. The location of the clause in the Fifth, rather than in the Sixth, and its reference to "no person," made it applicable to witnesses as well as to the accused.

On the other hand, the clause has a distinctively limiting factor: it is restricted on its face to criminal cases. The phrase "criminal case" seems to some to preclude more than the invocation of the right in civil or equity cases. In the minds of some judges and legal scholars, no criminal case exists until a formal charge has been made against the accused by indictment, information, or complaint before a magistrate.[66] Under such an interpretation the right would have no existence until the accused is put on trial; before that, when he is taken into custody, interrogated by the police, or examined by a grand jury, he would not have the benefit of the right. Nor would he have its benefit in a non-judicial

[65] "That in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence in his favor, and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of twelve men of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty; nor can he be compelled to give evidence against himself; that no man be deprived of his liberty, except by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers," Virginia Declaration of Rights, sect. 8, 1776, in Perry (ed.), *Sources of Our Liberties*, 312. Pennsylvania and North Carolina followed the same phraseology in 1776; Vermont did so in 1777. In 1780 Massachusetts also emulated Virginia, but referring to the criminal defendant said that no "subject" shall be compelled to "accuse, or furnish evidence against himself." New Hampshire copied Massachusetts in 1784. The constitutional provisions in Delaware and Maryland were significantly different from the Virginia model. In 1776 Delaware, instead of inserting the self-incrimination clause amidst the enumerated rights of the accused, gave it a separate section: "Sect. 15. That no man in the Courts of Common Law ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself." Maryland in 1776 did likewise, but provided for exceptions "in such cases as have been usually practised in this State, or may hereafter be directed by the Legislature." Perry (ed.), *Sources of Our Liberties*, reprints all relevant documents.

[66] See Corwin, "The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause," 2; Mayers, "The Federal Witness' Privilege against Self-Incrimination," 119; Charles T. McCormick, *Handbook of the Law of Evidence* (St. Paul, 1954), 258; and cases cited in notes 8-10.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proceeding like a legislative investigation or an administrative hearing. Moreover, despite what has been said about the language of the Fifth embracing a witness as well as the accused, some judges and legal scholars claim that its language protects only the accused.[67] Though the Supreme Court has held otherwise, the Court has also given the impression that the clause, if taken literally, does have that restrictive effect. But the Court refuses to take the clause literally. Of no other clause in the Constitution has the Court declared that it cannot mean what it seems to say. Thus, in *Counselman* v. *Hitchcock*, a major case on the Fifth decided in 1892, the Court held that the Fifth did protect ordinary witnesses, even in federal grand-jury proceedings.[68] Unanimously the Court declared, "It is *impossible* that the meaning of the constitutional provision can only be that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution against himself."[69] Although the Court did not explain why it was "impossible," the Court was right. Had the framers of the Fifth intended the literal, restrictive meaning, then their constitutional provision was a meaningless gesture because there was no need to protect the accused at his trial: he was not permitted to give testimony, whether for or against himself, at the time of the framing of the Fifth. Making the criminal defendant competent to be a witness in his own case, if he wanted to, was a reform of the later nineteenth century, beginning in the state courts with Maine's example in 1864, in the federal courts by an act of Congress in 1878.[70]

The Court has construed the clause as if its framers neither meant what they said nor said what they meant. Generally the Court has acted as if the letter killeth. Seeking the spirit and policy of the Fifth, the Court has, on the whole, given it an ever-

[67] Corwin, Mayers, and McCormick, as cited in preceding note. See, also, Wigmore, *Treatise on Evidence* (McNaughton rev.), VIII, 324; Claude R. Sowle, "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Principles and Trends," *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Political Science*, LI (1960), 132.

[68] 142 U.S. 547 (1892). The assault on the Counselman opinion in Mayers, "The Federal Witness' Privilege," 107, is historically unsound.

[69] *Counselman* v. *Hitchcock*, 562, emphasis added. Similarly, the Court said in *Ullmann* v. *United States*, 438, that the clause "is not to be interpreted literally."

[70] See *Ferguson* v. *Georgia*, 365 U.S. 570, 577 (1961), and Wigmore, *Treatise on Evidence* (McNaughton rev.), VIII, secs. 575-79.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

widening, liberal interpretation, on the principle that "it is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard."[71] In effect the Court has taken the position that the Fifth embodied the still evolving common law of the matter, rather than a precise rule of fixed meaning. State courts confronted by an even more restrictive constitutional clause, one expressly safeguarding only the criminal defendant, have also, and consistently, read it as if it were synonymous with broad common-law practices.[72] Indeed early state and federal decisions usually rested on the common law without reference to the constitutional provisions. In so doing the courts have been true to the intent of the framers of the Fifth and of its state constitutional equivalents. And in so doing the courts have also been true to the historical meaning of the right. The Supreme Court, in its liberal interpretations, has had the past on its side, but has not known it. Many apparent innovations are supported by old practices and precedents. Maybe Santayana was on the right track when he said that those who do not know history are doomed to repeat it.

IV

What, briefly, does history reveal about the scope and meaning of the Fifth? First, its framers meant to bequeath a large and still-growing principle. Madison, who introduced it, proposed the unqualified principle that no person should be a witness against himself.[73] Congress added the phrase, "in any criminal case,"[74]

[71] *Counselman* v. *Hitchcock*, 562.

[72] Pennsylvania provides the most striking example. The state constitution of 1776 had declared that "no man" should be compelled to give evidence against himself, but this clause appeared in the context of the rights of the accused. The state constitution of 1790 narrowed the clause by explicitly substituting "the accused" for "no man." Yet, in a case of 1802, counsel for defense argued that the clause in the 1790 constitution protected not only against answers tending to incriminate but also against those bringing the party into disgrace or infamy; and the state supreme court followed that argument, by dictum implying that such protection extended to witnesses as well as the accused. *Respublica* v. *Gibbs*, 3 Yeates (Pa.) 429, 437 (1802). In 1803, in a civil case, the same court held that no one could be forced to take the oath of a witness if his testimony tended to accuse him of an immoral act. *Galbreath* v. *Eichelberger*, 3 Yeates (Pa.) 515 (1803). For other cases, see below, notes 79, 81-82.

[73] Madison's speech, June 8, 1789, in *Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States* (*Annals of Congress*), 1st Cong., 1st Sess., I, 434.

[74] *Ibid.*, I, 753.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

probably—we are not sure—to permit the courts to compel a *civil* defendant to produce documents "against himself."[75] Such documents might injure his civil interest without infringing his traditional right not to produce them if they could harm him criminally.

Second, the right did extend to grand-jury proceedings. As early as 1681 John Sommers, the Lord Chancellor of England, took that for granted.[76] His book on the grand jury was reprinted in Boston in 1720 and, on the eve of the Revolution, in New York in 1773. An early federal circuit court opinion, not cited in *Counselman* v. *Hitchcock*, also took for granted that the right extended to a witness before a federal grand jury.[77]

Third, that the right extended to witnesses, as well as to the accused, can be traced to English cases of 1649 and 1679. Protection of the witness was invariably stated in American manuals of legal practice throughout the eighteenth century, as well as in English treatises, including the familiar works by Hawkins and Blackstone.[78]

Fourth, the right extended to both witnesses and parties in

[75] Charles Warren, "New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789," *Harvard Law Review*, XXXVII (1923), 49, 111, 116, 118, 130 n. 177; E. S. Maclay (ed.), *The Journal of William Maclay, United States Senator from Pennsylvania, 1789-1791* (New York, 1927), 90-92; *Geyger's Lessee* v. *Geyger*, 2 Dallas (Circ. Ct. Pa.) 332, 333 (1795); "Applicability of Privilege against Self-Incrimination to Legislative Investigations," *Columbia Law Review*, XLIX (1949), 92-93.

[76] John Somers, *The Security of Englishmens Lives, or the Trust, Power and Duty of Grand Juries of England* (London, 1681), reprinted in *A Guide to the Knowledge of the Rights and Privileges of Englishmen* (London, 1757), 170.

[77] Ex parte Lindo, #8,364, 15 Fed. Cases 556 (Circ. Ct. D.C., 1807).

[78] *State Trials*, IV, 989, 1101 (1649), and *ibid.*, VII, 296 (1679). For American manuals of practice, see (James Parker), *Conductor Generalis, Or the Office, Duty and Authority of Justices of the Peace* (New York, 1764), 167; (Richard Burn), *An Abridgment of Burn's Justice of the Peace* (Boston, 1773), 123; J. Davis, *The Office and Authority of a Justice of the Peace* (Newbern, No. Car., 1774), 159; Richard Starke, *The Office and Authority of a Justice of the Peace* (Williamsburg, Va., 1774), 146; (John F. Grimké), *The South-Carolina Justice of the Peace* (Philadelphia, 1788), 191; William W. Hening, *The New Virginia Justice* (Richmond, Va., 1795), 177. For English law books, see William Hawkins, *A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown* (London, 1716), II, 433; Matthew Bacon, *A New Abridgment of the Law* (Savoy, Eng., 1731), II, 288; Giles Jacob, *A New Law-Dictionary* (London, 1762), under title of "evidence"; William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (London, 1768), III, 370.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

civil as well as criminal cases if a truthful answer to the question might result in a forfeiture, penalty, or criminal prosecution. The proof consists of many English and early American state decisions.[79] In a little known aspect of the famous case of *Marbury* v. *Madison*, Chief Justice Marshall asked the Attorney General of the United States, Levi Lincoln, what he had done with Marbury's missing commission which he had had in his possession when serving as acting secretary of state. The Attorney General, who probably had burned the commission, refused to incriminate himself by answering, and the Supreme Court sustained him, though he was a witness in a civil suit.[80]

Fifth, there are many early state cases and one federal one showing that a witness in a civil suit did not have to answer questions against himself even if his answers would not incriminate but would merely affect his civil interests or property rights adversely. These far-fetched precedents have been abandoned.[81]

[79] For English authorities, see *Attorney General* v. *Mico*, 1 Hardres 123, 139-46 (1658); *Trevor* v. *Lesguire*, 1 Finch 72, 73 (1673); *Penrice* v. *Parker*, 1 Finch 75 (1673); *Bird* v. *Hardwicke*, 1 Vernon 109 (1682); *Att. Gen.* v. *Cresner*, 1 Parker 279 (1710); *Duncalf* v. *Blake*, 1 Atkyn 52, 53 (1737); *Smith* v *Read*, 1 Atkyn 526, 529 (1737); *Earl of Suffolk* v. *Green*, 1 Atkyn 450 (1739); *Jones* v. *Meredith*, 2 Comyns 661, 672 (1739); *Baker* v. *Pritchard*, 2 Atkyn 387, 389 (1742); 634, 635; *Boteler* v. *Allington*, 3 Atkyn 453, 457 (1746); *East India Co.* v. *Campbell*, 1 Vesey Sr. 246, 247 (1749); *Harrison* v. *Southcote*, 2 Vesey Sr. 389, 394-95 (1751); *Brownsword* v. *Edwards*, 2 Vesey Sr. 244, 245-46 (1751). For American authorities, see *Trammell* v. *Hook*, 1 Harris & McHenry (Md.) 259 (1767); *Marbury* v. *Madison*, 1 Cranch (U.S.) 137, 144 (1803); *Grannis* v. *Branden*, 5 Day (Conn.) 260, 272-74 (1812); *Taney* v. *Kemp*, 4 Harris & Johnson (Md.) 348 (1818). See, also, cases cited below, note 81.

[80] *Marbury* v. *Madison*, 1 Cranch (U.S.) 137 (1803). See, also, *McCarthy* v. *Arndstein*, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).

[81] *Simons* v. *Payne*, 2 Root (Conn.) 406 (1796); *Starr* v. *Tracy*, 2 Root (Conn.) 528, 529 (1797); *Connor* v. *Bradey*, Anthon's Nisi Prius Rep. (N.Y.) 135, 136 (1809). In Tennessee the court acknowledged that the state constitutional provision referred only to criminal cases, neglecting to notice that it also referred only to the "accused"; nevertheless the court declared, "but we think the principle existed previous to the Constitution" and applied it to a witness in a civil case who refused to answer on ground that his answer would be prejudicial to his interest civilly; *Cook* v. *Corn*, 1 Overton (Tenn.) 340, 341 (1808). See, also, *Bell's Case*, 1 Browne (Pa.) 376 (1811), where the court said, "I have always overruled a question that would affect a witness civilly, or subject him to a criminal prosecution: I have gone farther; and where the answer to a question would cover the witness with infamy and shame, I have refused to compel him to answer it." But in *Baird* v. *Cochran*,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sixth, along the same lines, there are many early state cases showing that neither witnesses nor parties were required to answer against themselves if to do so would expose them to public disgrace or infamy.[82] The origins of so broad a right of silence can be traced as far back as sixteenth-century claims by Protestant reformers like William Tyndale and Thomas Cartwright in connection with their argument that no man should be compelled to accuse himself.[83] The idea passed to the common lawyers, including Coke,[84] was accepted even in the Star Chamber as well as English case-law,[85] and found expression in Blackstone[86] and the American manuals of practice.[87] Yet the Supreme Court restricted the scope of the historical right when ruling that the

---

4 Sergeant & Rawle (Pa.) 397, 400 (1818), the preceding opinion was overruled, in effect, on the point that the witness need not answer against his interest civilly; otherwise, the opinion in *Bell's Case* was followed. For holdings, now the general rule, that the witness must answer questions against his interest though exposing himself to a civil suit, see *Taney* v. *Kemp*, 4 Harris & Johnson (Md.) 348 (1818), and *Planters' Bank* v. *Georgia*, 6 Martin O.S. (La.) 670 (1819). For a federal decision in accord with the earlier state decisions, see *Carne* v. *McLane*, #2,416, 5 Fed. Cases 89 (Circ. Ct. D.C., 1806).

[82] For Pennsylvania decisions, see the cases cited above, notes 72 and 81. See, also, *State* v. *Bailly*, 2 N.J. 396 (1807); *Vaughn* v. *Perrine*, 3 N.J. 299, 300 (1811); *Miller* v. *Crayon*, 2 Brevard (S. Car.) 108 (1806); *People* v. *Herrick*, 13 Johnson (N.Y.) 82 (1816). The English courts at this time were still applying the same rule; see, *Rex* v. *Lewis*, 4 Espinasse 225, 226 (1802); *Macbride* v. *Macbride*, 4 Espinasse 242, 243 (1802).

[83] William Tyndale, *The Obedience of a Christen Man* (1528), reprinted in Henry Walter (ed.), *Doctrinal Treatises and Introductions to Different Portions of the Holy Scriptures. By William Tyndale* (Cambridge, 1848), 355, where Tyndale said it was "a crule thing to break up into a man's heart, and to compel him to put either soul or body in jeopardy, or to shame himself." In 1584 Archbishop John Whitgift referred to a Puritan claim that "*nemo tenetur seipsum prodere, aut propriam turpitudinem revelare*" (no man is bound to accuse himself, or to reveal his own infamy); in Strype, *John Whitgift*, I, 319. See, also, the document of 1590 by Thomas Cartwright and others in Albert Peel and Leland H. Carlson (eds.), *Cartwrightiana* (London, 1951), 38 ff., and a document of about the same date in Thomas Fuller, *The Church History of Britain*, ed. J. S. Brewer (Oxford, 1845), V, 107-12.

[84] Morice, *A briefe treatise*, 8; 1 Coke's Institutes 158b, and 4 *ibid.* 279.

[85] Hudson, *Court of Star Chamber*, 208-09; Trial of Nathanael Reading, *State Trials*, VII, 259, 296-97 (1679); Trial of Peter Cook, *ibid.*, XIII, 311, 334-35 (1696); Trial of Jonathan Freind, *ibid.*, XIII, 1, 17 (1696); *East India Co.* v. *Campbell*, 1 Vesey Sr. 246 (1749).

[86] Blackstone, *Commentaries*, III, 363, 370.

[87] See note 78 above for the references to Parker, Burn, Davis, Starke, Grimké, and Hening, at the pages cited, for a standardized quotation from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Fifth did not protect against compulsory self-disgrace. Its decision to that effect in 1896[88] was oblivious to the history of the matter. In the 1956 *Ullmann* case reaffirming that precedent of 1896, Frankfurter for the Court stressed the importance of history, yet offered none, and, forgetting that the Constitution does not speak of merely a stunted right against self-incrimination, alleged that the "sole concern [of "the privilege against self-incrimination"] *as its name indicates*" [!] is with the danger of giving testimony leading to the infliction of criminal penalties.[89] History was on the side of Douglas and Black, dissenting, with respect to the question whether the "privilege" embraced public infamy, but they did not know it.

Seventh, from the standpoint of history, that 1896 case and its reaffirmation in 1956 were correctly decided on the main question, whether a grant of full immunity supersedes the witness' right to refuse answer on grounds of self-incrimination. As early as 1698 a Connecticut statute required testimony by providing immunity against prosecution for self-incriminatory disclosures.[90] Among the later colonial precedents are cases of 1758, when the Pennsylvania Assembly granted a witness immunity in exchange for his testimony,[91] and of 1763, when the Supreme Court of Judicature of New York offered pardons to some ships' captains in order to force them to testify about illicit trading with the enemy.[92]

Coke that "a witness alledging his own infamy or turpitude, is not to be heard."

[88] *Brown* v. *Walker*, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). There is little basis for the proposition in Wigmore, *Treatise on Evidence* (McNaughton rev.), VIII, 332, that a privilege against disclosing facts involving disgrace or infamy, irrespective of criminality, began later than and independent of the right against self-incrimination, nor for the companion proposition that in England the two were "never confused," that is, were unrelated. The three cases cited above in note 85 show the opposite, just as the evidence cited above in note 83 shows that the two "privileges"—against self-infamy and self-incrimination—were intimately allied in origin.

[89] *Ullmann* v. *United States*, 438, emphasis added.

[90] J. Hammond Trumbull and Charles J. Hoadly (eds.), *The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut* (Hartford, 1850-90), IV, 236.

[91] Gertrude MacKinney and Charles F. Hoban (eds.), *Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania (1682-1776)*, in *Pennsylvania Archives* (n.p., 1931-35), 8th Series, VI, 4679.

[92] MS Minute Book of the Supreme Court of Judicature, Oct. 19, 1762, to April 28, 1764, entries for Oct. 28, 1763, pp. 273, 289, Engrossed Minutes, Hall of Records, New York County, N.Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Eighth, history also supports the decision made by the Court for the first time in 1955 that the right extends to legislative investigations.[93] As early as 1645 John Lilburne, relying on his own reading of Magna Carta and the Petition of Right, claimed the right, unsuccessfully, before a Parliamentary committee, and the notion became commonplace in Leveller literature thereafter. In the mid-eighteenth century the two houses of Parliament were divided on the validity of such a claim.[94] On these shores, there were numerous instances of a witness claiming the right during an investigation conducted by a colonial assembly. Some assemblies, like that of Pennsylvania in 1756, explicitly recognized the validity of such a claim;[95] others, like that of New York in 1770, did not.[96] In the latter instance the Sons of Liberty were provoked into drinking to the toast, "No Answer to Interrogatories, when tending to accuse the Person interrogated."[97] A stronger precedent grew out of the investigation in 1778 by the Continental Congress into the corrupt schemes of Silas Deane, the diplomat. Deane invoked the right against self-incrimination, and Congress, it seems, voted that it was lawful for him to do so.[98]

Ninth, history belies the "two sovereignties" rule, a stunting restriction upon the Fifth introduced by the Court in 1931, but recently abandoned. The rule was that a person could not refuse to testify on ground that his disclosures would subject him to

[93] *Quinn* v. *United States*, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).

[94] See the pamphlets by Lilburne, in note 45 above, at pages cited. In 1742 Nicholas Paxton, the Solicitor of the Treasury, refused to answer incriminating questions before an investigating committee of Parliament. The Commons passed a bill of "indemnity" immunizing his testimony against prosecution, but the bill failed in the House of Lords. No one doubted at the time that the right against self-incrimination could lawfully be invoked before a legislative body. See "Debate on a Motion for Indemnifying Evidence," May 25, 1742, in *Gentleman's Magazine* (London), 511-25, 555-73, 611-16.

[95] MacKinney and Hoban (eds.), *Votes and Proceedings*, VI, 4445.

[96] Journal of the Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Colony of New York, 1769-1771, Public Records Office, Colonial Office Papers, Class 5, Vol. 1219, p. 8. Alexander McDougall, "To the Freeholders," *New-York Gazette: or, the Weekly Post-Boy*, Dec. 24, 1770.

[97] *New-York Gazette: or, the Weekly Post-Boy*, March 25, 1771.

[98] Letter of Gouverneur Morris, in *The Freeman's Journal, or North-American Intelligencer* (Philadelphia), June 14, 1781; see, also, the statement by Henry Laurens, president of the Continental Congress, April 21, 1779, in Edmund C. Burnett (ed.), *Letters of the Members of the Continental Congress* (Washington, 1928), IV, 166 n. 12, 168.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prosecution in another sovereignty or jurisdiction. Thus he could be convicted of a federal crime on the basis of testimony that he was required to give in a state proceeding, or *vice versa*. In matters involving national supremacy, Congress at its discretion could grant immunity against state prosecution, but not *vice versa*, nor could one state immunize against a prosecution in another. The Court mistakenly alleged that the "two sovereignties" rule had the support of historical precedents. History clearly contradicted that rule as the Court belatedly confessed when wholly scrapping it in 1964.[99]

Tenth, history supports the 1897 rule of the Court that in criminal cases in the federal courts—this was extended in 1964 to the state courts, too—whenever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because it is unvoluntary or coerced, the issue is controlled by the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth.[100]

[99] The "two sovereignties" rule was established in *United States* v. *Murdock*, 284 U.S. 141 (1931), following dicta in *Hale* v. *Henkel*, 201 U.S. 43, 69 (1906). See, also, *Fellman* v. *United States*, 322 U.S. 487 (1944), *Krapp* v. *Schweitzer*, 357 U.S. 371 (1958), and *Mills* v. *Louisiana*, 360 U.S. 230 (1959). In the Murdock case the Court declared: "The English rule of evidence against compulsory self-incrimination, on which historically that contained in the Fifth Amendment rests, does not protect witnesses against disclosing offenses in violation of the laws of another country. King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 7 St. Tr. (N. S.) 1050, 1068; Queen v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, 330." The Court did not know or note that the Willcox decision had in effect been overruled or, at the least, distinguished away by the Court of Chancery Appeal in *United States of America* v. *McRae*, L.R. 3 Ch. 79 (1867). In the latter case, defendant pleaded the danger of incriminating himself under United States laws, citing a statute that would have subjected his lands to forfeiture. The other "precedent" cited in *Murdock*, the Boyes case of 1868, was not in point and was inappropriately cited. The historic precedent was *East India Co.* v. *Campbell*, 1 Vesey Sr. 246 (1749), where the English court ruled that Campbell did not have to disclose whether goods were illegally acquired in India, because he might be sent to Calcutta for punishment. This case was unknown to the Supreme Court when it misstated the English rule in the Murdock case. See J.A.C. Grant, "Federalism and Self-Incrimination," *University of California Los Angeles Law Review*, IV (1957), 549-82, and *ibid.*, V (1958), 1-25; and Grant, "Immunity from Compulsory Self-Incrimination in a Federal System of Government," *Temple Law Quarterly*, IX (1935), 57-78. In 1964 the Supreme Court bowed to scholarship and confessed its errors, saying that there was no historical justification for its "two sovereignties" rule; the Court completely repudiated that rule as contrary to history and to the policy of the Fifth Amendment, in *Murphy* v. *Waterfront Commission of New York*, 378 U.S. 79 (1964).

[100] *Bram* v. *United States*, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); *Malloy* v. *Hogan*, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Partly because of Dean John H. Wigmore's intimidating influence and partly because of the rule of *Twining* denying that the Fourteenth Amendment extended the Fifth to the states, the Court until 1964 held that the coercion of a confession by state or local authorities violated the principle of due process of law rather than the right against self-incrimination.[101] Wigmore, the great master of evidence, claimed that the rule against coerced confessions and the right against self-incrimination had "no connection," the two being different in history, time of origin, principle, and practice. He was wrong.[102]

[101] Wigmore, *Treatise on Evidence* (3d ed.), III, 250 n. 5, declared that the rule of *Bram* v. *United States* "must be specially repudiated" because the Court had confused the right against self-incrimination and the rule excluding coerced confessions; "... that history should be rashly tampered with by asserting any common origin is inexcusable." *Brown* v. *Mississippi*, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) was the first of a long line of cases in which state-coerced confessions were held to violate due process of law.

[102] Wigmore, *Treatise on Evidence* (3d ed.), III, 249-50. Wigmore was excessively technical, literal-minded, and sweeping in his generalizations when contrasting the rule against coerced confessions and the right against self-incrimination. From the fact that a separate rule against coerced confessions emerged in English decisions of the eighteenth century, nearly a century after the right against self-incrimination had become established, he concluded that the two rules had *no* connection. That the two operated differently in some respects and had differing rationales in other respects led him to the same conclusion. But he focused on their differences only and so exaggerated those differences that he fell into numerous errors and inconsistencies of statement. See Morgan, *Basic Problems of Evidence*, 129-31, and John M. Maguire, *Evidence of Guilt: Restrictions upon Its Discovery or Compulsory Disclosure* (Boston, 1959), 15-17. McCormick, under Wigmore's influence, declared that the language in *Bram* v. *United States*, to the effect that the Fifth Amendment privilege "was but a crystallization of the doctrine as to confessions," was "an historical blunder." Yet McCormick sensibly added, "Nevertheless, the kinship of the two rules is too apparent for denial. It is significant that the shadow of the rack and the thumbscrew was part of the background from which each rule emerged." *Handbook of the Law of Evidence*, 155. In support of the proposition that the disappearance of torture and the recognition of the right against compulsory self-incrimination were victories in the same political struggle, McCormick cited William Holdsworth, *A History of English Law* (London, 1903 ff.), V, 184-87, and A. Lawrence Lowell, "The Judicial Use of Torture," *Harvard Law Review*, XI (1897), 220-33, 290-300. McCormick's point was well made. The relationship between torture, *compulsory* self-incrimination, and *coerced* confessions was a historical fact as well as a physical and psychological one. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the argument against the three, resulting in the rules that Wigmore said had no connection, overlapped. Compulsory self-incrimination was always regarded by its opponents as a species of torture. An act of 1696 regulating

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Finally, history is ambiguous on the controversial issue of current interest, whether the right against self-incrimination extends to the police station. When justices of the peace performed police functions and conducted the preliminary examination of suspects, the interrogation was inquisitorial in character, as it is in the interrogation room of the police station today, and it usually had as its object the incrimination of the suspect. Yet he could not be examined under oath, and he did have a lawful right to withhold the answer to incriminating questions. On the other hand he had no right to be apprised that he need not answer, nor be cautioned that his answers could be used against him—not until the mid-nineteenth century in England. However, the right against self-incrimination began as a protest against incriminating interrogation *prior* to formal accusation. That is, the maxim *nemo tenetur seipsum prodere* originally meant that no one was obligated to supply the evidence which could be used to indict him. Thus, from the very inception of the right, a suspect could invoke it at the earliest

---

treason trials required that confessions must be made willingly, without violence, and in open court; 7 & 8 Wm. III, chap. 3, sect. 2, *Statutes of the Realm*, VII, 6. In 1730 the editor of the collected state trials observed that in other countries torture was used to coerce confessions, "but this is a practice which Englishmen are happily unacquainted with, enjoying the benefit of that just and reasonable Maxim, *Nemo tenetur accusare seipsum*." *State Trials*, I, xxv. Similarly, Baron Gilbert, writing before 1726, declared that though the best evidence of guilt was a confession, "this Confession must be voluntary and without Compulsion; for our Law in this differs from the Civil Law, that it will not force any Man to accuse himself. . . ." *Law of Evidence*, 139-40. When the rule against coerced confessions emerged its rationale was that a coerced confession is untrustworthy evidence. Trial of Matthew Mahoney, *State Trials*, XVII, 1003, 1053 (1741); *Rex* v. *Warickshall*, 1 Leach's Crown Cases 263 (1783). There remained, however, an indissoluble and crucial nexus with the right against self-incrimination, because both involved coercion or the involuntary acknowledgment of guilt. Significantly, the few references to the right against self-incrimination in the debates on the ratification of the Constitution identify the right with a protection against torture and inquisition, that is, against coerced confessions. See Elliot (ed.), *Debates*, II, 111 and III, 447-48, 451-52; Maclay (ed.), *Journal of William Maclay*, 90-92. Wigmore fell into error by assuming that the right against self-incrimination had a single rationale and a static meaning. In fact it always had several rationales, was an expanding principle of law, and spun off into different directions. One off-shoot was the development of a separate rule against coerced confessions. If there was "an historical blunder," it was made by the English courts of the eighteenth century when they divorced the confessions rule from the self-incrimination rule.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stages of his interrogation.[103] In its *Miranda* decision in 1966 the Supreme Court expanded the right beyond all precedent, yet not beyond its historical spirit and purpose. The Court ruled that the Fifth requires that the police fully and clearly apprise the suspect of his constitutional rights. He must understand that he has a right to remain silent, that his answers may be used against him, that he is entitled to counsel in the police station in order to protect his right under the Fifth, that he can forestall all questioning until counsel is present, that the state will provide counsel if he is indigent, and that he may not waive these rights except knowingly and intelligently.[104]

The ghost of John Lilburne wrote that opinion. Its purpose is to eliminate the inherently coercive and inquisitional atmosphere of the interrogation room and to guarantee that any incriminating admissions are made voluntarily. That purpose—to overcome inquisitions and insure that confessions are the product of free choice—is, historically, the heart of the Fifth, the basis of its policy. Even the guarantee of counsel to effectuate that purpose has precedent in a historical analogy: the development of the right to counsel originally safeguarded the right against self-incrimination at the trial stage of a prosecution. When the defendant lacked counsel, he had to conduct his own case, and though he was not put on the stand and did not have to answer incriminating questions, his failure to rebut accusations and insinuations by the prosecution prejudiced the jury, vitiating the right to silence. The right to counsel permitted the defendant's lips to remain sealed; his "mouthpiece" spoke for him.[105] In the *Miranda* case the Court extended the protection of counsel to the earliest stage of a criminal action, when the need is the greatest because the suspect is most vulnerable.

History, Frankfurter once wrote, presents a body of experience expressing the judgment of its time, but history does not save the Supreme Court "from the necessity for judgment in giving past

[103] On the preliminary examination conducted by justices of the peace, see James Fitzjames Stephen, *A History of the Criminal Law of England* (London, 1883), I, 219-26. See, also, Yale Kamisar, "Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure," in Kamisar *et al.*, *Criminal Justice in Our Time* (Charlottesville, Va., 1965), 18-30.

[104] *Miranda* v. *Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

[105] Stephen, *A History of the Criminal Law*, I, 416, 424-25, 440.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

history present application."[108] Whether the Court's opinions ought to rely upon the wisdom and insights of the past in relation to the right in question is not the issue here. The issue is whether the Court has used the evidence of history knowledgeably and responsibly in its Fifth Amendment opinions. It has not. Yet, without knowing it, by blunder or instinct the Court has handed down opinions that have had a strong ally in history in keeping the Fifth "as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard."

[108] Felix Frankfurter and Thomas Corcoran, "Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury," *Harvard Law Review*, XXXI (1926), 917, 982.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Social Mobilization, Political Participation, and the Rise of Juan Perón*

PETER H. SMITH
University of Wisconsin

Much of the persisting bewilderment over the strength of *Peronismo* in contemporary Argentina derives from the remarkable relationship between *El Líder* and the country's urban masses. More than a decade after his unceremonious exit from the country, Juan Perón continues to exert an almost mystical influence over large portions of the urban lower class.[1] Skeptics frequently insist that his transatlantic appeal is based on the practical need of trade-union leaders for a unifying symbol, the persisting results of collective "brainwashing," misleading identification of Perón with immediate postwar prosperity, or nostalgic recollections of both his rhetorical ability and his extraordinary wife Evita. Explanations of this kind doubtless have some validity,

* This paper is derived from a larger study on political conflicts relating to the Argentine beef industry, undertaken with the generous aid of the Social Science Research Council and the Foreign Area Fellowship Program.

[1] In this essay the concept of "class" is based on the composite distribution of *social* and *economic* power, with political power treated as a separate category. On these grounds I distinguish between four strata: (1) the wealthy and prestigious upper class or "aristocracy," including some descendants of prominent families who have lost their economic fortunes; (2) the upper middle class, prosperous but not prestigious; (3) the lower middle class, neither wealthy nor prominent; and (4) the poor and neglected lower class or "masses." Class consciousness is regarded as a catalyst to action, and not as part of this operational definition.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but they fail to answer one basic question: How did Perón gain the support and devotion of the urban masses in the first place?[2]

It is not as though he had been a life-long crusader for social reform. Raised in the lower middle class, Perón was essentially a military man of great ambition. In June 1943, at the age of forty-seven, he took part in a military coup which promptly set up a right-wing dictatorship. In March 1944 he sparked a colonel's revolt against the conservative leadership. As Edelmiro Farrell stepped into the presidency, Perón took over both the vice-presidency and the Ministry of War—in addition to his position in the Department of Labor and Social Security, which he had run since October 1943. With this multiple leverage he forged a formidable alliance between the military and the working-class *descamisados* (literally, "shirtless ones") of the city. After falling out with Farrell, he launched his "impossible candidacy"[3] for the presidency and won the 1946 elections with a thumping fifty-six per cent majority. In retrospect it is quite clear that Perón exploited the working class for the sake of his own ambitions. But this still begs the original question: Why were the urban masses so vulnerable? Why did they support Perón? Why did they regard his allegedly "fascist" and "totalitarian" regime as a legitimate government?[4]

[2] I emphasize the *urban* masses because of their continuing visibility, volubility, and importance, though Perón also drew strong support from rural masses in the early nineteen-forties. For some conflicting views on the general question of Perón's popularity, see Joseph R. Barager (ed.), *Why Perón Came to Power: The Background to Peronism in Argentina* (New York, 1968).

[3] See Robert J. Alexander, *The Perón Era* (New York, 1951), 42-53.

[4] American writers have frequently identified Perón's "Nazi" leanings with "totalitarian" government. See Alexander, *Perón Era*, and George I. Blanksten, *Perón's Argentina* (Chicago, 1953); the tendency is somewhat less marked in such recent works as James R. Scobie, *Argentina: A City and a Nation* (New York, 1964), and Arthur P. Whitaker, *Argentina* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1964). An excellent comparison between fascism and *Peronismo* is given in Gino Germani, *Política y sociedad en una época de transición: de la sociedad tradicional a la sociedad de masas* (Buenos Aires, 1963), 233-52. In fact there is good reason to believe that Perón's rule was essentially "authoritarian" rather than "totalitarian," according to the typology set forth by Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in Erik Allardt and Yrjo Littunen (eds.), *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology* (Helsinki, 1964), 291-341.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Social Mobilization and Political Participation

In an effort to examine such problems, the following essay seeks to explore the political status of the urban lower class in the years preceding and immediately after Perón's rise to power. Using Karl W. Deutsch's terminology, this interpretation will focus on the process of "social mobilization," that is, "an overall process of change, which happens to substantial parts of the population in countries which are moving from traditional to modern ways of life." The concept refers not to isolated changes in the experience, needs, and behavior of affected groups, but to recurrent clusters and patterns of such alterations. Presumably, the intensity and direction of the process can be gauged by quantitative measurements. The essential point, for both Deutsch and this paper, is that social mobilization can cross a "threshold of criticality" and lead expanding parts of the population to seek political power.[5]

Available data on Argentina's social mobilization are summarized in the following tables, which show that urbanization, industrialization, internal migration, literacy, and average living standards all increased markedly between about 1914 and 1947. Of special significance is not only the relative increase in mobilization, which is fairly slight in some areas, but the absolute increase; total population, urbanization, and the number of people employed in nonagricultural occupations more than doubled during this period. As an index of urban voting strength and self-identification, it should also be noted that the proportion of native-born residents

[5] Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, LV (1961), 493-514. Though this scheme can be usefully applied to Argentina, as I hope to show, its meaning should be qualified in two important ways. First, there is no *automatic* connection between social mobilization and political participation; nor is there any universal index (quantitative or even qualitative) to the criticality threshold. On this point, see Alfred Stepan, "Political Development Theory: The Latin American Experience," *Journal of International Affairs*, XX (1966), 223-34. Second, modernization does not follow a single track along which progress can be statistically measured, as Deutsch appears to imply. Different *kinds* of modernization have been amply demonstrated in such works as S. N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1966); Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston, 1966); and C. E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History* (New York, Evanston, and London, 1966).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in Greater Buenos Aires rose from merely fifty-one per cent in 1914 to seventy-four per cent in 1947.

TABLE 1

Social Mobilization: Economic Indicators, 1910-14 and 1945-49

(Yearly Averages)

	1910-14	*1945-49*
Average GNP (millions of 1950 pesos)	19.9	57.0
Manufacturing as % of GNP	15.6	23.5
Agriculture, Stockraising as % of GNP	25.2	18.5
Per Capita Income (1950 pesos)	2376	3556
"Economically Active" Population (millions)	3.1	6.3
Work Force in Non-Agricultural Occupations (millions)	2.0	4.5
% Total Work Force in Non-Agricultural Occupations	65.8	70.8

Sources: United Nations (Economic Commission for Latin America), *El desarrollo económico de la Argentina* (Mexico, 1959), I, 15. Guido di Tella and Manuel Zymelman, "Etapas del desarrollo económico argentino," in Torcuato S. di Tella *et al.*, *Argentina, sociedad de masas* (Buenos Aires, 1965), 192.

TABLE 2

Social Mobilization: Demographic Indicators, 1914 and 1947

	1914	*1947*
Total Population (millions)	7.9	15.9
% of Total in Cities of 20,000 or more	36	47
Population of Greater Buenos Aires (millions)	1.9	4.6
Population of Greater Buenos Aires (as % total)	24	28
% Native-Born Residents in Greater Buenos Aires	51	74
% Internal Migrants in Greater Buenos Aires	11	29
Literacy Rate (% age 14 and over)	65	86

Sources: Gino Germani, *Estructura social de la Argentina: análisis estadístico* (Buenos Aires, 1955), 21, 58, 68-69, 231; *idem*, *Política y sociedad en una época de transición* (Buenos Aires, 1963), 187, 230.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What effect did these developments have on national politics? As many scholars have shown,[6] Argentina's economic growth in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led to the appearance of large and disparate "middle classes," some of whose members joined with other groups to form the Radical party. Winning the presidency away from the landed aristocracy in the elections of 1916, the Radicals maintained political supremacy until 1930, when Hipólito Yrigoyen was ousted by a military coup. From that time until 1943, the country was run by a conservative and pro-aristocratic coalition known as the Concordancia.

While Argentina's social mobilization thus helped bring effective political participation to some segments of the *middle* classes, the *lower* class was virtually excluded from politics. It is true that eligible members of the lower class voted in elections. Table 3 shows how the electorate grew between 1912 and 1946 in the nation as a whole and in the city of Buenos Aires, which gradually accumulated a truly "mass" political audience.[7] Until the tumultuous election of 1946 voter participation in the capital city, with its large lower-class population, was consistently higher than the national average. Before 1930, however, lower-class voters seem to have been responding to political initiatives of the upper and middle classes in a generally passive way: this was "political participation," as Deutsch would say, but of minimal quality. After that date their posture appears to have become more active and aggressive—as indicated by Buenos Aires' repeated opposition to the pro-aristocratic Concordancia.[8]

[6] Notably John J. Johnson, *Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors* (Stanford, 1958), and Ezequiel Gallo (h.) and Silvia Sigal, "La formación de los partidos políticos contemporáneos: la U.C.R. (1890-1916)," in Torcuato S. di Tella *et al.*, *Argentina, sociedad de masas* (Buenos Aires, 1965), 124-76.

[7] The progressive decline in the proportion of unnaturalized immigrants greatly expanded the electorate. In the presidential elections of 1916, barely fifty per cent of the adult male population was registered to vote; in 1946, about seventy-three per cent was registered. Ministerio del Interior (Argentina), *Las fuerzas armadas restituyen el imperio de la soberanía popular* (Buenos Aires, 1946), I, 368, II, 431-548; and Dirección Nacional del Servicio Estadístico, *IV° censo general de la Nación* [1947] (Buenos Aires, 1949), I, 5.

[8] See data in Ministerio del Interior, *Las fuerzas armadas*, I, 464, 476, 589-90. Incidentally, the time lag between the activation of the middle and lower classes suggests that it might be useful to correlate political participation of different socio-economic strata or groups with their respective "criticality

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 3

Participation in Selected Elections, 1912-46[a]

Year	Nation		City of Buenos Aires	
	Registered (Thousands)	*% Voted*	*Registered (Thousands)*	*% Voted*
1912	934	68.6	126	84.1
1920	1,445	53.1	222	73.0
1928	1,808	80.9	304	91.6
1934	2,395	65.1	415	80.2
1938	2,745	67.9	492	77.9
1940	partial elections	70.1	509	80.9
1946	3,480	82.2	694	82.9

Source: Ministerio del Interior, *Las fuerzas armadas*, 2 Vols. (Buenos Aires, 1946), I, 331, 340, 383-87, 427-28, 481, 592-95, 600, 602; II, 431-548.
[a] Data for the 1940 elections in the province of San Luis have been added to the national totals for 1934 and 1938, as that province did not hold elections in those years. The elections of 1928 and 1946 were for the presidency.

Under Argentina's Constitution, which greatly resembled that of the United States, the urban masses could press their demands through two main institutions: the popularly elected Municipal Council of Buenos Aires or the national Congress, which had gained considerable recognition as a relatively open arena for political competition. Competent and articulate leadership for their cause was offered by the Socialist party, which frequently controlled the Municipal Council and had sizable delegations in the Congress.[9] In 1932, despite widespread allegations of electoral fraud, the Socialists obtained one-quarter of the seats in the national Chamber of Deputies. Urban concentration during the Depression promised to bring the masses increased electoral strength. From a purely for-

thresholds," thus modifying Deutsch's own hypothesis in "Social Mobilization," 497.

[9] Though some Socialists were middle class in origin and outlook, the party appears to have been recognized as a significant vehicle for the promotion of lower-class political interests—partly because it was the only one. Furthermore, the moderate faction had split off in 1927 to form the "Independent Socialists," thus leaving the Socialist party in the hands of the mainly pro-lower-class group. For data on Socialist representation in Congress, see Eduardo Zalduendo, *Geografía electoral de la Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1958), 226-27.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mal standpoint, it looked as though the swelling lower class would be able to find legal and adequate outlets for the effective expression of its political interests.

But what happened when spokesmen for the urban lower class made explicit demands on Argentina's political system in the nineteen-thirties? It has frequently been noted that democratic institutions and procedures formed a mere "façade" in the 1930-43 period. But did political leaders ever try to promote lower-class interests, as they were perceived, through the existing systems? If so, how did it actually operate? How did upper-class leaders respond to pressures from the lower class? And how did such developments contribute to the rise of Perón?

In order to deal with these questions this paper will now analyze the political activity of two lower-class groups connected with the Argentine beef industry: the consumers of municipal Buenos Aires and the workers in the packinghouses, mostly located in the city's suburbs. While this approach is undoubtedly limited, it allows us to study specific conflicts relating to one of the country's most important economic sectors. It allows us to treat the urban lower class both as an amorphous, unorganized group (consumers)[10] and as a coherent, unionized group (workers). It allows us to discern some power relationships between these lower-class elements and two groups of long-standing prominence—cattlemen, who formed the backbone of the country's aristocracy, and managers of the private and foreign-owned packinghouses. And it allows us to take a close look at the meatpackers' union, which, as we shall see, played a critical role in Perón's rise to prominence and the presidency. Despite its disadvantages this analysis should provide a suggestive basis for generalization about Perón's connection with the urban masses.

The Consumers and the City Council

As a group the urban consumers did not display any notable economic or political power before the nineteen-thirties. Though

[10] Though members of the middle classes could also be regarded as "consumers," they tended to identify with the producers and were not predominant anyway. Gino Germani estimates that fifty-eight per cent of the people in Greater Buenos Aires belonged to the lower class in 1947. *Estructura social de la Argentina: análisis estadístico* (Buenos Aires, 1955), 210.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the domestic market accounted for roughly seventy per cent of total beef production, consumers had no cooperative arrangements or other organized means of asserting their potential economic influence. This weakness became painfully apparent in the post-Depression period. Along with the cost of living, prices for beef climbed from an average of forty-seven centavos per kilo in 1932 to eighty-five centavos per kilo in 1945.[11] In a country that was famous for its cattle, beef was becoming difficult to buy.

The highly carnivorous Argentines promptly sought to remedy these economic ills through political action, first on the municipal level. It should be noted that ordinances of the City Council were subject to the veto of the mayor, appointed by the president. Possibilities for conflict were particularly apparent in the nineteen-thirties, when national politics was dominated by the conservative Concordancia and the most vocal (if not always the largest) group in the Buenos Aires City Council belonged to the Socialist party.

The pattern of struggle was first revealed in 1932, when an aristocratic mayor named Romulo S. Naón proposed nationalization of the city-owned slaughterhouse. Socialists in the Council bitterly opposed the scheme, loudly proclaiming that it would benefit upper-class cattlemen at the expense of the consumers and (to a lesser extent) the workers in the slaughterhouse. As José M. Penelón declared, urban Buenos Aires would once more become "the specially sacrificed victim of . . . the stockmen and the speculators in land."[12] Despite this opposition Naón's recommendation was adopted by the national Congress as part of a law to promote cattle-raising interests.[13]

In March of the following year a new mayor—Mariano de Vedia y Mitre, another scion of the landed aristocracy—decreed a change in the working schedule at the municipal slaughterhouse

[11] Junta Nacional de Carnes, *Estadísticas básicas* (Buenos Aires, 1964), 8, 13-14.

[12] Concejo Deliberante de la Municipalidad de Buenos Aires, *Diario de Sesiones* (hereafter, Concejo Deliberante), Oct. 6, 1932, III, 3210.

[13] The Socialists protested again after the passage of the Meat Law, but without success. Concejo Deliberante, Dec. 28, 1933, IV, 4688. Though the plan for nationalization was later abandoned, it was not so much the result of consumer pressure as a policy decision by Horacio Bruzone, president of the Meat Board. Junta Nacional de Carnes, *Informe de la labor realizada desde el 1° de enero de 1934 hasta el 30 de septiembre de 1935* (Buenos Aires, 1935), 64.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which meant that its beef would reach the markets one day after slaughter. Speaking for the consumers again, Socialists complained that the measure would give private and mainly foreign-owned packinghouses a commercial advantage—and lead to a rise in retail prices. After a Socialist move to override the decree was defeated by only one vote (15-14), the Council unanimously approved another proposal to create a committee to investigate the municipal beef business. On the somewhat specious grounds of imprecise language, however, De Vedia y Mitre vetoed the resolution.[14]

Conflicts between the Council and the mayor soon became a political routine. Late in 1933 Socialists sponsored a measure to expand the city slaughterhouse's control over the local market and presumably keep prices down; the bill was passed by a two-thirds vote, then vetoed by the mayor. In 1934 the Council approved a Socialist plan to give the municipal slaughterhouse an outright monopoly over the urban market by thirteen votes against seven; the mayor promptly vetoed it. In 1935 a non-partisan proposal to reorganize and strengthen the municipal slaughterhouse was quickly passed, and just as quickly vetoed. In 1937 the mayor vetoed still another ordinance requiring that all beef from the private packinghouses be given hygienic inspections by agents of the city slaughterhouse.[15]

On the municipal level, political efforts in favor of urban consumers met with repeated frustration. The ruling group made not a single concession. As De Vedia y Mitre explained one of his de-

[14] Concejo Deliberante, May 11, 1933, I, 616; May 12, 655-56; June 2, II, 842-44. Fernando Ghío later claimed a Socialist victory in the battle over day-old meat. *Ibid.*, July 10, 1934, I, 959. De Vedia y Mitre apparently revoked the original decree through his own volition, though, rather than as a result of consumer complaints.

[15] Concejo Deliberante, Sept. 15, 1933, III, 1904-05; Oct. 10, 2323; Oct. 27, 2841-43; Nov. 14, IV, 3330; July 10, 1934, I, 958-70; July 27, II, 1247-48, 1289, 1291; July 31, 1446; Aug. 10, 1682-88; Aug. 16, 1935, II, 1592-1609; Sept. 17, III, 1727; Oct. 15, 1937, III, 2270-72; Nov. 30, 3079-87, 3099; Dec. 17, IV, 3541-42; Dec. 23, 3829-33. But the mayor did not oppose the Council on issues which posed no potential threat to the stockmen or the leading packing plants. A bill against the clandestine entry of meat into Buenos Aires was easily passed through a nonpartisan commission without any perceptible opposition from the mayor. *Ibid.*, Nov. 16, 1934, III, 2878-79; Dec. 7, IV, 3417. Another bill whose main effect would be to tighten hygienic regulations was passed by the Council and apparently approved by the mayor. *Ibid.*, Dec. 11, 1934, IV, 3477-84.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cisions, "any measure which ties up the commercial development [of the Buenos Aires meat market] can impinge upon one of the most important sources of the country's wealth, the production of livestock."[16] Liberally interpreted this meant that De Vedia y Mitre, even as a municipal official, would take no action in behalf of consumers that was prejudicial to the cattlemen. If the consumers and their leaders were to gain access to an effective decision-making apparatus, they would have to look outside the City Council.[17]

Consumers and the Congress

As if in recognition of this situation, consumer spokesmen turned to the national Congress. In June 1937 a Socialist deputy requested information on the rising cost of living from the Concordancia administration. The next year Nicolas Repetto—one of Argentina's leading Socialists and parliamentarians—claimed that beef prices were being driven up by a cattlemen's cooperative packinghouse (Corporación Argentina de Productores de Carne, known from its Spanish initials as the CAP) and the National Meat Board, both established under the 1933 Meat Law. The state, he implied, was protecting the producers at the expense of the consumers.[18]

Despite the passage of a general law for the control of retail prices,[19] consumer resentment against the Meat Law and especially the CAP mounted rapidly during the early nineteen-forties. In 1941 when the Minister of Agriculture was forced to explain the rise of meat prices to the Chamber of Deputies, Socialists and even some Radicals charged that consumer interests had been neglected by the government. Silvio Ruggieri bluntly denied the Minister's assertion that an excessive number of butcher shops had pushed up the prices for beef, claiming instead that "the great producers' corporations and the wholesale distributors are the ones

[16] *Ibid.*, Dec. 17, 1937, IV, 3542.

[17] In the name of consumers, another upper-class mayor later proposed and gained approval of a plan to put more beef from the private packinghouses on the municipal market—a plan which would clearly help the producers as well. *Ibid.*, May 12, 1942, I, 51-52; June 2, 154-55.

[18] Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, *Diario de Sesiones* (hereafter, Diputados), June 10, 1937, I, 598; July 13, 1938, II, 741-44.

[19] *Ibid.*, "Leyes sancionadas," 1939, V, 290-91.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

who determine the rise in prices. . . ." As a result, insisted this Socialist, state action was needed to help the consumer.[20]

Congress was deeply concerned about the price of beef in 1942. Within a fortnight a Radical proposed a special investigation of the meat market; a delegate from Córdoba suggested a subsidy fund; Socialists presented a plan for stricter price controls; and spokesmen from stockraising areas advocated a greater role for the CAP in the local meat market.[21] In addition three young intellectuals from Buenos Aires sent a learned and lengthy memorandum to Congress, pinning the blame for the price rise squarely upon the CAP.[22] But as stockmen confronted consumers no positive action was taken.

This congressional deadlock was broken by executive decree in 1943, when President Ramón Castillo gave responsibility for retail beef prices to the CAP—of all institutions.[23] An organization which had been completely dedicated to raising livestock prices now assumed the supposed task of lowering the market price of beef. A measure that was nominally taken in behalf of the consumers placed the domestic trade under the control of the producers.

Under existing political conditions, the consumers and their spokesmen were unable to make any headway. Efforts to work through established governmental institutions were utterly futile. The City Council was blocked by the mayor. Parliamentary demands made no impression on a Congress which, under the Concordancia, was losing its role as an open arena for competition. And the executive favored the producers. Highly mobilized and actively seeking political power, Buenos Aires' urban consumers needed a meaningful way of promoting their interests, perhaps through a whole new political system.

The Consumers and the Revolution

It was after the 1943 coup that the consumers began to get some governmental attention, though this was not clear during the first

[20] *Ibid.*, Aug. 27-28, 1941, III, 485-99, 515-55.

[21] *Ibid.*, May 29, 1942, I, 145-47, 171-72; June 3, 579-81; June 12, 860-61.

[22] José Mármol, Horacio Giberti, and Ricardo Olivari, *Por qué está cara la carne* (Buenos Aires, 1942).

[23] The text of the decree appears in Junta Nacional de Carnes, *Síntesis de la labor desarrollada, 1933-1945* (Buenos Aires ,1945), 95-97. Also see the explanation in the newspaper *Edición Rural*, March 26, 1943.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stage of conservative military rule. Along with all the provincial governments and other major institutions, the CAP was taken over by the new national authorities. The meaning of this move was hard to ascertain. Aristocratic leaders of the Argentine Rural Society maintained a diplomatic public silence, while other stockmen expressed the hope that this action would strengthen the CAP.[24] It looked as though cattlemen were keeping control.

After the conservative leaders were ousted by Perón's clique of colonels in 1944, however, the state began to demonstrate positive concern for the lot of urban consumers. Late that year the Farrell administration announced its intention to place the CAP at the service of the consumers and not the producers. Cattlemen stoutly resisted this plan,[25] but eventually had to settle for a draw. In early 1946 the government declared that the CAP would henceforth be considered a "semi-official" entity and not the exclusive property of cattlemen, thus placing strict limits on any efforts to drive up livestock and beef prices.[26]

Rising pressure from the consumers—or, rather, their defenders in the Farrell administration—even influenced the policy of the National Meat Board, governed by prominent cattlemen. In June 1944 a permanent classification and grading scheme was applied to the domestic trade, assuring purchasers of the quality and proper price of beef. That same month limits were placed on the canning of meat for export so that more would be available for local consumption, and at lower prices. And in July the Meat Board suggested a new schedule of price ceilings that was promptly applied by the national government.[27] Though none of these measures threatened the interests of the stockmen to any great degree, they still showed some concern for the consumers.

Thus Argentina's urban consumers finally gained effective representation in the political sphere under the Farrell administration, whose dominant figure was Juan Domingo Perón. This long-awaited political power was neither direct nor constitutional: it was found in decisions from above, imposed on the country by dictatorship. But in contrast to previous times, when consumer

[24] *Edición Rural*, March 8, 1944.
[25] *Anales de la Sociedad Rural Argentina*, LXXVIII (1944), 709-14.
[26] *Edición Rural*, Feb. 20, 1946.
[27] Junta Nacional de Carnes, *Síntesis*, 35-40.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

interests were politely expressed by parliamentary delegations, pro-consumer action was successful.

Packinghouse Workers and Parliament

Like the consumers, packinghouse workers displayed little political activity before the nineteen-thirties. A strike in 1917 was broken by the combined efforts of management and the Radical government of Hipólito Yrigoyen.[28] Despite continued grievances the laborers remained passive until 1932, when they staged another strike; this one, too, was broken by the management.[29] Though they were nearly forty thousand strong,[30] packinghouse workers possessed neither economic nor political strength in the early years of the Depression.

One reason for this weakness was organizational. There were unions—but for each separate packinghouse, not for the industry as a whole. Of course, this dispersion limited the bargaining strength of labor leaders. In 1932, just before the strike of that year, an effort to solve this problem was made by José Peter, a well-known Communist, who set up a Federation of Workers of the Meat Industry with the purpose of uniting all the separate worker organizations. Peter's success was notable but incomplete. Even after the Federation joined the General Workers' Confederation (or CGT) in 1936, the packinghouse workers remained in relative disarray.

Despite this state of affairs Peter stimulated the workers' desire for political action by giving articulate expression to their grievances. As he forcefully argued, packinghouse managers paid pitiful wages, ignored such labor laws as there were, laid off workers without reason, put labor organizers on a "black list" and sometimes had them beaten. Complaints about working conditions referred to the unhealthy atmosphere in freezing rooms, the risk of contamination on the killing floors, and the danger of

[28] See my article, "Los radicales argentinos y la defensa de los intereses ganaderos, 1916-1930," in *Desarrollo económico*, VII (1967), 795-829, especially 807-09.

[29] Rodolfo Puiggros, *Libre empresa o nacionalización en la industria de la carne* (Buenos Aires, 1957), 152-61.

[30] *IV° censo general*, III, 106.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

accident in the cutting and chopping areas. His most passionate statements concerned the "standard" system, under which workers were paid to perform a minimum amount of labor—or be fired—and then rewarded for extra efforts on a declining scale. To Peter and his colleagues, steady increases in the minimum schedule and the declining scale of payments for extra accomplishment made the "standard" a symbol of proletarian oppression.[31]

Possibly because of his affiliation with the CGT in 1936, Peter's efforts began to show some slight political results that same year.[32] At the behest of two Socialists in the Chamber of Deputies, a committee was named to investigate working conditions in the packinghouses and to recommend any necessary legislation. Only one of the six committee positions was given to the Socialist party, however, and the chairman was a cattle-raising aristocrat. As a result, nothing was accomplished. In 1938 another committee was appointed for the same purpose; again, leadership was given to upper-class landowners and no concrete action was taken.[33]

Pro-labor activity in Congress intensified in 1939, when the Socialists introduced a bill to set up a commission (including representatives of Peter's Federation) to supervise working conditions, establish a minimum wage, resolve labor-management conflicts, and draw up a general labor law for the meat industry. Later that year, some members of the Radical party suggested inclusion of the packinghouses under a general labor law of the early nineteen-twenties, and in 1940 some other Radicals presented a plan to set up retirement and compensation funds for the workers.[34]

None of these political efforts in behalf of the workers bore any perceptible or practical results. Two of these bills were re-

[31] See the paper *C.G.T.*, for example, July 28, 1939; Oct. 27, 1939; April 19, 1940; June 21, 1940; Sept. 6, 1940; Oct. 11, 1940; Nov. 29, 1940.

[32] Significantly, the CGT abandoned a previous policy of apolitical unionism in late 1935 and started promoting political action—usually through the Socialist party. Samuel Baily, *Labor, Nationalism, and Politics in Argentina* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1967), especially 51-61.

[33] Diputados, Dec. 21-22, 1936, V, 573-75. The committees' paltry meeting and attendance records are given in *ibid.*, Aug. 5, 1937, I, 1167; June 1, 1938, I, 281, June 22, II, 183, Sept. 30, VI, 322. Packinghouse workers did not work through the Municipal Council, incidentally, because they lived outside the city limits.

[34] *Ibid.*, Aug. 16, 1939, III, 49-53, Sept. 29-30, V, 124-25; Aug. 14, 1940, III, 46-63.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

introduced later on,[35] but neither of them was brought to the floor for debate and no laws on the matter were passed. Under Peter's leadership and the existing political system, the packinghouse workers could not accomplish their goals.

Labor and Perón

It was not until the revolution of 1943 that prospects improved for the packinghouse workers. Specifically, the change began in October of that year, when the Department of Labor was turned over to Perón. Renamed the Secretariat of Labor and Social Security, the new department sought to stimulate labor organization and promote the interests of the workers. Openly courting the laborers, using both the carrot and the stick, Perón used this office to establish a political base which eventually helped carry him into the presidency.

Perón's technique was nowhere better exemplified than in his treatment of the packinghouse workers. After taking over the labor department, he helped establish a whole new organization to replace Peter's ineffective Federation.[36] With Perón's approval Peter's internationally oriented Communists were pushed aside by a young, nationalistic team of native Argentines, headed by Cipriano Reyes, in a typical expression of the rising influence of indigenous elements among the urban laborers. Called the Federation of Labor Unions of the Meat Industry and formally christened in June 1944, the new syndicate included workers at every level of employment and encompassed all the packinghouses. The problem of organization was finally solved.

As a matter of fact the workers started to act even before the new union was set up. After some workers were laid off their jobs in early 1944, a strike was held at the Armour plant. In March Perón himself proposed a settlement that would have included a five centavo per hour wage increase, half pay for vacations, a guarantee of sixty hours of work every fortnight, the return of suspended workers to their jobs, and the stoppage of brutality by the foremen. The Armour management refused

[35] *Ibid.*, June 5, 1941, I, 267; June 10, 1942, I, 678.

[36] Some of Perón's tactics are described in Alfredo López, *La clase obrera y la revolución del 4 de junio* (Buenos Aires, 1945).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to accept these terms, and the strike dragged on for a number of months. On June 1 Perón took decisive action and a government decree brought the strike to a compulsory end. Wages were boosted by ten centavos an hour—about a thirty per cent increase—and overtime work would be paid an extra twenty-five per cent. In return the workers were merely required to promise not to strike for at least another year.[37]

Government intervention soon became the rule in clashes between management and workers. Late in 1944 Perón imposed a settlement on the Smithfield & Argentine firm. In April of 1945 he arranged a minimum-wage agreement for workers employed by the CAP.[38]

Labor-management relations took a decisive turn for the worse in early 1945, when the packinghouses suspended thousands of workers, partly for "disciplinary reasons" and partly because of a reduction in the volume of trade.[39] On March 31 a general strike was called in all packing plants. A deadlock ensued, with both sides determined not to back down. On April 24 it happened again: the government intervened and ordered the management to take the workers back. If it proved impossible for the packers to absorb them all for economic reasons, the state would pay the salaries of up to 12,600 workers for as long as three months as a matter of social justice. And pay it did; in the end this program cost the Argentine government nearly ten million pesos.[40] Few measures ever captured the *Peronista* concern for the packinghouse laborers quite so neatly.

Later that year the workers had a chance to show their gratitude, when Perón was imprisoned by the shaky Farrell government. After a few days of frantic negotiations, some with the dynamic Eva Duarte, Cipriano Reyes commanded his followers to go to the Plaza de Mayo and demand the release of Perón.[41] In they came,

[37] Secretario de Trabajo y Previsión, *Revista de Trabajo y Previsión*, 1944, No. 2, 604-07.

[38] *Ibid.*, 1944, No. 4, 1615; 1945, Nos. 7-8, 1196-97.

[39] See the management's subsequent statement in *Edición Rural*, March 20, 1946.

[40] *Revista de Trabajo y Previsión*, 1945, Nos. 5-6, 162-63, 165-67; 1945, Nos. 7-8, 738-39; 1946, No. 9, 130-32. These payments were probably made from the vast stores of foreign exchange that had accumulated in Argentina during World War II.

[41] See Cipriano Reyes, *Qué es el laborismo* (Buenos Aires, 1946), especially

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

marching all night from the Avellaneda slums, swarming in front of the government palace and calling for their hero. Late that evening the government gave in to this pressure, brought Perón back to the city and let him address the jubilant throng. This was one of the most dramatic moments in Argentina's political history: the famous *17 de octubre*, the first major mass action that the country had ever known. More than any other single event, this was the occasion that marked the rise to power of both the urban lower class and its charismatic leader.

Perón was quick to repay the workers' loyalty.[42] Late in 1945 packinghouse managers refused to cooperate with a newly created labor relations board that was supposed to establish minimum wages, in effect eliminating the "standard" system. Reyes responded by calling a general strike. A frequently violent stalemate ensued for three months, and then the climax began. The government declared the strike to be legitimate, decreed that working hours should be reduced in freezing rooms, and publicly condemned the management's intransigence. In March 1946—significantly enough, in President Farrell's office—the packing companies surrendered. They promised to comply with a minimum wage decree. They pledged their cooperation with the labor commission. They said they would reincorporate all the workers suspended since the beginning of 1945; they agreed to provide some job stability; they consented to a full day's pay for six hours of work in the freezing rooms; and they left the decision whether the workers should be paid for the three months strike time in the hands of a notoriously pro-labor government. The union, on the other hand, made no concessions at all: its only obligation was to enter all future negotiations with "good will."[43]

Rarely had a triumph been so clear cut. Furthermore, this agree-

---

45-52. This event marked the beginning of Evita's active participation in labor politics; but it was not until Perón's inauguration as president the following year that she assumed major responsibilities in this area.

[42] Although Perón was running for the presidential elections of February 1946 at the time, the Secretariat of Labor and Social Security was clearly under his influence.

[43] *Revista de Trabajo y Previsión*, 1945, Nos. 7-8, 911-27; 1946, No. 9, 30-32, 144-47, 300-02. A protest by the slaughterhouse managers against governmental favoritism to labor during the middle of the strike was printed in *Edición Rural*, March 20, 1946.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment served as the basis of labor-management relations for many years to come, as the workers continued to benefit from governmental protection. Between 1946 and 1949, one writer estimates, their nominal wage actually doubled.[44]

By 1946 it had evidently become clear to the urban masses that the way to gain power was through the elevation of Perón. In the elections of that year the central issue was quite clearly drawn: whether Argentina should continue with her openly authoritarian political system or return to time-worn constitutional procedures. The contest pitted Perón's new Labor party, which Cipriano Reyes helped form, against a broad coalition containing virtually every other party in the country—including the Socialists, deeply committed to parliamentary practice and resentful of Perón's courtship with the urban lower class.[45] Perón obtained a good deal of electoral support from rural peons and some portions of the lower middle class, but scored most heavily among the urban masses. Even with its sizable middle class, the city of Buenos Aires gave Perón a fifty-four per cent majority. And in Avellaneda, the major packinghouse district, the results were overwhelming: eighty-seven per cent of those eligible cast ballots, sixty-eight per cent of which were for Perón.[46] Ironically, it was through this most scrupulous and "democratic" election in Argentine history that Perón was given the authority to install his undemocratic regime.[47]

Conclusions

In summary, intensive social mobilization in early twentieth-century Argentina led to the appearance of a potentially powerful

[44] Horacio J. Noboa, *Política nacional de carnes* (Buenos Aires, 1956), 17. This meant that the laborers kept substantially ahead of the rise in the cost of living. Junta Nacional de Carnes, *Estadísticas básicas*, 14. On the whole, labor made solid gains in the early Perón era; the share of national income comprised of wages and salaries jumped from 42.3 per cent in 1945 to 54.0 per cent in 1950. Torcuato S. di Tella, *El sistema político argentino y la clase obrera* (Buenos Aires, 1964), 104.

[45] The Socialist position is explained in López, *La clase obrera.*

[46] Ministerio del Interior, *Las fuerzas armadas*, II, 433, 443. The active intensity of lower-class appreciation of Perón is also noted by Torcuato S. di Tella, who holds that *Peronismo* combined "Bonapartist" leadership with "worker spontaneity." *El sistema político*, 54-64.

[47] To add to the irony, Perón subsequently broke with Reyes and destroyed the Labor party in an effort to gain complete control over the working-class movement. Baily, *Labor*, 105-08.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

urban lower class. In the late nineteen-thirties and early forties, leaders of this sector (in specific behalf of consumers and packing-house workers) sought to promote urban mass interests through established and constitutional political institutions. Before 1943 these leaders, mostly Socialists, were stopped at every turn by the ruling Concordancia; and the institutions through which they pressed their demands, particularly the national Congress, were devitalized and discredited. The critical point is that socially mobilized groups sought political participation, but were not given access to power. The inevitable result was frustration. Perón's entrance on to the scene came, then, at a propitious time; his success in behalf of urban lower-class groups won him their support and even devotion.[48]

Despite the limitations of available data, this description points toward a number of tentative conclusions. First, the analysis suggests that Perón's popularity was mainly based on the pre-existing political frustration of the lower class; the urban masses were not so much "hoodwinked" by his charismatic demagoguery as they were impressed by his decisive and effective leadership. Second, despite the allegedly "totalitarian" features of Perón's regime, his followers had limited goals—more wages, cheaper beef—and were not "revolutionaries" in any broad sense of the term. The subsequent demise of the Socialist party was due not to its usage of parliamentary procedure but to its consistent failure. Third, Perón's supporters might have accepted his eventually undemocratic political procedures because of their unfortunate experiences with such "democratic" institutions as the Municipal Council and the Congress. Not surprisingly, power meant more than constitutional regulation of the competition for it. Fourth, Perón might even have dispensed with democratic political practice not wholly out of malicious premeditation, but partly because authoritarian measures provided the quickest and most rational means of satisfying the desires of the lower class. Fifth, the urban masses' attachment to Perón was not entirely rooted in spontaneously shared values or worldviews, but was strongly conditioned by the attitudes and

[48] Though this paper might deal with a series of uniquely explicit conflicts between the aristocracy and the lower class, the general process of political frustration and institutional decay showed up in other areas. For example, see Max Consoli, *Por qué soy peronista* (Santa Fe, 1946).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

actions of the ruling upper class. If the Concordancia had been more flexible and tolerant, Argentine political history might conceivably have taken a much different course.[49] Sixth, one might surmise that memories of the Concordancia's unbending political intransigence prompted members of the lower class to accept and even encourage Perón's personal economic extravagance and social excesses, which could at least be construed as defiance of the hated upper class and its conventional mores.

Furthermore, this analysis provides partial confirmation for Deutsch's hypothesis that social mobilization can cross a "threshold of criticality" for expanding sectors of the population and prompt them to participate in politics. But it further implies that the *kind* of resultant political participation depends not only on the timing or pattern of mobilization, but also upon the availability and institutionalized accessibility of political power. In Argentina the patent futility of constitutional procedures helped persuade the mobilized masses to follow Perón; however cynical and selfish he actually might have been, it was he who gave the urban lower class a feeling of significance and strength. That meaningful political participation has so frequently been denied to his supporters since 1955 might partly explain why Perón continues to stand as a symbol of their aspirations even today.

[49] See the somewhat similar comments in Germani, *Política y sociedad*, 250-52. It is always difficult to assess the importance of political values. Samuel Baily stresses the conservative outlook of migrant workers and their unhesitating regard for Perón as a kind of traditional *patrón* in *Labor*, especially 71-135. K. H. Silvert also emphasizes the "populist conservative" or "falangist" qualities of Perón's ideology. "Leadership Formation and Modernization in Latin America," *Journal of International Affairs*, XX (1966), 328. But it is still unclear whether members of the urban masses accepted Perón's leadership because of his proclaimed values or accepted his values because of his effectiveness. What does seem clear is that values and performance *both* affect the strength of leadership.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Small Population as a Political Handicap to National Development*

DONALD B. KEESING
Stanford University

This paper advances some hypotheses on the connection between a country's size and its development which, if true, mean that the internal political effects of a small population exacerbate and compound economic difficulties, especially under twentieth-century conditions. The effects postulated here are discussed under three headings: (1) the conflict between "nationalism" and sound economic policy; (2) the difficulty of motivating leadership and "class traitor" behavior needed for development; and (3) the effects of small numbers of people in each social and political role.

The current importance of the problem is suggested by the fact that there are now over fifty poor countries with populations under five million, about half of them with less than two million. Another twenty developing countries have from five to fifteen million people. Most countries with less than five million people are found in Africa (twenty-seven) and in the Americas (fifteen).

No attempt is made to test scientifically the hypotheses put forward here. I admit that an objective test would be difficult, for two reasons. First, multiple political and economic influences interweave to cause the development problems of small countries, creating a serious identification problem. Second, small countries

* The valuable suggestions of Richard R. Fagen, associate professor of political science, Stanford University, have improved the paper, but he is exonerated from responsibility for the results.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are statistically distinct from larger ones in other important respects besides their populations. For example, countries with small populations typically enjoy greater natural resources per inhabitant than more populous countries as a result of being sparsely settled, or else they are tropical islands or virtual islands with special possibilities for tourism and orientation toward the sea. Such differences make it hazardous to interpret, for instance, the observed tendencies for small populations to be associated, at a given income level, with smaller per capita industrial output.[1]

Of extra importance to their politics, small countries have distinct modal patterns of culture and history. Most are former French possessions in tropical Africa, former British coastal colonies, or one-time Spanish possessions in America. Only twelve less-developed countries with populations under five million (in 1964) have been nominally independent for over a hundred years. They could hardly be considered a random sample in any sense; ten are in Spanish America. But they do suggest, viewed as a group, that small developing countries frequently (though not always) generate unfortunate politics and do not undergo rapid social and economic change over the long run, compared to more populous poor countries. The twelve countries are Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, Haiti, and Liberia.[2]

We still know too little about the economic handicaps of small-

[1] See, for example, Hollis B. Chenery, "Patterns of Industrial Growth," *American Economic Review*, L (1960), 624-54, and Donald B. Keesing, "Population and Industrial Development: Some Evidence from Trade Patterns," *American Economic Review*, LVIII (1968), 448-55.

[2] Of the ten small Spanish American countries listed first, only Costa Rica and Uruguay have had any large share of liberal governments; and only they are roughly equal to the Spanish American average in income. One indicator of industrialization is per capita energy consumption in metric tons of coal equivalent. In 1964 the Spanish American average stood at 919 tons, while of seven larger Spanish-speaking countries in America, Colombia in last place had a per capita energy consumption of 494 metric tons. Among the small countries mentioned, equivalent figures were 830 for Uruguay, 268 for Costa Rica, and 105 to 231 for the other eight Spanish American countries (based on United Nations *Statistical Yearbook, 1965* [New York, 1966], tables 142 and 19). Panama, independent over sixty years, stood at 907. Such statistical differences can be interpreted in many ways, and might have an economic basis, but they do suggest systematic contrasts in development.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ness. We can safely say, however, that a small country experiences at least the following disadvantages:

(1) High costs in the many "social overhead" and public sector activities that involve increasing returns (economies of scale), a problem that is especially acute when the population is spread thinly.

(2) High costs in manufacturing industries involving economies of scale, in which sales must be largely limited to the home market. These include bulk processing industries and some assembly-line operations in which transport costs are substantial.

(3) A general lack of competition from within, for lack of sufficient numbers of modern enterprises, resulting typically in sluggish monopolistic behavior unless competitive pressure is brought to bear from outside.

(4) Insofar as the country is intellectually isolated, a tendency toward poor standards of performance, low productivity, and stagnant technology, relative to the prevailing per capita level of education and training, due to insufficient interaction and consequent meager stimulus from exchange of ideas among trained people.

(5) To the extent that the country is physically small, a narrower range of natural resources than in a large country.

(6) The serious disadvantage of being surrounded by other nations' tariff and migration barriers, quantitative import restrictions, and other discriminatory measures. These barriers restrict prospective exports and other international transactions, and turn the terms of trade against the country.

In combination, these circumstances mean, first, that a small country can expect to achieve less per capita output than a large country from given per capita resources, including natural resources, capital, education, and the like. Second, a small country is far more dependent than a large country on international transactions, in order to compensate for its disadvantages listed above. Third, throughout development, an appropriate policy balance for a small country must be extremely "outward-looking," encouraging international exchanges of ideas, competition with foreign enterprises, borrowing of technology, and a high degree of international specialization, so that reasonable economies of scale can be achieved and local resource deficits can be overcome through trade. This in turn means that protection or subsidies must be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

applied very selectively; redundant protection is an invitation to inefficiency, whereas in a large country internal competition tends to correct such policy errors.

Another very obvious difficulty, more political than economic, is the political-military weakness of any small country and its vulnerability to interference and manipulation by the larger powers, with little opportunity to reciprocate in kind. This may be, in its own right, a crucial obstacle to development, if the great powers stand actively opposed to the types of internal policies and leadership that are essential for successful development. I am not emphasizing this aspect of the problem, which has been widely recognized and discussed, but foreign intervention can easily aggravate the internal political difficulties described here.

I

The emotional feelings for one's country, commonly known as nationalism, that are so much a part of recent world history offer, I hypothesize, serious obstacles to constructing and maintaining appropriate development policies, especially in small countries. Nationalism, after all, is an integrating force on the national level, but a divisive force at the international level.[3]

The positive aspects of nationalism are restricted and the negative ones enlarged when nations are small. Integrating a nation of two or three million people does not achieve much economically, whereas turning fifty or a hundred million people into a single economy already represents a major step forward. When the small country is also economically backward, with no more than a hun-

[3] Largely for this reason, no doubt, specialists in development tend to divide along predictable lines in their attitudes to "nationalism." This is only secondarily because integration is more unambiguously desirable in economics than in politics, and because the word "nationalism" means somewhat different things to different people. Professionals whose work makes them most aware of the inner conflicts and fragmentation typical of backward countries—specialists in the internal politics of development, economic planners, sociologists, country specialists—generally welcome the integrating effects. Other professionals' training encourages them to take national integration almost for granted, but to see all too keenly the costs of division at the international level. This group includes most economists and specialists in international relations. These people tend to regard nationalism as an almost unmitigated disaster, an irrational impulse for which mankind pays a staggering price. Clearly both viewpoints can be reconciled, to some extent, by recognition of the double-edged nature of nationalism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dred or two hundred dollars' per capita income, the home market is incredibly small and utterly inadequate to support efficient development from within.

Nationalism has its emotional side that cannot be easily curbed or curtailed by practical considerations. Thus, in addition to the barriers thrown up by other countries, and the inhibitory effect on international transactions inherent in independence because of the latent threat of autonomous legal actions, a small country is moved by nationalism to add its own maze of obstacles to the barriers that cordon off its economy and society. In a large country, this effect would not be so serious—economies of scale, competition, exchanges of ideas, pressures for technological improvement could still be generated, up to a point, from within. But in a small country the results are apt to be plainly disastrous, a perpetuation of high costs, stagnation, and backwardness. Given such added obstacles, we can anticipate any number of vicious circles. New exports become more difficult to achieve, foreign investment resources cannot be attracted except at a frightful price in concessions, balance of payments problems encourage ubiquitous and spiralling protection, poverty holds down public expenditures that could promote development, multiplying controls encourage corruption and inefficiency, and an unpromising economic climate helps to drive educated people abroad. The spirit of nationalism itself may act as a powerful inhibitor to recognition of achievements abroad that are worth borrowing.

To put the matter less pessimistically, an intelligently led government, bent on promoting development, must walk a tightrope in its policies, and it cannot afford to imitate completely the policies of large countries which are the best known examples of past development. In the creative and difficult task of forging appropriate outward-looking policies, popular nationalism is an enemy, a source of constant pressures toward error. This is also true, to some extent, in a larger country, since the economy is never large enough to look entirely inward, and since the nation's size leads to advocacy of ambitious but mistaken projects that a small country would not be able to consider. But, on balance, the conflicts between nationalism and sound economic policy would appear more acute in a small country. At least, this is my first hypothesis.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II

My second major argument starts with the observation that development, in a small as in a large nation, depends on able and intelligent political leadership, above all, on an appropriate and vigorous use of public fiscal resources and other instruments of public social and economic policy. This is all the more apparent in countries that have remained backward into the twentieth century, since the spontaneous and private forces leading toward development are obviously weak and unreliable in these countries.

The problem starts with the fact that appropriate leadership requires not only high-quality people, who presumably are potentially present even in a small population, but also motivation. And it is, I submit, a much less inspiring historic task to help build a nation of one, two, or five million people, who started the twentieth century very backward, than to have contributed some decades ago to the building of, say, Germany, Russia, or Japan.

In fact, it can be so much less inspiring that development is likely to founder for lack of an appropriately motivated leadership. And unfortunately, the ideologies that are most successful in inspiring people in small, backward countries to sacrifices for the sake of history are linked to autarkic policies that would be sheer economic disaster for these countries.

It is important to observe that promoting development requires some extremely difficult decisions, involving personal sacrifices, hard work, unpopularity, and even (in an almost general case) "class traitor" behavior. Political power offers temptations—how many leaders of small countries have become wealthy and found comfort in high living, and at what costs to their nations? The disproportionate frequency with which this burden falls on small countries is a reflection of the difficulties in motivating the leadership to higher goals.

Development is always a long process, and the payoff takes more than a lifetime; one must act for future generations. Moreover, for a small country, even in proportion to its size, sound development policy, as I have suggested, calls for restraint in the uses of central power. A country of two million will never require a huge and glorious bureaucracy, nor ubiquitous controls or planning; these would tend to ruin its ability to take advantage of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the international transactions on which its development depends. What is generally needed is a small, efficient, carefully balanced administrative operation that, to be successful, must be almost inconspicuous. For this, the country's ablest leaders must be asked to sacrifice all the empires, glories, and comforts that they could hope to win at home or abroad by actions that would *not* contribute to their country's development. This is a tall order.

One aspect of the problem worth elaborating is the "class traitor" dimension. Many backward countries are dominated socially, economically, and politically by landed and commercial aristocracies and their wealthy brethren who have moved into modern sector industries and public service.[4] Such landholder and commercial families, with their immense economic advantages and superior educations, tend to supply the leaders who assume the new positions of political and economic power.

Yet to promote development, political leadership must place the nation as a whole ahead of the privileged classes. First, development requires a systematic destruction of social class and caste privileges in order to promote social, geographical, and occupational mobility. Previously disadvantaged groups must even be given special favorable treatment to try to offset their cultural and educational backwardness in order to speed the day when they can contribute positively to the society and economy. Burdens such as debt servitude must be eliminated. Second, development requires effective taxation to support heavy public expenditures. The largest share of this burden must be placed squarely on the well-to-do and property-owning classes. Third, favoritism and public support of entrenched profitable positions in the modern sector must be avoided. The government must foster competition at home and from abroad, discourage inefficiency, prevent excess profits, and seek to minimize corruption, indolence, waste, and inefficiency in the public as well as in the private sector. Fourth, traditional land tenure systems must generally be attacked and reformed, particularly absentee landlordism and ancient practices

[4] This is by no means fortuitous, since the surplus from the land, the labor that can be fed from this surplus, and the control of commerce were the commanding heights of any traditional agricultural economy. Whoever controlled those heights became a dominant elite. Under Western military and ideological pressures, widely varying arrangements for control of those heights have been converted into property arrangements.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

such as sharecropping and the *hacienda* system, designed to extract a constant surplus from the land with a minimum of effort on the part of the owners. I would not myself generally recommend dividing land among the cultivators, at least as an economic measure; promoting large modern commercial farms usually makes more sense. But any land reform is bound to be resisted by a traditional elite. Fifth, the vested interests that must necessarily be hurt are sure to include various foreign enterprises, whose powerful governments are capable of many kinds of intervention. Clearly, a political leadership that tries to implement the requisite changes faces formidable opposition.

Since the leadership is almost certain to be drawn from the privileged classes, it must deliberately choose to put nation above class and accept the opprobrium of acting as "class traitors." It seems to me that almost every currently-advanced country has been led to its present eminence, in part, by just such "class traitors." But, surely, behavior along these lines, like foregoing comfort and wealth, is far easier to motivate when leaders are helping to build a great and powerful country.[5]

My second hypothesis, then, is that development is less frequently and less vigorously promoted by leaders in small countries, because competing incentives weaken their motivations.

III

My third hypothesis is that politics, and above all the politics of social change, are different in a small compared to a large country, in such a way that it is much easier for a small group of people to impose their power and unprogressive policies indefinitely on a small country. Pressures similar to those that would lead to progressive policies, political upheavals, or even social revolution in

[5] In many countries in Africa and Southeast Asia, the landholder elite problem is not present in the form just sketched. Quite a number of lightly-populated, largely tribal, peasant societies were taken over by administratively advanced colonial powers such as Britain, France, and the Netherlands, who chose to extract the surplus from the land to support their administrations through modern systems of direct and indirect taxes. Here, leaders who have seized the administrative machinery have inherited power in the wake of the colonial regiment. But even in these cases there are surely strong competing loyalties, to themselves, their families and friends, their tribes, and the army or civil service to which they belong, that conflict regularly with the requirements of development.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a large country can be much more easily resisted, though ease of political communication may be a positive asset if the right sort of leadership and policies can be found.

The essence of this argument is that numbers of political actors make a *big difference. With hundreds of thousands or millions of* educated adult citizens, each trying to influence policy, largely in progressive directions, ideas and currents of opinion develop a momentum that ultimately influences even the most cynical, reactionary, or dictatorial of governments. The number of possible personal contacts and cross-influences grows geometrically with the number of actors, to the point where politically active groups must be treated, even in repression, by categories or in some more or less randomized fashion. Under the circumstances, the milder forms of political action and cross-influence flourish in virtual immunity—political jokes, for example—while there exists a considerable statistical likelihood of getting away with more serious maneuverings. The probability of some of these efforts connecting and bearing fruit is also higher.

A related aspect is that even when the politically active classes are proportionally small, if they are numerically fairly large, there can be a feeling of something more than a group of individuals, that is, a mass or bandwagon effect, almost impossible to achieve in a much smaller country, at least when it is plagued by severe contrasts in incomes, education, and socio-political status.

Another political difference, as a corollary to the previous hypothesis, is that the opposition and other intermediate actors, as well as the leadership itself, are more moved by the historical and cosmic importance of their actions, and are thus more likely to take something broader than a selfish view.

In some contrast, in a small country with a very low educational and economic level, the number of important potential political actors is only in the thousands, the people with real wealth perhaps only in the hundreds. It is not impossible for a political leader to establish a personal relationship with nearly everyone who represents a potential key actor, or at least to extend police surveillance and persuasive measures to everyone likely to prove influential. If serious opposition appears among the lower classes, violence can be applied on a considerable scale with relatively

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

little fanfare or notoriety, compared to the results of proportionally equivalent measures in a much larger country.

Of course, it would be absurd to say that a dictator cannot "get away with" a great deal, even in a large country. Especially in wartime and other times of crisis, all sorts of horrors have been perpetrated. But I submit that such actions are taken at greater risk, and with more concessions to pressures for progress (including development), than in a small country. Even when one tyrant gets away with socially undesirable policies, changes are forced upon his successors. In large countries, at least in modern times, the constellation of policies and political forces is always changing from generation to generation, and the results almost always include a succession of serious efforts at reform. Not even imperial China or Rome remained static for long in this regard; and the pressures for change have become incomparably greater in the last century or two, in backward countries faced with the fact of their backwardness.

IV

Let me emphasize that the tendencies suggested, even if they do in fact exist, are only statistical likelihoods, and do not automatically apply to any particular small country. Examples to the contrary are not hard to find. Several countries have become impressively advanced despite their small populations.[6] Others that are still poor are making admirable political and economic headway—Lebanon, Singapore, and Jamaica, for example.

I would also be the first to agree that the hypotheses put forward require careful research, to try to shed some really scientific light on them. Until this is done, they cannot be regarded as proven. Yet is seems to me that scale phenomena on the level of countries are among the most complex of the puzzles confronting the social sciences; and it will be years before we will be able to tackle such matters scientifically with any degree of assurance. Meanwhile, the special difficulties of small countries offer pressing practical problems. Under the circumstances, it is desirable to try

[6] Norway, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, and Israel still have less than five million people. Until recently the same was true of Switzerland.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to leap ahead and anticipate the eventual results of cumulative scientific method.

Too often specialists in the study and practice of development have ignored inherent political tendencies. Politics are a key to development. If there are scale effects in politics, such as I postulate here, this could be a matter of great practical importance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Negro and the New Freedom: Fighting Wilsonian Segregation

NANCY J. WEISS
Washington, D.C.

If broadened opportunities, political democracy, and social justice describe Wilsonian Progressivism, the man on the furthest fringe of that movement was surely the American Negro. Woodrow Wilson's first administration inaugurated officially-sanctioned segregation in the federal departments and witnessed ill-concealed moves to cut into already meager Negro patronage.

White liberals and Negroes alike worried the same question: how could Progressivism find room for race discrimination? Or, how could one explain the introduction of official shackles on the black man at a time when America was legislating the liberation and protection of the individual? The President, liberal publicist Oswald Garrison Villard declared, "fails utterly to see that to discriminate in his democracy against anyone, is to bring his whole carefully reared edifice crashing to the ground."[1]

Yet, federal segregation was less a new departure than the logical culmination of a decisive Southern—and national—trend. Moreover, despite the anomaly of a New Freedom bringing a new bondage, Progressivism and racism were in many respects interdependent. The early years of the Progressive era coincided with widespread Negro disfranchisement and the birth of full-scale,

[1] Oswald Garrison Villard, *Segregation in Baltimore and Washington* (n.p., 1913), 8; Villard, "The President and the Segregation at Washington," *North American Review*, CXCVIII (1913), 805.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

state-level Jim Crow legislative discrimination. Accustomed by imperial design and judicial decision to thoughts of racial superiority, white America linked Progressive democracy and equality to greater separation from Negroes.[2]

I

By the election of 1912 most Southern states had succeeded in purging their political systems of Negro voters and office-holders. Those Negroes retaining the franchise generally aligned themselves as a bloc with the party of emancipation. But 1912 marked a turning point in national Negro political participation. Angry at Theodore Roosevelt's "lily white" Progressivism and alienated by incumbent William Howard Taft's concessions to racism, Negroes were fair game for Democratic efforts to split the solidarity of the bloc vote.[3]

Democratic candidate Woodrow Wilson was a Southerner who concurred in his wife's outspoken belief in social separation of the races, a college president who barred Negroes from Princeton (and who later told darky stories in Cabinet meetings).[4] Prominent Negroes faced the issue squarely: "We do not believe that Woodrow Wilson admires Negroes," W. E. B. Du Bois wrote with considerable understatement. And yet, he told readers of the NAACP's magazine *Crisis*, Negroes might well expect such a "cultivated scholar" to treat them with "farsighted fairness."[5] Leaders of the race secured a much-publicized campaign pledge "to see justice done them in every matter, and not mere grudging justice, but

[2] C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (rev. ed., New York, 1964), Chap. II, *passim*.

[3] W. E. B. Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward An Autobiography of a Race Concept* (New York, 1940), 233-34; Henry Lee Moon, *Balance of Power: The Negro Vote* (Garden City, N.Y., 1948), 93-94; J. Milton Waldron and J. D. Harkless, *The Political Situation in a Nut-Shell: Some Un-Colored Truths for Colored Voters* (Washington, 1912), 11, 17, 20, 25; Arthur S. Link, "The Negro as a Factor in the Campaign of 1912," *Journal of Negro History*, XXXII (1947), 84, 93-96; John Hope Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom: A History of American Negroes* (rev. ed., New York, 1956), 445; *Crisis*, Dec. 1912, p. 75; William F. Nowlin, *The Negro in American National Politics* (Boston, 1931), 90-91.

[4] Josephus Daniels, *The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 1913-1921*, ed. E. David Cronon (Lincoln, Nebr., 1963), 195, 204, 234, 321, 414, 493; Link, *Wilson: The Road to the White House* (Princeton, 1947), 3, 502.

[5] *Crisis*, Aug. 1912, p. 181.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

justice executed with liberality and cordial good feeling." "Should I become President of the United States," Wilson promised in 1912, "[Negroes] may count upon me for absolute fair dealing and for everything by which I could assist in advancing the interests of their race in the United States."[6] Even Villard proclaimed himself "quite delighted" with the candidate's position.[7]

Thus, the election of 1912 saw the curious spectacle of the champions of the Negro lining up, albeit hesitantly, behind a symbol of Southern Democracy. "We sincerely believe," the *Crisis* intoned,

> that even in the face of promises disconcertingly vague, and in the face of the solid caste-ridden South, it is better to elect Woodrow Wilson President of the United States and prove once for all if the Democratic party dares to be Democratic when it comes to black men.[8]

Although there is no way of measuring the Negro vote, observers speculated that roughly half a million black men would exercise the franchise in 1912. Du Bois has written that Wilson won the votes of nearly 100,000 Negroes in the North alone. While many Negroes voted for Roosevelt, Professor Arthur Link states that Wilson got "more [Negro votes], probably, than any other Democratic presidential candidate had ever received." In any event, it appears that influential Negro leaders and a significant part of the rank and file did break away from their traditional Republican affiliations.[9]

After Wilson took office Negroes quickly discovered that their support packed little bargaining power. By the summer of 1913 segregated toilets, lunchroom facilities, and working areas had been ordered in the Departments of the Treasury and the Post

[6] Quoted in Alexander Walters, *My Life and Work* (New York, 1917), 194-95. See, also, Villard to Francis Jackson Garrison, Aug. 9, 1912, Villard to Wilson, Aug. 14, 1912, Wilson to Villard, Aug. 17, 23, 1912, all in the Oswald Garrison Villard Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University; Link, "The Negro as a Factor," 88, 91-92; Elliott M. Rudwick, *W. E. B. Du Bois: A Study in Minority Group Leadership* (Philadelphia, 1960), 160.

[7] Link, *Wilson: The Road to the White House*, 503; Villard to Garrison, Aug. 14, 1912, Villard Papers.

[8] *Crisis*, Nov. 1912, p. 29.

[9] *Ibid.*, Aug. 1912, p. 180; Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn*, 235; Link, "The Negro as a Factor," 98; August Meier, "The Negro and the Democratic Party, 1875-1915," *Phylon*, XVII (1956), 185.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Office, among others. Job segregation was especially evident in cases where Negro men had previously supervised white women. Some construed the new policies as a backhanded way of phasing out all Negro civil service employes, and pointed to cases where Negroes were shifted into separate departmental divisions later slated for dissolution. For the first time photographs were required on all civil service applications. The impact was so great that Booker T. Washington could write of an August visit to the nation's capital: "I have never seen the colored people so discouraged and bitter as they are at the present time."[10]

Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels relates that the question of federal segregation was first introduced in high administration circles at a Cabinet meeting in April 1913, when Postmaster General A. G. Burleson brought up complaints over integration in the railway mail service. Burleson, a Southerner like Daniels, "was anxious to segregate white and negro employees in all Departments of the Government. . . . he believed segregation was best for the negro and best for the Service." Secretary of the Treasury William Gibbs McAdoo (another Southerner) especially seemed to agree with him. Then, Daniels recalls, the Cabinet discussed the general question of Negro appointments. "The President said he made no promises in particular to Negroes, except to do them justice, and he did not wish to see them have less positions than they now have; but he wished the matter adjusted in a way to make the least friction." Although no action was taken, the Cabinet certainly made no effort to halt the beginnings of deliberate segregation.[11]

Departmental segregation was a conspicuous reversal of a fifty year tradition of integrated civil service. With racism having

[10] Copies of the segregation orders for the Treasury Department can be found in the Villard Papers. See, also, Boston *Guardian*, Nov. 15, 1913; John Palmer Gavit, "The Negro at Washington," New York *Evening Post*, Oct. 21, 1913; New York *Times*, Nov. 18, 1913; Villard, *Segregation in Baltimore and Washington*, 6; Laurence J. W. Hayes, *The Negro Federal Government Worker: A Study of His Classification Status in the District of Columbia* (Washington, 1941), 51; Paul P. Van Riper, *History of the United States Civil Service* (Evanston, 1958), 241; Henry Lincoln Johnson, *The Negro Under Wilson* (Washington, 1916), 1-3; Washington to Villard, Aug. 10, 1913, and Robert N. Wood to Wilson, Aug. 5, 1913, both in the Woodrow Wilson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; Link, *Wilson: The New Freedom* (Princeton, 1956), 243ff.

[11] Daniels, *Cabinet Diaries*, 32-33.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

infiltrated state and local systems, easily-delineated pressures pushed the Wilson administration toward federal discrimination. The administration, itself obviously Southern, paid considerable attention to senatorial influence from the James K. Vardamans, Benjamin R. Tillmans, and Hoke Smiths. Moreover, organizations like the National Democratic Fair Play Association worked as powerful lobbies for a racist outlook on the civil service. And the capital itself, as the New York *Evening Post*'s Washington correspondent wrote, was "essentially a Southern city," where "the great majority of the white people . . . hold the Southern view of the negro . . . ." "The white men and women in the Government service," he continued, "have resented being compelled to associate with the negroes. *Never before has there been an Administration that dared to cater to this feeling, except in surreptitious ways* . . . . There has always been . . . a *wish* to do it, but not the *courage*."[12] Forces defending racial equality finally gave way to long-latent desires for discrimination.

While segregation orders were conceived and issued by subordinates, it is clear that Wilson made little or no effort to stop them. He summed up his own attitude in a letter to the editor of the *Congregationalist*:

> . . . I would say that I do approve of the segregation that is being attempted in several of the departments. . . . I certainly would not . . . have . . . if I had not thought it to their [Negroes'] advantage and likely to remove many of the difficulties which have surrounded the appointment and advancement of colored men and women.[13]

Federal appointment policy, on the other hand, initiated directly from the White House. Certain federal positions—like Register of the Treasury, Recorder of Deeds and Customs Collector for the District of Columbia, and Auditor of the Navy Department—as well as diplomatic assignments to black nations, were traditonally held by Negroes. Given their support for the Democrats in 1912, Negro leaders expected increased patronage. When Wilson took office the *Negro Year Book* reported that Negroes

[12] NDFPA to "Dear Madam," May 9, 1913, Wilson Papers; New York *Times*, May 4, 1913; Gavit to Villard, Oct. 1, 1913, Villard Papers. See, also, Gavit, "The Negro at Washington."

[13] Wilson to H. A. Bridgman, Sept. 8, 1913, quoted in Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters*, 8 Vols. (Garden City, N.Y., 1927-39), IV, 223.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

held thirteen significant federal offices and filled eleven posts in the diplomatic and consular service. By the end of 1915 nine of the former (plus four officials not listed in the original account) and three of the latter had "retired from office and white men . . . [had] been appointed to fill their places." Three years later just six diplomatic representatives and one judge were left.[14] Wilson made only two key Negro appointments: Minister to Liberia and Municipal Court Judge of the District of Columbia. Negroes were especially incensed when the black Register of the Treasury was replaced by an Indian. Wilson lamely noted the difficulty of pushing Negro nominations past a Vardaman-Tillman-Smith Senate, but failed to explain his predecessors' perseverance in pursuing the same end. Negro leaders underlined the irony of an administration preaching social separation of the races, but sending a white envoy to a black nation.[15]

Executive discrimination found considerable sympathy on Capitol Hill. During the first Wilson administration nearly two dozen anti-Negro measures were introduced in the House and Senate, "the greatest flood of bills proposing discriminatory legislation against Negroes" ever to come before the Congress. They ran the gamut from Jim Crow transportation regulations and armed forces enlistment to prohibition of miscegenation, civil service segregation, and repeal of the Fifteenth Amendment. Their sponsors were Southerners, and they made little or no progress, with only the miscegenation bill being reported by a committee.[16]

[14] Alexander Walters (President, National Colored Democratic League) to Wilson, March 10, 1913, Wilson Papers; New York *Evening Post*, March 11, 1913; Monroe N. Work (ed.), *Negro Year Book and Annual Encyclopedia of the Negro* (Tuskegee, 1913), 99-100; *Negro Year Book: An Annual Encyclopedia of the Negro, 1916-1917* (Tuskegee, 1916), 36; *Negro Year Book: An Annual Encyclopedia of the Negro, 1918-1919* (Tuskegee, 1919), 208. Van Riper estimates a "decline of Negro federal employment from nearly six per cent of the total civil service in 1910 to about 4.9 per cent in 1918." *History of the United States Civil Service*, 242.

[15] *Crisis*, Sept. 1913, p. 215, March 1916, p. 215, Aug. 1916, p. 198. Lester A. Walton to Editor, New York *Times*, Aug. 14, 1913; New York *Times*, March 24, 1914; Villard, "The President and the Segregation at Washington," 801-02; Gavit, "The Negro at Washington"; New York *Evening Post*, Aug. 4, 1913; Washington to Villard, Aug. 8, 1913, Villard Papers.

[16] Franklin, 445; Hayes, 45; *Crisis*, June 1914, p. 77; U. S. Congress, House Committee on Reform in the Civil Service, *Segregation of Clerks and Employees in the Civil Service, Hearings . . .*, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 1914; U. S., *Congres-*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II

Incorporating a remarkable ethnic, social, and occupational diversity, the youthful National Association for the Advancement of Colored People seemed the logical forum for liberals of every cast who challenged the thinking of those supporting segregation. As chairman of its executive committee, Oswald Garrison Villard, grandson of famed abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison, led off with a steady letter-writing campaign designed to clarify the administration's stand on the race issue. He urged the President to repudiate a disastrous policy, due, he hoped, "to the individual initiative of department heads without your knowledge and consent." But Wilson insisted that departmental segregation was "in the interest of the negroes . . . ." "My own feeling," he wrote, "is, by putting certain bureaus and sections of the service in the charge of negroes we are rendering them more safe in their possession of office and less likely to be discriminated against." This gave spokesmen for the Negro grounds for open attack. On August 15, 1913, the NAACP filed an official protest at the White House against the "drawing of caste lines." Negroes "desire a 'New Freedom,' too, Mr. President," they asserted. The organization called for public response to their appeal for social justice.[17]

Villard mobilized his liberal *Nation* and New York *Evening Post;* Boston *Guardian* editor William Monroe Trotter led off the Negro press reaction; and the NAACP's branches organized nationwide protest meetings.[18] The press, both Northern and Southern, white and Negro, answered the call. Responding to suggestions for a letter-writing marathon, countless citizens flooded the White House mailbags. Hundreds of letters bore the signatures of Negroes of every station. More notably, however, the NAACP's appeal brought forth vocal support from white clergymen, professors,

---

sional Record, 63d Cong., 1st Sess.—64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1913-16, L-LIII, *passim; Crisis*, May 1914, p. 11.

[17] Villard to Wilson, July 21, 1913, Wilson to Villard, July 23, 1913, NAACP to Wilson, Aug. 15, 1913, all in Villard Papers; New York *Evening Post*, Nov. 17, 1913.

[18] NAACP, *Fourth Annual Report* (New York, 1914), 12, 15, 16, 48, 52-54, 59; New York *Times*, Dec. 19, 1913; Boston *Guardian*, Nov. 15, 1913; Boston *Post*, Dec. 1, 1913; Charles W. Puttkammer and Ruth Worthy, "William Monroe Trotter, 1872-1934," *Journal of Negro History*, XLIII (1958), 298-316.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

social workers, philanthropists, Progressive politicians, and leaders of other minority groups like Jews and women. The "harsh and humiliating discrimination," they wrote, was "an insult and an outrage upon American citizenship," "violating the spirit of the Constitution and opposed to the teachings of Jesus Christ." From all corners there arose cries of dismay over the "unjust and disheartening" measures instituted "in plain derogation of the policy favored by our fundamental law."[19]

Beyond letters and editorials, white liberals exerted little, if any, more active pressure. Some appealed to their spokesmen in Congress to influence the President, and touched off critical communications from Capitol Hill to the White House. Congressman John J. Rogers of Massachusetts introduced resolutions urging investigation of treatment of Negro employes in the Treasury and Post Office Departments, but both measures died on committee calendars without gaining so much as a hearing. Some whites debated arranging a peaceful protest at the White House by representatives of the segregated employes, but nothing ever materialized.[20] In short, white liberals spoke up vociferously for the Negro cause, but the issue never packed enough political leverage to evoke more effective tactics.

Negroes appealed to Wilson not only on grounds of humanitarianism, campaign pledges, constitutionalism, and plain American decency, but also on the basis of political expediency. The precarious Democratic strength established among members of their race in 1912 crumbled rapidly in the face of the President's policies, so that Negro Democratic politicians found themselves "in a political wilderness of dispair [*sic*]." The men who decried segre-

[19] See, for example, letters in the Wilson Papers which the President received from the following: James Schouler, Sept. 8, 1913; Minneapolis Sunday Forum, Sept. 7, 1913; National Council of Congregational Churches of the United States, Nov. 14, 1913; Jacob H. Schiff, Aug. 20, 1913; Francis J. Garrison, Aug. 21, 1913; Alfred Hayes, Sept. 19, 1913; David I. Walsh, Oct. 26, 1914; Northeastern Federation of Women's Clubs, Aug. 15, 1913; Charles Fleischer, Nov. 3, 1913; Karl F. Geiser, Oct. 1913; Julius Rosenwald, Sept. 4, 1913; Alice P. Gannett, Aug. 20, 1913; Eugene N. Foss, Oct. 20, 1913.

[20] See Sen. [Wesley] L. Jones (Wash.) to Wilson, Sept. 29, 1913, Wilson Papers; Villard to Rep. A. Mitchell Palmer (Pa.), Nov. 20, 1913, Sen. Henry F. Hollis (N.H.) to Villard, Sept. 6, 1913, both in Villard Papers; H. Res. 288 and 289, *Congressional Record*, 63d Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, L, 5684; Villard to Archibald Grimke, Oct. 30, 1913, Villard Papers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gation were fighting for their very political lives. "We are constantly being called traiters [*sic*] and being threatened with bodily harm," the secretary of the National Colored Democratic League wrote to presidential secretary Joseph P. Tumulty. "We are publically [*sic*] and frequently charged with having sold the Race into slavery . . . ."[21]

But these men were talking about more than their own careers. What they saw was a fast-disappearing opportunity to capitalize on Negro disaffection from the Republican fold. They continually emphasized that Wilsonian discrimination would mean political suicide for any vestiges of Negro Democracy in 1916. And Wilson countered just as consistently by insisting that segregation was not a matter of politics, but of humanitarianism. Certainly the size of the Negro vote, and the political leverage it wielded, were small, so that the immediate political benefits of courting Negroes were limited. But the chances for constructive reconciliation and for a useful precedent were not insignificant.[22]

The future, and not only the political future, was very much on the minds of those who cried for a change in policy. What were the implications of the new caste system for future generations? There was no telling, protesters noted, what measures others might justify on the basis of the Wilsonian precedent. "Should the National Government adopt this seemingly simple provision," a prominent Negro professor wrote, "it would thereby sanction all of the discriminatory legislation on the statute books of the several states and would suggest and justify all such enactment in the future."[23] Hand in hand with this caution went a curiously ambivalent attitude toward the President himself. Carefully noting Wilson's sincerity and highmindedness, many tried to rationalize his program as the work of underlings unbeknownst to him. What they feared more than anything, however, was the future election of a less scrupulous, less principled chief executive who would tailor Wilsonian segregation policies to more disastrous,

[21] Rufus L. Perry to Wilson, July 21, 1913, Peter J. Smith to Tumulty, June 1, 1913, both in Wilson Papers. See, also, A. B. Cosey to Tumulty, Aug. 22, 1913, Wilson Papers.

[22] Villard to Wilson, July 21, 1913, Villard Papers; New York *Evening Post*, Nov. 8, 1913.

[23] Kelly Miller, *Segregation: The Caste System and the Civil Service* (Washington [1914]), 11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

far-reaching ends, affecting not only Negroes but possibly other minority groups like Jews.[24]

With the public "campaign of making the White House just as uncomfortable as possible" gaining in momentum, Villard continued his own efforts at private persuasion. Finding Tumulty sympathetic to his arguments, he nevertheless had great difficulty in establishing any real understanding with the President on the race isue. While justifying departmental segregation, Wilson admitted that "in several instances the thing has been managed in a way which was not sufficiently thoughtful of their feelings . . . ," which provoked Villard to retort: "Believe me, it is not a question of handling segregation awkwardly or tactfully, or otherwise, it is a question of right and wrong." The interchange ended temporarily with the President pleading for time and tolerance:

> I hope . . . that by the slow pressure of argument and persuasion the situation may be changed and a great many things done eventually which now seem impossible. . . . I appeal to you most earnestly to aid at holding things at a just and cool equipoise until I can discover whether it is possible to work out anything or not.

Shifting focus from the White House to the departments proved no more rewarding. Villard informed Treasury Secretary McAdoo of a speech he intended to give concerning segregation instituted under McAdoo's jurisdiction. The ambivalence of the Secretary's reply summed up the sheer frustration encountered by those who tried to reverse the discriminatory policies. "There is no 'segregation issue' in the Treasury Department," McAdoo insisted. "It has always been a mischievous exaggeration." And yet, in the same letter he confessed,

> . . . I shall not be a party to the enforced and unwelcome juxtaposition of white and negro employees when it is unnecessary and avoidable without injustice to anybody, and when such enforcement would serve only to engender race animosities detrimental to the welfare of both races and injurious to the public service.[25]

[24] New York *Evening Post*, Oct. 21, 1913; "The President and the Negro," *Nation*, Aug. 7, 1913, p. 114; Villard, "The President and the Segregation at Washington," 804; Villard, *Fighting Years: Memoirs of a Liberal Editor* (New York, 1939), 239.

[25] Villard to Garrison, July 31, Aug. 12, 1913; Wilson to Villard, Aug. 29, Sept. 22, 1913; Villard to Wilson, Sept. 18, 1913; Villard to McAdoo, Oct. 25, 1913; McAdoo to Villard, Oct. 27, 1913, all in Villard Papers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From the Negro's point of view, departmental segregation was anything but a "mischievous exaggeration." In November 1913 a group of prominent Negroes representing the National Independent Political League and sponsored by Massachusetts congressmen went to the White House to deliver a petition of protest against discrimination in the government service. Wilson seemed impressed by the protest and surprised at the conditions they mentioned. He assured the delegation that "segregation had not been decided upon as an administration policy," and promised further investigation. The protests reputedly made some impact, so that in December the New York *Evening Post* could write, "it seems plain that the word has gone forth that the segregationists must take the back track. . . . it appears that a return to former conditions is underway all along the line."[26]

III

Despite token efforts, like removal of some signs on toilets, there seems to have been little concrete evidence of actual reversal of policies.[27] In November 1914 the delegation of Negro leaders called again at the White House to discuss the situation. Headed by Boston *Guardian* editor Trotter, the group detailed instances of continued segregation, charged certain officials with race prejudice, asked for investigation and redress by executive order, and predicted Negro opposition to the Democrats in 1916. Wilson, dismissing any political considerations, "said that the policy of segregation had been enforced for the comfort and best interests of both races in order to overcome friction." The President ended the interview abruptly, announcing that he was insulted by Trotter's approach, and warning that any future meetings would have to be conducted by another Negro spokesman. The so-called Trotter incident provoked a new flurry of editorials and correspondence; even those who found Trotter's conduct objectionable agreed on the positive results of reintroducing the segregation issue into

[26] Boston *Guardian*, Nov. 15, 1913; New York *Evening Post*, Dec. 13, 1913. See, also, Villard, *Fighting Years*, 241; Villard in the Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, Jan. 2, 1914; NAACP to Wilson, Jan. 6, 1914, Wilson Papers; Garrison to Villard, Dec. 14, 26, 1913, Villard Papers.

[27] Gavit to Villard, Oct. 1, 1913, Villard Papers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

public discussion. Whether Trotter actually did anything out of order is open to doubt; Tumulty told Villard that the Negro's speech was "one of the most eloquent he had ever heard," and the President later admitted privately to Tumulty that "he was very sorry he had lost his temper as he had made a great mistake."[28]

As the controversy over the Trotter interview died down another issue arose to take its place on Negro and white liberal editorial pages. President Wilson and his Cabinet had attended a private White House showing of "The Birth of a Nation," the controversial D. W. Griffith film based on Thomas Dixon's *The Clansman*. Featuring vicious distortions of Negro activities during the Reconstruction era, the movie was a potent weapon for inflaming white hatred of blacks. Indignant at this so-called "work of art," Negroes organized nationwide protests calling either for censorship of particularly offensive scenes or for total banning of the film. In only a smattering of communities were they at all successful. The movie's producers delighted in justifying its value by noting that it had been screened without objection before the President and his Cabinet. Wilson, driven into a corner by persistent inquiries, lamely directed Tumulty to explain that "the President was entirely unaware of the character of the play before it was presented, and has at no time expressed his approbation of it. Its exhibition at the White House was a courtesy extended to an old acquaintance."[29]

While "The Birth of a Nation" and federal segregation bred loud public protest, a private effort in behalf of the Negro was also taking shape. Largely unsuccessful at curbing Wilson's negative policies, white liberals and Negro leaders put forth a constructive suggestion of their own to grapple with the Negro's place in an expanding American democracy. The idea of a National Race Commission was first developed by R. H. Leavell, professor of economics at Texas A & M, and later taken up by Villard and the NAACP. The plan called for a presidentially-appointed, privately-

[28] New York *Times*, Nov. 13, 14, 1914; New York *Evening Post*, Nov. 12, 1914; "Friction," *Independent*, Nov. 23, 1914, p. 269; New York *Evening Post*, Nov. 13, 1914; Villard to Garrison, Nov. 18, 1914, Villard Papers; Villard to Garrison, Dec. 11, 1914, Villard Papers.

[29] *Crisis*, May 1915, pp. 40-42, June 1915, pp. 69-71, 87-88; New York *Times*, March 7, April 18, 1915; Wilson to Tumulty, April 28, 1915, memorandum in Wilson Papers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

financed, biracial, multi-sectional commission to investigate every phase of Negro life in the country, "with particular reference to his economic situation." Hopefully, the inquiry might ease racial tensions and provoke legislative recommendations from the White House. Moreover, the investigation would be in the best tradition of Progressive concern for social justice; it "would be of great service to the white South as well as to Negroes," for "a situation in which millions of people were living on the border line of destitution in the slums . . . ought to be intolerable in civilized communities. . . ."[30]

The Race Commission plan spoke the purest language of Progressivism. Its primary objective—"to promote realization of democracy in America"—could be attained "by providing adequate opportunity for self-realization by all individuals of all classes or all races in ways beneficial both to the individual and to society."[31] Those who drafted the proposal fully understood the American reform tradition of widening avenues of opportunity for the disadvantaged.

Villard took the plan to the White House in May 1913. He left the interview enthusiastic over Wilson's reaction; the President, he wrote to Professor Leavell, was "wholly sympathetic," promising to consider the proposal in the light of "his relations with the Senate and Congress, and what it will mean to him to antagonize the reactionary Southern politicians. As to the necessity of some such inquiry he was quite clear . . . ."[32] Wilson postponed subsequent interviews throughout the summer, insisting that the Mexican crisis kept him too preoccupied for other considerations. Villard repeatedly sought authorization to proceed with the fund-

[30] Leavell to Villard, Feb. 20, April 4, July 7, 1912; Villard to Leavell, April 1, Aug. 15, 1912, Villard Papers; "A Proposal for a National Race Commission to be appointed by the President of the United States. Suggested by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People," undated, Villard Papers; Leavell to Wilson, Feb. 20, 1912, Villard Papers; Villard, *Fighting Years*, 236.

[31] Leavell to Villard, Aug. 18, 1912; Leavell, Sketch of a (Tentative) Detailed Plan for Investigations Directed by the Proposed President's Commission of Race Facts and Race Relationships, both in Villard Papers.

[32] Villard to Leavell, May 15, 1913, Villard to James H. Dillard, May 15, 1913, both in Villard Papers. The plan had been broached to the then-candidate Wilson in 1912, but he insisted that consideration of the commission be deferred until he actually entered the White House. See Villard to Leavell, Aug. 15, 1912, Villard Papers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

raising; "I am particularly urging this upon you now," he wrote in August, "because of the intense dissatisfaction of the colored people at the treatment by your Administration thus far."[33]

A few days later Wilson rejected the suggestion. With the balance of his legislative program still awaiting congressional action, he shrank from alienating powerful Southern congressional leaders. An investigation, he maintained, inevitably implied an indictment. Recalling his earlier receptivity, he admitted, "I never realized before the complexity and difficulty of this matter in respect of every step taken here."[34]

Strikingly, the President's stand on the Race Commission sparked absolutely no public protest. Villard had purposely avoided any publicity of the negotiations, fearing that outside pressure might force Wilson's hand. At the same time, departmental segregation and appointments more than occupied the efforts of those championing the Negro cause. Indeed, the Race Commission "lobby" consisted of only one man—Villard himself. Various professionals and NAACP leaders made comments on the original draft, but the organization itself remained officially silent.[35] The only recriminations after Wilson's refusal came in bitter letters from Villard. "Frankly, I feel very sorry that you find yourself 'absolutely blocked by the sentiment of senators,'" he wrote. "I believe that like your most immediate predecessors, the time will come when you will find it necessary to go ahead and do what is right without considering their feelings . . . ." But "[bowing] down to the god Expediency," Villard warned, ought not to demand continued segregation and non-appointment of Negroes. Unless Wilson faced squarely the place of the Negro in his New Freedom, the liberal editor predicted, "the feeling of bitterness among the colored people towards your Administration and the Democratic party shall steadily increase."[36]

Villard was right. The election of 1916 justified warnings that segregation policies spelled the end of an unusual opportunity to

[33] Villard to Wilson, Aug. 18, 1913, Villard Papers.

[34] Wilson to Villard, Aug. 21, 1913, Villard Papers.

[35] Albert Bushnell Hart to Villard, Jan. 16, 1913; Du Bois, Comments on the Foregoing Plan; J. E. Spingarn, Suggestions in Regard to the Proposed Commission on the Negro, Jan. 14, 1913, all in Villard Papers.

[36] Villard to Wilson, Aug. 27, 1913, Villard Papers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

convert Negroes to the Democratic party. Unfortunately, there are no satisfactory statistics to indicate just how many Negroes broke away to vote for Wilson in 1912, or how many deserted the Democrats in 1916. Beyond just holding their own, the Democrats seemed unable to absorb any significant portion of the Negro voters who had defected from Republicanism to support the Progressive ticket in 1912. General contemporary comment indicates that Negroes "returned en masse to the party of liberation."[37] In Negro Harlem, for instance, the Democratic vote slipped from 23.29 to 20.23 per cent, while the Republican share jumped from 17.67 to 77.99 per cent, undoubtedly including the 56.63 per cent who had voted for Roosevelt in 1912.[38] More important than the overall tallies, leaders of the race who stumped for the Democrats in 1912 faced the 1916 election with nothing but distaste for Wilson. Their continued allegiance, promising future Democratic dividends of large-scale Negro support, would have been especially valuable.

Surely, Negroes in general found in their press little reason to stick with the Democrats. The New York *Age*, expressing the philosophy of Booker T. Washington and a supporter of Taft in 1912, declared for Charles Evans Hughes, as did the Washington *Bee*.[39] The NAACP solicited explicit statements on the race question from both candidates. Tumulty responded for Wilson with a noncommital "he stands by his original assurances. He can say with a clear conscience that he has tried to live up to them, though in some cases his endeavors have been defeated."[40] Hughes never

[37] Moon, 97.

[38] At the time of the 1912 election Harlem Negroes had clustered in some two dozen blocks, indicated in detail in a map in Victor R. Daly, "The Housing Crisis in New York City," *Crisis*, Dec. 1920, p. 61. These votes are from fourteen election districts from the Twenty-first and Thirtieth Assembly Districts (selected from Assembly District slides in New York City's Municipal Reference Library) corresponding to the blocks most densely populated by Negroes. The returns are drawn from the "Official Canvass of the Votes Cast in the Counties of New York, Kings, Queens, and Richmond at the Election Held November 5, 1912," *City Record*, XL (Dec. 31, 1912), 2-119, and "Official Canvass of the Votes Cast in the Counties of New York, Bronx, Kings, Queens and Richmond at the Election Held November 7, 1916," *City Record*, XLIV (Dec. 30, 1916), 2-129.

[39] New York *Age*, Nov. 2, 1916; Washington *Bee*, Nov. 2, 1912, Nov. 1916, *passim*.

[40] NAACP to Wilson, Oct. 10, 1916, Wilson Papers; *Crisis*, Dec. 1916, pp. 84-85.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

answered the NAACP's letter, and left himself to be judged on the basis of a Nashville campaign pledge of "equal and exact justice to all. I stand for the maintenance of the rights of all American citizens, regardless of race or color."[41] At first Association leaders reluctantly found Hughes "practically the only candidate for whom Negroes can vote." The *Crisis* eventually urged Negroes to disown both major party candidates, suggesting formation of an all-Negro party and ultimately advising abstention or a vote for the Socialist candidate.[42]

In sum, in 1916 Negro leaders found their race courted by neither party. Despite years of agonizing controversy over their place in Progressivism, the political establishment was again trying its best to ignore the Negro question. Looking back on the election the *Crisis* summed up best of all the frustrating lack of progress toward enlisting those in power in the cause of a democracy not limited by the color line. By the peak of the Progressive era the President had proven "satisfactory as a reducer of the tariff, a promoter of currency reform, and as a man of Peace." "But," the editors wrote, "he was still the representative of the southern Negro-hating oligarchy, and acknowledged its leadership." By the same token, "Mr. Hughes was the author of several of the best decisions in favor of the Negro that the reluctant Supreme Court has ever handed down. At the same time, on specific Negro problems he was curiously dumb."[43]

IV

Why were Negroes and white liberals unsuccessful in extending the boundaries of a Progressivism limited "to whites only"? Wilson argued that his sentiments were on the side of the protesters, but that courting Southern senatorial support for his Progressive legislative package made it impossible for him to act in their be-

[41] *Crisis*, Nov. 1916, pp. 16-17, 33-34; Francis L. Broderick, *W. E. B. Du Bois: Negro Leader in a Time of Crisis* (Stanford, 1959), 94-95; NAACP to Hughes, Sept. 14, 1916, Villard Papers.

[42] *Crisis*, Oct. 1916, p. 268, Nov. 1916, p. 12.

[43] *Ibid.*, Dec. 1916, p. 59. See, also [NAACP], *Freeing America: Seventh Annual Report of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People* (New York, 1917), unpaginated..

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

half. Yet he straightforwardly advocated "separate but equal" as mutually beneficial to both races.

It is too easy, however, to attribute the stalemate to executive inhibitions alone. The key still seems to lie in the nature of the protest. Negro groups lacked a cohesive, tightly organized program. Gaining the right to vote, and fighting lynching, preoccupied much of their effort. This was the decade of landmark Supreme Court decisions striking down the Grandfather Clauses in state voting requirements and levelling an initial blow at residential segregation. For many, these struggles were much more important than gaining political positions. But Negroes disagreed over more than just priorities affecting their race alone. Looking at the national scene, many played down their grievances; "we believe," a North Carolina cleric told Wilson after Trotter's White House demands, "that he should not have approached you with a minor domestic protest when you are filled with graver responsibilities . . . ."[44]

These disavowals were well calculated to cripple the effectiveness of any organized protest. The Negroes who wrote to the President claiming that "Mr. Trotter does not represent the Negroes of the United States," or that "the more thoughtful" members of the race "don't approve of Mr. Trotter's insult to you," may honestly have been ashamed of his reported disrespect.[45] But they also testified to the exceptional fragmentation of Negro leadership. Theirs was largely the fading gasp of a Washingtonian theory of Negro conduct, reflecting the growing split in Negro philosophies of self-advancement.

In previous Republican administrations Booker T. Washington had been recognized as "the office broker for the race," or chief consultant on Negro patronage and policies. Publicly conciliatory toward the white South, the Tuskegee educator subordinated eventual attainment of political and civil rights to the more immediate goals of moral and economic progress through self-help and vocational training. The Wilson administration

[44] Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn*, 228; Work, *Negro Year Book, 1916-1917*, 51; Walton to Tumulty, March 25, 1913, E. D. W. Jones to Wilson, Nov. 13, 1914, both in Wilson Papers.

[45] E. D. W. Jones to Wilson; I. W. L. Roundtree to Wilson, Nov. 13, 1914, Wilson Papers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

found Washington newly out of favor not only in official circles, but also among the ranks of leading Negroes.[46] New expectations and new spokesmen came to prominence with the Democrats. Seriously challenging the old, more accommodating outlook, fathers of the Niagara Movement, like Du Bois and Trotter, stressed immediate equality—social, economic, *and* political—and urged agitation to reach these goals. The inability of these men to agree among themselves contributed to a proliferation of loose factions and formal groups all in the same fight without meaningful coordination of efforts.

The protest movements petered out, too, because they eventually lost even their divided leadership. Villard, certainly their most influential white spokesman, became preoccupied with keeping the United States out of World War I. Washington died early in 1915, and Bishop Alexander Walters ("the new political leader of his race for the incoming Democratic administration at Washington") was dead before Wilson's second inaugural. Discredited (however unfairly) among Negroes and whites alike after the White House incident, Trotter quickly began to "slip . . . out of the main current of the protest movement." A foe of accommodation, he nonetheless divorced himself from the activist Du Boisian camp, and never took full advantage of cooperation with white liberals.[47] Du Bois, too, had already generated considerable friction with white NAACP leaders. In 1916 he decisively curbed his effectiveness when he told Negroes, in effect, to throw away their votes and abandon the regular political process, surely their best hope for any kind of influence on the status of the race in Wilsonian Progressivism.

Even if we accept this analysis of deficiencies in the protest movement, it is still important to ask whether we may not be overstating the case. In short, could Negroes have been expected to make much of a dent in Wilsonian segregation policies? The national apotheosis of Jim Crow militated strongly against any possible hope of success for the champions of the Negro cause.

[46] Villard to Charles Dyer Norton, Sept. 20, 1910, Villard Papers; Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn*, 71; Broderick, 114; Meier, *Negro Thought in America, 1880-1915: Racial Ideologies in the Age of Booker T. Washington* (Ann Arbor, 1963), *passim*.

[47] New York *Age*, Dec. 5, 1912; Puttkammer and Worthy, 309.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But the generation of the current Negro revolution may still wonder over the striking lack of militancy in the protests of the Progressive era. The afflicted exercised unusual restraint and self-discipline, engaging in thoroughly polite, deferential opposition. In the second decade of this century, hardly more than a generation removed from the demise of Reconstruction, Negroes were in considerable part an ex-slave population. Their educational level and political consciousness were still barely above a minimum. It is a commonly accepted principle of social science that a submerged group must reach a certain plateau before it can even begin to rebel, and most Negroes of the Wilson era were still struggling toward that level. The birth of the NAACP, fusing white liberal strength into the Niagara Movement, was barely three years past when Wilson took office. The transition in Negro thinking from a Washingtonian to a Du Boisian approach was an important one, and one whose earliest stages coincided with the birth of the New Freedom. Negro protest, symbolized and centralized chiefly in the NAACP, was a very new, highly improvised instrument in the Wilson era—an instrument which took nearly forty years to impress upon the nation the gravity and sincerity of its purpose.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Intelligentsia Versus Reason of State

ALFRED VAGTS
Sherman, Conn.

> Reason of state is nothing but a word invented to serve the tyrants as an excuse.
>
> Voltaire

The most magistral, and the best written, of all historical treatments—there have been no others[1]—of the concept of

[1] We must at least mention the artists' figurations of reason of state, beginning with Cesare Ripa's *Iconologia.* In this work's many editions—I am using the one of Rome, 1603, pp. 426 ff.—*ragione di stato* is depicted as "a lady armed with cuirass, helmet and scimitar . . . with a ferule in her left hand . . . the right resting on a lion's head, . . . at her feet a book inscribed IUS." While the arms refer to the prince's determination to use force and just war in the application of his state reason, the ferule demonstrates that the *ragione di stato* in question is properly belonging to whomsoever holds dominion; the law book points to the use of *ragione civile* and civil law. One French version of Ripa is *Iconologie ou Explication nouvelle de plusieurs images, etc. Tirée des recherches et des figures de César Ripa. Moralisées par J. Baudoin* (Paris, 1644); *raison d'état* is depicted and described in I, 66 ff. Altogether different is the concept of *raison d'état* in Jean Charles Delafosse's *Nouvelle iconologie historique à attributes hiéroglyphiques qui ont pour objets les quatre éléments etc.* (Paris, 1768), 73: A dragon, pierced by two arrows, on which a victorious sun throws its rays, all in a framework composed of a shield of the Medusa, a lion's head, a helmet, a spear, a diadem, motifs that leave much to the imagination or associations of the viewer. It ought to be remembered that these iconographies were primarily intended to guide artists who were commissioned to paint political allegories. An actually executed image of state reason is the frontispiece of Grimmelshausen's "Zweyköpfige Ratio Status" (1684) with the inscription: "Schaut hier das Ratio Status Bild,/ Das jetzund in der Welt viel Gilt,/ Wie jeder es Beschneid und bestielt." *Ratio status* is a strong male figure, ermine clad, holding in one hand two swords, one laurel-enlaced, and in his right an orb, titled "Ratio Status Versatus," while groups of people, politicians and learned men, are snipping away at the ermine mantle, whose spots are really eyes, the symbols of watchfulness. The figure is double-faced, representing in one direction

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

state reason has so far been that of the late Friedrich Meinecke, whose *Idee der Staatsraison*, first published in 1924, has only recently appeared in English under the somewhat misleading title of *Machiavellism*.[2] This, like other studies of the subject, is almost purely literary; though almost every one of the authors discussed by Meinecke had been the servant of a state at some time, hardly any attention is given to application of the idea in the service of the state or in political battles. It remains well above the timber line of political practice and sociological conditioning.

As we know from Meinecke's *Ausgewaehlter Briefwechsel*, he could be a versifier of considerable charm, thus belonging to a group, or possibly a type, of the poet-historian and stylist, together with Mommsen, Macaulay, Treitschke, and others. His bent was certainly toward *Literaturgeschichte*, a history of literature following the development of political ideas, as it had esthetic, ethical, or others, in German writing where the history of ideas actually started—a mixed blessing to some.[3] This manner of writing would largely leave aside such problematic subjects as *Verdeckungsideologien* and their uses. What one has missed these many years has been the critical examination of the idea's working—and its being worked—in day-to-day political struggles and discussions, how it was embraced or repudiated by various groups of interests, such

---

reason of state and in the other, less preferable, divine right. Otto Woodtli, *Die Staatsraison im Roman des deutschen Barock* (Frauenfeld and Leipzig, 1943), 12 f., illustrated. The 1670 edition of Grimmelshausen shows a double-headed figure, one occidental, the other Turkish, holding a sword in each hand and seated on an orb. For Rubens' remarks on reason of state in one of his paintings in the Medici gallery in the Louvre, see Guy de Tervarent, *Les énigmes de l'art* (Paris, 1947), III, 50.

[2] *Machiavellism*, trans. Douglas Scott (London and New Haven, 1957).

[3] For a 1933 judgment on *Ideengeschichte* by a scholar who was probably Meinecke's most brilliant, though to him not the most acceptable, student, see Eckart Kehr's Chicago lecture on "Recent German Historiography," now in his *Der Primat der Innenpolitik* (Berlin, 1965): "The history of ideas is a German phenomenon, which has arisen from specifically German social conditions. This answers the question of its influence abroad at once. Abroad, almost no notice was taken of it, Meinecke is nearly unknown there. . . . It was Meinecke who at the right time with his history of ideas found a way out of the dilemma of the spiritually leaderless German bourgeoisie. In the long run this way out is only a cul-de-sac. But for the moment those who chose it felt strengthened and uplifted. They felt as if on a high mountain from which they gaze down into a dirty valley. . . ." 261 f.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as bureaucracies, churches, or political-minded literati, Liberals, Socialists, and Anarchists. It is this vacuum which tempts one to think in terms of a *Literatengeschichte* in connection with state reason, of the writings of those whom Thomas Mann at his most conservative time called *Zivilisationsliteraten,* and the confrontations they have had with idea and praxis.

I

By the count of one historian of the idea, those opposed were even in the majority. Without giving the period for his census, J. Ferrari in 1860 found that as against some 424 Italian writers favoring the idea, and who "boldly taught the art of guiding the kings, to cheat the peoples, flatter the chieftains, crush the rebels, rule over events," there were 470 hostile to it, on their part uncovering "an occult science killed by modern science and solemnly proscribed by the Revolution of 1789."[4]

The protesters' file is nearly as old as state reason itself. True, the great Corneille, so *regierungsfromm,* so loyal to existing government that Napoleon I declared that had he lived in his own time, he was ready "to make him a prince," approved of state reason (in *Othon,* 1664) and censured only its misuse;[5] but George Chapman in the tragedy of *The Revenge of Bussy d'Ambois* (printed 1613, but written much earlier) pictured an agent in the service of Henri III unjustly justifying Bussy's several incarcerations in the Bastille as called for by reasons of state pronounced in the name of the divine rights of kings. Not only did the piece bespeak a kind of literary man's sympathy for the writer in Bussy, but it was also meant by Chapman, who was fairly close to Walter Raleigh, as a criticism of the absolutist hankerings of James I.[6]

In overgoverned seventeenth-century Germany, being taken over

[4] J. Ferrari, *Histoire de la raison d'état* (Paris, 1860), vi, x.

[5] "Mais quand le potentat se laisse gouverner
Et que de son pouvoir, les grand dépositaires
N'ont pour raison d'Etat que leurs propres affaires. . . ."
Act I, sc. 1
For Corneille and state reason, see Leo Lowenthal, *Literature and the Image of Man* (Boston, 1957), 100 ff.

[6] *Cambridge History of English Literature,* VI (New York, 1933), 39.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by absolutism[7] and endlessly overrun by wars, burgher complaints were raised against the "immoral," "cheating" reason of state, so much invoked to justify wars.[8] Opposed to a Machiavellian, rather than a patriarchal, princely state, Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff (1626-92) in his *Teutscher Fürsten-Stat* of 1656 noted that in his day there was "often . . . almost no disloyalty, evil doing or frivolity which is not in some wrong place excused by *ratione status* or as *Staatssachen*."[9] Even though he spent most of his life in state service, Leibniz, the noblest product of contemporary *Bürgertum*, would still "reject both the theory that there was no authority higher than the State, and the usual excuses for violating treaties, such as honor, prestige or Reason of State."[10]

A satirical writer of the Baroque era, Johann Michael Moscherosch (1601-69), in his *Wunderliche und wahrhafftige Gesichte Philanders von Sittewald* (Strassburg, 1642-43) would fight *ratio status* as "a foreign word and vice," as "the wrecker of ancient German honesty and faithfulness."[11] Satires attacked the "Alamodische," the "New Fashioned Politicus" who bent his knee before the princes' idol, called *ratio status*, the "Idolum Principum, d.i. der Regenten Abgott, den sie heutigs Tags anbetten und Ratio-Status genannt wird" (1678).[12] No period of German literature was more shot through with *Fremdwörter* than that of the Baroque, revolting to good Germans and early nationalists and purists, and few of these importations could be more hateful and fearful than the double-barreled, Italo-French term *Staatsraison*.[13] It might be said that *Das Fremde*

[7] For Prussia, see Hans Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy. The Prussian Experience 1660-1815* (Cambridge, 1958).

[8] H. v. Zwiedineck-Südenhorst, *Die öffentliche Meinung in Deutschland im Zeitalter Ludwigs XIV. 1650-1700* (Stuttgart, 1880), 65 ff.

[9] Kurt Zielenziger, *Die alten deutschen Kameralisten* (Jena, 1914), 340.

[10] F. Hertz, "G. W. Leibniz as a Political Thinker," in *Festschrift für Heinrich Benedikt* (Vienna, 1957), 30; Paul Schrecker, "Leibniz' Principles of International Justice," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, VII (1946), 491 ff.

[11] Adam Wandruszka, "Vom Begriff des 'Vaterlandes' in der Politik des Dreissigjaehrigen Krieges," in *Gesamtdeutsche Vergangenheit. Srbik-Festgabe* (Munich, 1938), 9-10.

[12] Woodtli, 204.

[13] "State" remained for many Germans a distinctly unlovable term; it was so to Max Weber who became enraged by the demand of a Swiss jurist in June 1914 that "One must love the State": "What, one is supposed to even love the monster?" Karl Jaspers in *Nationalzeitung* (Basel), Sept. 18, 1960. The French language pays the state a curious reverence, capitalizing *État*, "the only French

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in it was governing, instead of *Der Fremde*, as was so often the case when thrones were filled with foreign relatives of dynasties becoming extinct, when Italian states in the institution of the *podestà* had the—supposedly neutral—*straniero* run the various city states before the tyrants took over.

A great deal of the anti-Ludovican propaganda in Germany had for its *leitmotif* the concept of *Staatsraison*, never fully acclimatized, *eingedeutscht*, hence ever suspect as foreign, wicked, destructive. Pamphlets bore such Baroque titles as *Curiosorum, nec non politicorum, vagabundi per Europam, vulgo sic dicti Rationis-Status de praesenti tempore Nugae Somniorum. Das ist: Die Andere Classe . . . politischträumender Schwätz-Gesichter, Das in der Europäischen Welt überall zu Hause sich einfindende so genannte Ratio-Status* (numerous editions from 1675[14]), or *Frantzösisch. Ratio status, Oder Rasender Staat des Ehrsüchtigen ruchverlorenen Lilienkönigs* (1702). According to the accusations of their authors, French *ratio status* had upset all hitherto valid concepts of law in Europe; it had given rise to the closely related, equally dreadful concept of *raison de guerre*—the excuse for the frightful scorched earth burnings in the Palatinate including Heidelberg—both undermining justice, God, conscience, humaneness, honesty. For Louis there was no God but state reason. He had turned the divine Decalogue into one of Satan's, whose very own daughter was state reason.[15]

Among these writings the outstanding was, as the French well knew, written by François-Paul de Lissola. His *Bouclier d'estat et de justice contre le dessein manifestement découvert de la monarchie universelle sous le vain prétexte des prétensions de la Reine* (1667, many editions) was intended as a refutation of the claims of Louis XIV, as the husband of a Spanish princess, to parts of the Spanish empire. Lissola warned the world that the Prince de Rohan's famous tract *De l'Interest des Princes et Estats de la Chrestienté* (first pub-

noun so honored." Carl J. Friedrich and Charles Blitzer, *The Age of Power* (Ithaca, 1957), 98.

[14] The editions I have seen are ascribed to Andreas Cless, the place of publication Falso-Veronae (Nürnberg), 1677 and 1679, the latter edition illustrated by four engravings, one of them a triple-faced *ratio status*.

[15] The above is based on Hubert Gillot, *Le règne de Louis XIV et l'opinion publique en Allemagne* (Nancy, 1914), and Johannes Haller, *Die deutsche Publizistik in den Jahren 1668-1674* (Heidelberg, 1892).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lished in 1638) was utterly misleading when he maintained that Spain's power and designs were more dangerous than French power and French reasoning.

II

The most elaborate and often highly critical treatment of the "un-German" and inhuman reason of state was to be found in the *Staatsroman* of the Baroque, verbose productions of often over a thousand pages that make one wonder how in the ruinous wake of the Thirty Years' War there could have been time and ways to write, publish, buy, and read these tomes. Their heroes and anti-heroes are throughout all-highest personalities, kings and queens and princes, legitimate or pretenders, princely figures of the age in all their hubris projected back into various historical ages and places. State reason usually comes close to becoming a Satanic principle victimizing innocent people, mostly great ones. Only a rare writer like Hans Jakob Christoph von Grimmelshausen, the author of *Simplizissimus* and *Mother Courage*, willing to recognize the need for reason of state in an anarchic age, deplored its application by the God-less, conscience-less politician,[16] for whose secret doings and intrigues the burgher has to pay in the end with his money and liberties, forced to realize that even the best prince at times is required to override humane considerations, for, in the Ludovican age, he is the state. To make the abstract concept believable, Johann Rist in his *cri de coeur* of the *Friedewünschende Deutschland* (1646) puts *ratio status* on the stage in the person of a surgeon, called in to cure poor Germania, so sorely mistreated by man-eating Mars. The doctor first proposes *Emplastra Ligae, Unionis, Neutralitis, Confoederationis cum exteris*, which salves she refuses to take along with the two nostra *Simulatio* and *Dissimulatio*, with which the Italians have had such success; she turns them all down as too weak for a hardened German stomach. Finally, she swallows, encased in a baked apple, some *Pillulae Hypocriticae*, highly praised by clerics and secular persons. *Ratio status* expects his payment from his old patron, Mars.

It is the exception in these novels to have a defence of *ratio status*. Still, something like that came from the pen of a Brunswick

[16] "Zweyköpffiger Ratio Status," in *Simplissisimi Staats-Kram* (Nürnberg, 1670, 1684, 1695, reprinted Tübingen, 1968).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

duke, a minor though far from the least nobleman among the multitude of German princelings of the time, who sought to show how humaneness in the ruler can restrict the arrogance and irresponsibility of those many counsellors who claim to speak and act in the name of state reason; he urged that without the working of this reason the arbitrariness of divine right would represent the worse alternative, as bad as the rule of an upstart, illegitimate tyrant who interrupts the legitimate succession in which the accumulated credit of old ruling houses is embodied, or as bad as the sway of the instincts and desires of the populace uncontrolled by reason.[17]

In spite of all implied criticism, the *Staatsroman* remains fundamentally *staatsfromm*, loyally teaching that the mutual relations of prince and subject, his love for them and their obedience to him, will put restrictions on the harsh rulings of state reason while at the same time suppressing even the last remnants of any right of resistance; this right has by now become a *crimen laesae majestatis*, with Cromwell the worst among the recent offenders. Without going to such criminal lengths, the moral person of the Baroque novel is encouraged in his resistance against the misuses of reason of state—a resistance in which he no longer finds help from a completely politicized church. He is strengthened by his belief in the rightness of human faithful love, married and filial.

The reading public for whom this literature was designed was clearly the burgher of the German cities where reason of state, as propounded and applied by the territorial princes and their counsellors, was felt to be the deadly enemy of burgher self-determination; he had seen princely subjects ridden to death, until they came to feel "like a donkey to whom it is a matter of indifference who is riding him." Observing this misery which was greater than his own, the burgher was hard to persuade that *ratio status* provided "a wise way of preserving the State with good reason," and that it was only the false *politicus* who abused the term in order to veil an inexcusable deed in the name of supreme necessity, that, in short, there might be a difference between devilish Machiavellism and

[17] One of these *Staatsromane* warns of the dangerous effects of rebellious oratory, in an age when pulpit oratory was nearly the only public oratory surviving on the continent, as able "to rule over the will of man, to stir up as well as put to sleep or even capture their passions and put others in their stead"; Woodtli, 79. This is an echo, of course, of the Masaniello uprising in Naples in 1647.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

good reason of state. More commonly, state reason was condemned as undermining moral order, was made to declare about itself: "*In summa*, that which others consider impossible, I [*ratio status*] can make possible: and as long as I am on earth, you do not have to fear anything, neither virtue nor honor, neither honesty nor uprightness, nor justice, nor rightness and order, good police, court of law and government."

The influence of state reasoning is seen as particularly wicked wherever "vices are used as *rationes status* or for governmental advantage," where it is being maintained that "all those fare evil who do not do evil themselves." Political individualism and state reason, the latter a tyrant, despite its vaunted rationality, ruling contrary to all rationality and determined by unregulated passion, are polar opposites. The prince is warned of this from below, if not by one or the other of his subjects then by a burgher of one of the remaining free cities: "Do away with the Machiavellian ratio status which usually throws a lawful prince prematurely down from his throne straight into hell." He and his counsellors are reminded that absolute silence and secrecy surrounding state affairs, which they observe at the command of state reason—which on the other hand calls for the subject's absolute non-reticence—is a dangerous thing, since it leads the counsellors to remain silent when signs of danger to the state appear. They are warned of the dangers of secret diplomacy in which state reason fondly believes that it finds its highest virtuosity:

> And even if an ambassador, as some describe him, is an honest man so trained that he must lie for the benefit of his prince or country, still he must be truthful in his promises, upright in his proposals and in his conversations so careful that no one can ever accuse him of some lie.

For, once caught in a lie, he will never be believed again. Veiling, painting over are the *simulacra imperii* (Tacitus) of the diplomat and his employer, their doings repulsive to the common man who shrinks from the inventions of those State painters for whom the Devil himself has mixed the colors. For "I [*ratio status*] am the excellent poet of colors, who can paint over and coat the actions of great princes and lords with lovely dyes, strange movements,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

secret, high, important causes, just as one wants them and the age requires it" (Philander von Sittewald).[18]

III

Many, if not most, of the criticisms brought against reason of state and its practitioners are clearly in evidence in this literature, so difficult of access and hence so far neglected. They were to be resumed in the centuries to come when reason of state would be condemned in even more forthright terms[19] and some of the greatest political crimes—and a few follies as well—would be imputed to it. State reason would be found at the bottom of such affairs as the Calas and de la Barre cases of the French *ancien régime*; the abducting and shooting of the Duc d'Enghien, justified by Napoleon and his minions in terms of this supreme reason;[20] down to the Dreyfus case and the abandonment of Czechoslovakia by the Western powers in 1938.[21] In its name such innocents were sacrificed as la Walewska who, urged on by the Polish nobility, hoping for a *Polonia restituta* at the hands of Napoleon I, surrendered to his importunities: "Je suis prête à sacrifier mon bonheur particulière au bien de l'Etat."[22] Less heinous was the use to which the formula was put by Mme de Maintenon. According to Saint-Simon, Louis XIV returned much too early from the army in the field where from the beginning she had not wanted him to go:

> His absence made her uneasy; a campaign opened so successfully would have kept him away for long, to gather his laurels in person. Her tears at their separation and her subsequent letters were arguments

[18] The above is based on Woodtli and on a reading of some of the novels in the Faber du Faur Collection of Baroque works in the Yale University Library.

[19] One of the early "conversation lexica," Johann Hübner's *Reales Staats-, Zeitungs- und Conversations-Lexicon* (Leipzig, 1709), defines *raison d'état* as something misused, like *raison de guerre*, "and applied as a cover of injustice."

[20] Prince Napoléon, *Napoléon et ses détracteurs* (Paris, 1887), 279.

[21] Report of Czechoslovak Minister in Paris, Osusky, Aug. 1, 1938: "As to Lord Runciman, he is a man with whom British state reason is decisive. Once he has convinced himself, that it is in the interest of England to sacrifice Czechoslovakia, he will do it without remorse." *Europäische Politik 1933-38 im Spiegel der Prager Akten.* Veröffentlichungen des Deutschen Instituts für aussenpolitische Forschung, No. VIII (Essen, 1942), 115.

[22] Frédéric Masson, *Napoléon et les femmes* (17th ed., Paris, 1895), 267.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> to which all considerations of state, all desires for military glory, had to give way.

Mme de Maintenon herself, in a letter, was "delighted that reasons of State have forced the King to return to Versailles."[23]

To the foremost "radical" writers of eighteenth-century France, the *philosophes* from Voltaire and Diderot down, state reason was, if reason at all, reason poisoned by Machiavellism. They were resolved to follow their own *raison* and *raisonnement*, without governmental tutelage. This they did when, contrary to France's official state reason which made her diplomacy oppose Russia for most of the century, they openly sided with Catherine II. She, in turn, showed herself a most adroit propagandist, not only rewarding *philosophes* like Diderot materially or providing funds for the revision of the Calas case, but proudly proclaiming that such judicial murders could not have happened in eighteenth-century Russia, where reason, embodied in an "enlightened despotism," was holding sway, *raison* which Voltaire professed to believe "seems hard to bring about amongst all princes of Europe a competition unheard of before our own days."[24] The bewitchment of the *philosophes*, whether far away from Russia or even when travelling there as Diderot did, is an uncomfortable reminder of the spell cast by the twentieth-century Kremlin over so many Western intellectuals protesting against their own countries' reason of state procedures, without suspecting that there might be another reason at work in Russia. Frederician Prussia fared almost as well in such circles, and "Frederick, truly, as well as Catherine could be content with their *philosophes* in Paris who so ingeniously and with so much conviction would justify their reason of state by *Raison*."[25]

In eighteenth-century Italy, the original homeland of the idea and many of the practices justified by it, if we follow Ferrari's history, Filangieri and Beccaria,

> the nation's two demi-gods during the century, believed that it sufficed to pronounce the truth to propagate it and to propagate it in order to spread happiness all over the world. This principle, continuously

[23] W. H. Lewis, *The Sunset of the Splendid Century* (New York, 1955), 134, 136.

[24] Albert Lortholary, *Les "philosophes" du XVIII^e siècle et la Russie* (Paris, [1951?]), 121, 136, 150 ff., 195.

[25] Albert Cherel, *La pensée de Machiavel en France* (Paris, 1935), 237.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> preached by the press, which owes to it its own existence, had chased reason of state out of all books, all writings, all tribunes where it could not any longer show itself without provoking unanimous maledictions.

Everywhere in the age of Enlightenment there was discussion only of questions of justice, legislation, political economy. "No one spoke any more of the advantages of silence, of the success of iniquity or the play of individual passions in public affairs." If reason of state did not altogether disappear, there was yet "the naive hope that the precepts of Machiavelli or Botero would, which [principles] —seemingly—could command events and provide a social necromancy by which great men could be produced *ad libitum* or revolutions at leisure."[26]

IV

The many loveless marriages for dynastic and other state-reasoned necessities, including that of the great Catherine, who had, however, emancipated herself, provided writers with a most popular subject and endless occasions to point to the inhumanity which surrounded the thrones, and to stir the indignation or at least the tear ducts of the reading bourgeoisie.[27] In such cases marriage could be avoided, if at all, only by the entry of the intended female victim into a nunnery, a fate almost equally abhorrent.[28] While such marriages have continued into our own days, they—and some non-princely ones as well[29]—were the special mark of the *ancien régime*, or of what

[26] Ferrari, 352, 254, 374 f.

[27] The *Institutions politiques par le Baron de Bielfeld* (Nouv. ed., Leyden, 1768), Vol. II, Chap. 1, Sec. xxxix, gives special treatment to "marriages for state reason," this "ambiguous expression which has only too often served as a cloak to cover up the most odious proceedings. There is hardly a more infamous word than this one in politics." Chap. 5, Secs. viii-x.

[28] Mme d'Aiguillon, a niece of Richelieu, who had lost her husband in the Huguenot wars, "de peur que, par quelque raison d'Estat, on ne la sacrifiast encore, fit voeu un peu brusquement de ne marier jamais et de se faire Carmelite." Tallemont de Réaux, *Historiettes* (ed. Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Paris, 1960), I, 310.

[29] Sir Francis Bacon advised Buckingham (July 12, 1617) against the latter's brother's marriage with Edward Coke's daughter, a rich heiress, as "very inconvenient both for your brother and yourself. He shall marry into a disgraced family, which in reason of state is never held good." Since both Buckingham and James I wanted the marriage, Bacon began to lose favor with them, starting on his fall, ending with his impeachment in 1621. Catherine Drinker Bowen, *The Lion and the Throne* (Boston, 1956), 403.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

continued to survive of this regime, as in Bismarck's veto of the marriage of one of the granddaughters of Emperor William I with Prince Alexander I of Bulgaria. Reason of state figured in a French-Spanish marriage contract of 1615.[30] Before James IV of Scotland (later James I) in 1584 crossed the North Sea to win the hand of a Danish princess,

> he made it plain to the Privy Council that he married for reason of state, chiefly to provide his kingdom with an heir—"and as to my own nature, God is my witness, I would have abstained longer," the admission on James' part of his own strong homosexual inclinations.[31]

The most protracted wooing for a princess and incidentally for an alliance was that of Charles Prince of Wales for an infanta of Spain, an affair so portentous that Parliament dared to protest, running up against a warning from James I "not to meddle with deep matters of state, saying he marvels at their venturing upon a province that pertains to him, and is offended thereof." Parliament in turn assured him "that they did not pretend to meddle in affairs of state but only to remind him humbly of what they considered prejudicial to him."[32] Whether Charles himself really wanted the infanta, no one in England seemed certain, a Venetian ambassador hearing.

> on good authority that not long ago he said laughingly to a few intimates after regarding a portrait of the infanta not being able to contain himself entirely, after having praised her highly, that if it were not a sin, princes ought to have two wives, one for *ragione di stato* and the other to please themselves.[33]

Sin or no sin, many, if not most princes of absolutism, in their *Maitressenwirtschaft*, proceeded along this line.

If such *mésalliances* went beyond dalliance, resulting perhaps in a secret marriage, such as that of Louis XIV and La Maintenon, or possibly that of Charles II to Lucy Walter, which many contempo-

[30] François Auguste Alexis Mignet, *Négotiations relatives à la succession d'Espagne sous Louis XIV* (Paris, 1835-42), I, 281.

[31] G. P. V. Akkrig, *Jacobean Pageant. The Court of James I* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 3.

[32] Roger Coke, *A Detection of the Court and State of England during the Four Last Reigns* (London, 1696), I, 72; *Calendar of State Papers*—Venice XVII, 181 f., 186.

[33] *Ibid.*, XVII, 453 f.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

raries thought had actually taken place, thus strengthening in their eyes Monmouth's claim to the throne, these ties would be denied. As poor John Hicks (1633-85), a Monmouth follower and nonconformist divine, declared on the scaffold: It was just one of those things which reasons of state would appear to justify a king in denying if the supposed interests of his kingdom would be advantaged thereby.[34] The denial of the Walter marriage by Charles himself, a marriage not at all unlikely per se, since there was as yet no Royal Marriage Act forbidding unions below certain ranks to members of the royal family, was widely ascribed to the doings of James and his friends. As a *roman de clef* of circa 1682 put it in the mouths of country folk who express to Charles their own conviction that Monmouth was the true heir to the throne: "We know not upon what pretended reasons of state Purdino's [that is, James'] creatures have prevailed with the King to deny him."[35]

Marriages arranged for state reasons, or forbidden by them, loveless unions, marriages pursued and brides jilted for political reasons, overriding true love, are standing subjects of the *Staatsroman* of the Baroque age. In the *Clélie* (10 Vols., 1654-61) of Mlle de Scudéry, read by all contemporary Europe, the evil hero Tarquinius, developing into a tyrant, sacrifices his original love for the second daughter of Severius Tullius in order to obtain the hand of the elder daughter and heiress, declaring that the satisfaction he is to obtain through winning the higher position is far greater than any that love could give. Consequently, he poisons the more beloved royal daughter whose sister accommodatingly poisons her own husband, the two forming a couple in whom private and political crime come to embody conscienceless reason of state at its worst, in their hauteur pitying those who, in a shepherd-like life, resign crowns for the sake of their love. They achieve the ungodly position of lovelessness that made a German poet ask:

> Wär's wahr, dass Majestät nicht könnte stehn mit Liebe,
> So sage mir, wie Gott ein ew'ger König bliebe?
>
> (If it were true that Majesty is inconsistent with love,
> Tell me: How could God remain eternal king?)
>
> (Angelus Silesius)

[34] F. A. Inderwick, *Sidelights on the Stuarts* (London, 1888), 368 f.
[35] Low George Scott, *Lucy Walter: Wife or Mistress* (London, 1947), 215.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In a less criminal situation, the king of another "state novel," Jean Barclay's *Argenis* (German translation by Martin Opitz, Amsterdam, 1644), explains to his daughter whom he wants to marry for reasons of state:

> Private persons commonly marry according to their preference or in keeping with egalitarian customs. We, however, must let such genteelness pass by. For the state of kings demands that even almost unworthy and hostile persons are united with them by the holy duty of matrimony, that out of cruel necessity all laws of connections and sworn brotherhood are being put aside. He is usually the most welcome to us who usefully strengthens our power to a high degree; and those relationships are considered the noblest which strengthen the empire most.

In the happy ending, love is shown as proving the true reason of state: in the *Argenis*, the love of the king's daughter seemingly directed at a man far below her station, is found not to be misdirected after all—she has followed, if not state reason, state instinct, and her lover is in the end revealed as of truly noble and elevated birth.

The purer idealistic sentiment toward such marriage planning and scheming, contrary to the prevailing silencing practices of the age, is usually voiced by the female partner to the intended connection. It is she who pronounces against the disregard of what she—and the presumable readers—consider the nobler sentiments, sentiments to which the increased power that might result from a planned marriage, is not appealing, or is even abhorrent:

> Does he not know it: that love hatched by state wisdom [*Staats-Klugheit*] produces snake eggs which may have the color of dove eggs but inside have poisonous worms? . . . Besides, God Himself for the most part shows His displeasure at some blindings of love by dooming them to infertility; and if there are children, they are sacrifices brought by them [the dynasts] to their interests.

Such novelistic judgments are the expression of burgher smugness in the face of so large a number of eugenically poor offspring of Hapsburg, Stuart, and other contemporary royal marriages.

Where the woman is heir to the throne, and presumably free to make her own choice of a consort, she is still under the dictate of state reason, like Victoria so much later. In *Die durchleuchtige*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Syrerin Aramena, a novel by Duke Anton Ulrich of Brunswick (Nürnberg, 1669-73), the heiress is under pressure from her cruel father Belochus who, in order to maintain the unity of his empire, wants her to marry—monstrously enough by the concepts of the seventeenth-century—her own brother Baleus. Even though considering obedience the supreme filial duty, she resists his demand at a price she is willing to pay, the renunciation of the preference of her own heart. Resisting the suit of the man at her feet, Prince Abimelech, whom she loves but whom the requirement of the state and her father's opposition would not allow her to wed, she tells him: "Rise up, my prince, and be assured that thy love is not abhorrent to me. . . . and if I once were at liberty to select a Ninevite king in accordance with my own wish, none but thee, Abimelech, shall be it." She tries to calm his passion: "Stop! Stop! Let not your blind love grow powerful enough to make you sin." He nobly excuses himself, acknowledges her superior wisdom, and wants to know what, after her refusal, he might still expect:

> This, my prince (answered the Queen), that his Aramena will always recognize his love with a faithful counter-favor, also will never marry, unless Heaven has selected Abimelech for this purpose. This, the queen said with moist eyes: and Abimelech threw himself once more at her feet, and would not speak a word, out of melancholy and pleasure.

In spite of her renunciation, she is still critical of state reason:

> I can praise State causes [*Staatsursachen*] just as little as I find them useful . . . since after all pleasure in human life is preferable to all other considerations; and that prince or lady is unhappy who must submit to the dictates of the state and may not enjoy that liberty which is permitted even to shepherds and shepherdesses.

Such talk, however, a relative-queen, the sister of Beloch and in her own right ruler of Tyro, a neighboring state, will not approve: "Royal persons are demi-gods and must not share the thought of common people. Considerations of how to make their empire and their power greater and stronger must be dearer to them than a vulgar fit of love which makes so many unhappy." The ducal author, obviously in the interest of good princely government, finds a happy ending after all, but only after a new obstacle is overcome: It turns out that Aramena is not the daughter of Beloch but of another king whose heiress she also is. But now, after her brother

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Baleus has given up his suit, Beloch himself wants her hand, in order to confirm his hold on the lands he has ruled so far. She turns him down, he besieges her in her castle, and the Queen of Tyro announces that she must marry Beloch:

> If thou are a great queen, know that Belochus is a still greater king because fortune has thrown the great queen of Syria into his power. . . . No human power can or may hinder his aim: Heaven as well will not do it, because he is just and good. If you have pity for your poor land and the blood of so many thousands, thou wilt make peace . . . and show to the world that the beautiful Aramena has conquered herself and for the benefit of her empire has concluded a marriage even if incompatible with her sentiment. . . . [Aramena must know at last that] the likes of us have to marry, not in keeping with free choice but with the demands of the state.

But no, answers Aramena; she might agree with the abstract rule if the welfare of the state of Syria should demand it, but Syria would be more hurt than helped by the proposed marriage which would put it under Babylonian servitude forever. As against that situation, state interest and private preference could well coincide. A mystic taboo, strengthened by her virtue, keeps Beloch and his passions at bay, and she is spared the fate of Judith who had to slay Holofernes; she is saved by the lover who is worthy of her, and with his soldiers breaks down the prison walls with which the representative of false reason of state has surrounded the noble queen.

Thus ends, happily, this "state novel," clearly written *pro domo*, by a prince himself for the sake of princely government, in which human virtues and human right, embodied in a noble queen, superior to all the subsequent queens of Europe—with the possible exception of Maria Theresa—are shown to survive whatever burgherdom may have been led to believe about conditions under the sway of reason of state.[36]

Marriages arranged for state reasons—and so seldom with regard to eugenics—marriages forbidden by them, or matches achieved in spite of them, remained a cherished subject of humanitarian indignation (or irony, as in Thomas Mann's *Königliche Hoheit*) for literati. When one of E. T. A. Hoffmann's ethereal Julias is forced to marry a princely imbecile for reasons of state, it proved the event

[36] For the above, see Woodtli, 93 ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the life of the musical director Kreisler that drove him to his final madness.[37] And when Wallis Warfield, the Duchess of Windsor, gave her memoirs the title, conceived presumably by a ghost-writer, *The Heart Has Its Reasons* (New York, 1956), how much was she herself aware of the tradition of protests against certain marriages due to state reason?

V

The *ancien régime*'s most outstanding, most shocking judicial murder cases were both due, according to "enlightened" views, to state reason or clerical fanaticism, or both—*"Ecrasez l'infame!"* (Voltaire), a cry antedating the de la Barre case by some twenty-seven years. These were the crimes committed in the court trials of the Calas family (1762) and of de la Barre (1760).[38] No longer held back by La Fontaine's cautious, if sly, warning that the reason of the strongest is always the best (1668), Voltaire—and among other authors Melchior Grimm[39]—took up both cases and in the latter at least succeeded in forcing the French government to admit its errors, state reason or not, to which the fighting author would then refer ironically on occasions, as when mentioning the claim of Richelieu's *Political Testament* that "la raison doit être la règle d'un Etat,"[40]

[37] Walther Harich, *Ernst Theodor Amadëus Hoffmann. Das Leben eines Künstlers* (Berlin, 1920), II, 267.

[38] For the latter case, see most recently Gaston Marchou, "Le Chevalier de la Barre," *Revue de Paris*, LXXII (1965), 112 ff., who establishes that in the case the government was more responsible for the judicial murder than the church authorities, the latter actually being willing to condone the sacrilege imputed to young de la Barre. It was the *parlements* as well as Louis XV who wanted to show the world that they were no less *catholique* than the clergy. Among the crimes imputed to the victim was the reading of Voltaire's *Dictionnaire philosophique*. The author at first panicked and tried to shake off de la Barre, "ce petit imbécile," and only later, when it had become less risky, came to write his *cri du sang innocent*. M. Marchou himself, to stay in the literary tradition, based a drama, *Le sacrilège* (1959), on the de la Barre case.

[39] Grimm proposed a public subscription for the relief of the Calas family; according to his "projet de subscription pour un estampe tragique et morale," the subscribers were to receive a print showing the sorrowing family in jail, but the government suppressed it. In his "Correspondence" Grimm proposed more than liberty of conscience—separation of religion and state, with the latter "a thing absolutely indifferent to the government. . . . We still need full freedom for everyone talking nonsense at his ease." Edmond Scherer, *Melchior Grimm* (Paris, 1887), 128, 419.

[40] *Dictionnaire de la philosophie* (1765 and after), ed. Jules Benda (Paris, n.d.), I, 257.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rallying behind him the *philosophes* and Encyclodepists, or even, if somewhat more deceptively, an empress, Catherine II, and a king, Frederick the Great, the latter writing Voltaire (June 18, 1776): "Hercules vanquished the Nemean lion, and a strong athlete named Voltaire has crushed the hydra of fanaticism under his feet. Reason becomes stronger every day in our Europe."[41]

In the climate of opinion created and maintained by the independent, irregularly employed, precariously living writer it became possible—the Hegelian *List der Idee* working once more—for an author to invoke what amounted to the essence of state reasoning, so thoroughly anti-revolutionary, to further a revolution, the American, as Beaumarchais did. In order to overcome the scruples of Louis XVI against rendering secret help to the rebels, he addressed the King on December 7, 1775, under (and true to) the motto: *Summum jus summa injuria:*

> The national policy which preserves states, differs in every respect almost entirely from civil morality which governs individuals [hence no good faith on the King's part was due to England] that actual enemy, that jealous rival of your success, that people always systematically unjust to you.[42]

VI

The ensuing revolutions seemed to promise to the writers the replacement of all reason of state by the working of true reason, pure spirituality. Lamartine in the February Revolution had seen the chance for a

> spiritualist policy, a religion of humanity, a general fraternity of mankind, a general fraternity of peoples. . . . The reign of God through the reason of all calls itself the Republic. We are founding the Republic. . . . Politics of which the ancients made a mystery, of which the moderns made an art, is neither the one nor the other: There is in it neither cleverness, nor force, nor ruse. . . . Policy, that is morality, reason and virtue.[43]

But there ensued the always unfailing post-revolutionary disappointments, radicalizing thought and expression. The more radical

[41] As quoted in Marchou, "Le Chevalier de la Barre."

[42] Edward S. Corwin, *French Policy and the American Alliance of 1778* (Hamden, Conn., 1962), 72.

[43] Cherel, 266 f.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a writer, the greater his scorn for the governmental principle of reason of state, for the state must be abolished, must not persist like a "rocher de bronze," must "wither away"—the formula which comes closest to recognizing an anarchist heritage in Marxism. "What is government among men? What is the reason of state?" Proudhon had asked.

> If the reason of state is to conform to justice, to what end does it serve? If it is an exception to justice, what is a justice that is subject to so many exceptions? Is political order the same thing as the economic order? Are they based one upon the other? How and since when? Formidable questions which academic science would be careful not to raise [least so in the present state of society when] instead of justice reason of state reigns, the last word of which, the baneful term, is *tyranny*. [It was so under absolutism] when the principles of fatality and antagonism were taken as the base of society, with reason of state taken for the law of government, the public domain identified with the appanage of the prince [and it was so no less under democracy]. Kings and pontiffs, ministers and philosophers did with state reason what M. Jourdain did with prose, without knowing it, and the people were not scandalized by it: That had always been called Justice.[44]

Proudhon saw in his own time—in 1862, more specifically—reason of state getting possession even of unsuspecting, seemingly "virtuous citizens" like Garibaldi and Mazzini in their striving for Italian unity. But what of so many Italians who did not want it, wanted to retain the separate parts of *Italia Unità*? As Proudhon saw it, Mazzini was maintaining that the state reason of nationality was sovereign, higher than and directed against princes or ministers or deviating writers, cities, and provinces, or even a whole population if they should happen to resist Mazzini's idea of the complete unity of Italy.[45] In pursuit of the idea, he was ready if need be to "decimate, purge, punish a whole population" should they happen to prefer Italian federalism to the unitary state and Victor Emmanuel's sovereignty. For Proudhon, the federalist, "only the federative

[44] *De la justice dans la Révolution et dans l'Eglise* (Paris, 1858), I, 40, 382, 391 ff.; II, 402 f.

[45] In the Italian-speaking Swiss Canton of Ticino, sympathy with the Italian uprising of 1848 was so strong that "the canton proved inaccessible to the considerations of state reason" and in various ways violated Swiss neutrality. Edgar Bonjour, *Geschichte der schweizerischen Neutralität* (2d ed., Basel, 1965), I, 312.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

system, founded on voluntary contract, and hence elevating pure justice to the supreme principle, is opposed to this incendiarism and slaughter."[46]

The violence which was threatened by the nationality principle against federative self-determination seemed to Proudhon worse even "in the interest of liberty and the Revolution" than international law "such as reason of state and the science of history together produce it."[47]

To the anarchist, nothing could be more unreasonable than reason of state: the state had to be abolished because it was unreasonable per se.[48] When Prince Kropotkin returned in 1867 from a Siberian expedition to the metropolis, he heard of the arrest of several Russian revolutionaries, including Chernyshevski. To his question: "What for? What has he done?" he received the answers of many good subjects of the Tsar: "Nothing particular, nothing! But, *mon cher*, you know State considerations! Such a clever man, awfully clever! And such an influence he has on the youth. You understand, that a government cannot tolerate that! That's impossible! *Intolérable, mon cher, dans un Etat bien ordonné*!" On Kropotkin's way to anarchism, this experience gave him "quite a turn."[49]

By comparison, early anarchism carried an almost cheerful note, somehow sharing the belief in "progress" and "evolution" which would bring the world at last into reasonable ungovernedness. It needed the century of experience with Communist-Fascist-Liberal governing and cruelties to produce the utter anarchistic despair of a literary man like George Orwell, of whom it has been said, by an ex-Communist, that he "at heart was a simple-minded anarchist and, in his eyes, any political movement forfeited its *raison d'être*

[46] Max Nettlau, *Der Anarchismus von Proudhon zu Kropotkin. Seine historische Entwicklung in den Jahren 1859-1880* (Berlin, 1927), 16 f.

[47] To Alexander Herzen, 1861, in *Lettres*, compiled by Daniel Halévy and Louis Guilloux (Paris, 1929), 283.

[48] As one of the Haymarket anarchists, Michael Schwab, declared before the jury that sent him to his death: "According to our vocabulary, anarchy is a state of society in which the only government is reason; a state of society in which all human beings do right for the simple reason that it is right, and hate wrong because it is wrong." Staughton Lynd (ed.), *Nonviolence in America* (Indianapolis and New York, 1966), 110.

[49] *Memoirs of a Revolutionist* (London, 1899), I, 229.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the moment it acquired a *raison d'état.*"[50] We must leave undecided whether this mind was quite that simple.[51]

VII

The Dreyfus case offered to French radical writers like Zola—and to some non-French ones as well[52]—at the time and later on, the sharpest challenge that state reasoning, seemingly antiquated by now but practiced above all by the army and upheld by the conservative forces in the Third Republic, could provide. It was for Liberals—rather more than for Socialists like Jaurès, not an original Dreyfusard—and for Jews, in France and elsewhere, the worst judicial crime of the nineteenth century. As Clemenceau exclaimed in his plea for Zola, the idea was

> conceivable under Louis XIV, under Napoleon, under men who hold a people in their hand and manipulate it according to their own will. In a democracy, reason of state is nothing but a contradiction, a last remnant of the past. . . . O yes, we have destroyed the Bastille, we dance every 14th of July to celebrate this destruction of state reason. But in our very inmost an inner Bastille has remained.[53]

Among political protest movements, *Dreyfusisme* remains as the strongest ever to have arisen among intellectuals, that so largely unorganizable element. Writers and teachers of all grades joined in a "Manifesto of the Intellectuals" and in the "Ligue pour la défense des droits de l'homme," headed by Clemenceau and Reinach, as the modes of resistance of the intellectual and of the individual against cold-hearted state reason, which was constantly invoked by the "bien pensants" and, above all, by the army officers[54] and the clergy (and against the blind urges of the ignorant masses, including the readers of the *Petit Journal* and similar papers). They

[50] Isaac Deutscher, *Heretics and Renegades* (London, 1955), 46 f.

[51] For a discussion, see George Kateb, "The Road to 1984," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXXI (1966), 564-80.

[52] See, for example, Hans Rehfisch and Wilhelm Herzog, *Die Affäre Dreyfus. Ein Schauspiel* (Munich, n.d. [1950's]).

[53] *Le procès Zola devant la Cour d'Assises de la Seine et la Cour de Cassation* (Paris, 1898), II, 426.

[54] They, according to Georges Sorel (*Reflexions sur la violence*, 6th ed., Paris, 1925, 308), "always conceived of justice in the manner of the *ancien régime* and found condemnation for reasons of state altogether natural."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were deeply convinced that, in the *affaire*, "reason of state, the old subject so bitterly controversial, was serving as an alibi for all the abuses."[55] In turn, they provoked the nationalist counter-organizations, falling eventually under Charles Maurras' leadership, first, the "Ligue de la patrie française," and, later, the "Action française." These drew many followers from the conservative intelligentsia—including nearly the whole Académie française[56]—which continually insisted that Dreyfus was, and must remain, guilty, for reasons of state, lest the state suffer.[57] The Action française led "the fight against revision in the name of raison d'état."[58] They feared damage to that *raison d'état* which, as a "bien pensant" like Charles Benoist would complain as late as 1907, had fallen into discredit because the *affaire* had forced the government to direct appeals to the elements of disorder in the effort to keep order.[59]

Both sides fought for an idea, rather than for or against a personality—the one for abstract justice and "pure reason," the other for the reason which the state needed for its own and the army's continued existence and which forbade a revision of the original judgment.

For a moment, the intellectuals believed that pure reason had won out over state reason (and laicism over clericalism, the Vatican having remained silent and not spoken out in favor of the great innocent, as the *Times* noted).[60] But they were soon disillusioned; they found, as did Charles Peguy, perhaps the noblest among them, that *Dreyfusisme*, so recently "a system of absolute freedom, truth, justice and deep spiritual order," in the end was deteriorating into *Combisme* and *Jaurèsisme*, "with its own system of constraint and

[55] Georges Suarez, *Briand: Sa vie—son oeuvre* (Paris, 1938), I, 246; Chéel, 281.

[56] Ernst Nolte, *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche* (Munich, 1963), 103.

[57] Historian Gabriel Hanotaux, foreign minister during part of the Dreyfus crisis, after some early stirring of his conscience took a "neutral stand," even declining to furnish available Quai d'Orsay information exculpating Dreyfus, for reasons of state. Review of Thomas M. Iams Jr., *Dreyfus, Diplomatists and the Dual Alliance* (Geneva, 1962), in *American Historical Review* LXIX (1963), 212. With the same motivation, German diplomacy from Chancellor Bülow down declined to help establish Dreyfus' innocence. Walter Frank, *Nationalismus und Demokratie* (Hamburg [1934]), 482.

[58] J. Paul-Boncour, *Entre deux guerres. Souvenirs sur la IIIe République* (New York, 1946), I, 139.

[59] Sorel, 308.

[60] *The History of The Times* (London, 1947), III, 286, 799.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

state reason, a system of political lying, corruption, cheating and shame."[61] As an enemy of party socialism and spokesman of syndicalism, Georges Sorel found that, with the *affaire* hardly over, the government of the *Défense républicaine* in turn had begun another *affaire*—that of the so-called *fiches*, the conduct sheets of officers—"in the name of raison d'État, piling up almost as many lies as the General Staff had amassed against Dreyfus," and were supported in this by Jaurès and other *Dreyfusards*. For Sorel the experience, as always, showed that

> our revolutionaries argue reason of state as soon as they get into power, that they then employ police measures and that they consider justice as an arm they can abuse against their enemies. The parliamentary Socialists in no way escape the common rule; they preserve the old cult of the state; they are therefore prepared to commit all the misdeeds of the ancien régime and of the Revolution.

As against this, Sorel and the Syndicalists wanted to resume the Proudhon heritage, the testament of Marx as they read it. With the hope that the state would wither away—that hope that the two contrasting, hostile fathers of socialism had in common—they, unlike the men of the eighteenth century, unlike the parliamentary Socialists, were proposing not to reform the existing state but to abolish it; and they were basing their fight on the ground of antipatriotism, patriotism being a continuous breeding ground of reason of state,[62] and on the spontaneous action of the syndicalized workers climaxing in the general strike.

VIII

To many radicals, in the United States and beyond, the Sacco-Vanzetti case signified the worst judicial murder of the twentieth century and of capitalism, which seemed to be applying, or so it seemed to Europeans, always more familiar with the ancient concept than Americans, reason of state against two innocent men. One of the monuments of this indignation is *Staatsraison. Ein Denkmal für Sacco und Vanzetti* (Berlin, 1928), a drama never

[61] Werner Richter, *Von Gambetta zu Clemenceau* (Zurich, 1946), 393. For the intellectuals' participation in the *affaire*, see C. Delhorbe, *L'affaire Dreyfus et les écrivains français* (Paris, 1932).

[62] Sorel, 308.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

staged, so far as we know, written by Erich Mühsam, a Munich anarchist, then only recently released from prison for his part in the Munich revolution of 1918-19, who was to be murdered by the Nazis five years later.

Few of these and other radicals were ready to reveal, or write about, reason of state as determining Russian Communist procedures such as the Stalin "purges;" certainly not Bertolt Brecht, who was sitting "quietly under a Danish thatched roof while in Moscow tsarist persecution mania was staging Communist reason of state,"[63] while at the same time Thomas Mann was moved to address the Kremlin with a mildly worded warning not to apply the ancient doctrine. Pleading in favor of Mühsam's widow, who had been jailed in Moscow like many other German refugees of the Left, Mann thought her "quite certainly a personality innocent and politically speaking non-dangerous. That her incarceration should be a state necessity, I shall never believe and can only explain to myself by the overly great zeal of subordinate officials."[64]

Reason of state has still not lost its scandal-provoking force in an increasingly interconnected world, providing the sharpest reaction in post-Hitler Germany, which, as the Third Reich, had been ruled by Nazi *Staatsraison*. The "intelligentsia's" indignation with "the ice-cold, rascally reason of state applied at all times by statesmen"[65] became alive once more; among the practitioners assailed was a pope, one of the untouchables to so many, drawn by Rolf Hochhuth in his drama *Der Stellvertreter* (*The Deputy*), first staged in Berlin in 1963, and afterwards in many other German and non-German cities including New York. The anti-hero of the play is Pius XII, the Pope of the Second World War, whom the author represents as saying to a young Jesuit, who has implored his help in easing the persecution of the Jews as far as this seemed in his power:

> Reason of state forbids us to denounce Herr Hitler as a bandit; he must remain as one worth negotiating with. . . . And not only in order to hold the Eastern frontier, to uphold the balance of power as well, Germany must remain viable. [For the author] a deputy of Christ who

[63] Reinhard Baumgart, "Vom starken B.B.," *Der Spiegel*, April 4, 1966.

[64] *Briefe 1889-1936* (n.p., 1961), 421. Whether due to this intervention or not, Frau Mühsam survived the Moscow years.

[65] Arno Schmidt, *Fouqué und einige seiner Zeitgenossen* (Karlsruhe, 1958), 12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> sees these things before his eyes and remains silent for reasons of state, who delays for even one day, hesitates for even one hour to raise his anguished voice to a curse that should shake every last man on earth, such a pope is a criminal.

Reason of state became the subject even of a West German opera, Werner Henze's *Der Prinz von Homburg*, based on a drama by Kleist, in which the hero is "a dreamer, stranded in a world of state reason and indolence."[66] A tragedy by dramatist Friedrich Hebbel centered around Agnes Bernauer, the unfortunate wife of a successor to the imperial throne whose father-in-law had her drowned in the Danube. One literary historian of East Germany would discover in Hebbel a "glorifier of ice cold reason" while another East German *Germanist* saw the same poet as demonstrating the image of a feudal society in its fatal decadence, and thus "closer to dialectical materialism than to Hegel's idealistic dialectics."[67]

The "thaw" in Russian affairs induced doubts in some minds whether in her immediate, Stalinist past the Soviet Union had not been ruled in keeping with state reasoning rather than with the original Communist hopes and promises of the "withering state," the very antithesis, and by now an old one, of reason of state. The mood went so far at least as to allow a cautious literary expression of such doubts in the novel *For the Good of the Cause* by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, dealing, according to announcements, with "individual rights versus raison d'état."[68]

The heirs, whether or not they are considered legitimate or ultimate, of nineteenth-century radicalism, including the communized nations or their governments, could not very well, and consistently with other ideas or practices, apply reason of state to their governmental activities. Where they did so, it would indicate a degree, if slight, of deviance from the Moscow line, of conformity to an older pre-Bolshevist tradition. This phenomenon has been observable in Poland notably. There, the press, as official as in any other Communist country has on various occasions invoked state reason for the country's stand on the problem of its new western boundaries. Following Gromyko's declaration at the Twenty-third USSRCP

[66] *Die Zeit*, Aug. 16, 1960.
[67] *Ibid.*, Nov. 29, 1966.
[68] Translated by David Floyd and Max Hayward, with introduction by David Floyd. (New York, 1964).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Congress about the Soviet Union's firm position on the Oder-Neisse line, a provincial paper in the newly annexed parts of Poland, *Glos Olsztynski*, wrote that this "fully corresponds with our attitude and reason of state."[69] A little earlier the Danzig *Glos Wybrzeza* had claimed for the same "peace border" that it had been determined "in accordance with Polish reason of state"—which, while historically untrue, might have been intended to say: not in accordance with ethnographic conditions—and that Poland had "fully exploited, for the first time in her history, the victory over German militarism."[70]

In their struggle with the Polish episcopate, Communist organs have declared themselves to be "painfully shocked" by the clergy's attempts at a reconciliation with the German bishops: All such endeavors were contrary to the "Polish reason of state and to the national interests of Poland."[71] What such argumentation would indicate is the awareness, on the part of the Communist regime, of a Western heritage,[72] either working among Communists themselves or in the population at large or at least among the intelligentsia, which has to be convinced and won over or kept loyal by the Gomulka regime.

[69] *Expellee Press Service*, May 20, 1966.

[70] *Ibid.*, March 31, 1966.

[71] *Ibid.*, June 9, 1966.

[72] It was in a Western, more specifically, French tradition among the post-1945 "succession states," when Guinea justified the detention of an American journalist, who had displeased Sekou Touré and Nkrumah in their attempt at a Ghana-Guinée union, by "reasons of state." New York *Times*, Aug. 20, 1959.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Reviews

Libel and Academic Freedom: A Law Suit Against Political Extremists *by Arnold M. Rose. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1968.—ix, 287 pp. $7.95.*

This is an account, in the third person, by the plaintiff, a sociology teacher at the University of Minnesota, of a successful libel suit that, however, on appeal ran afoul of the Supreme Court's New York *Times* decision because Rose had been a member of the Minnesota legislature during part of the time when he was libeled. He was charged by local right-wingers with having been a Communist collaborator and security risk and unfit to be either a legislator or teacher. The charge rested almost entirely on his participation with Gunnar Myrdal in the writing of *An American Dilemma.*

The principal defendant was Gerda Koch, an assiduous collector of right-wing literature and author of numerous leaflets. She interposed a counterclaim based on statements made by Rose in which she was called subversive and as dangerous as the Communists.

The trial lasted more than three weeks and ended in Rose's vindication. The jury threw out the counterclaim and awarded Rose $10,000 compensatory and $10,000 punitive damages. But the verdict was reversed on appeal because the trial judge had not applied the rule of the *Times* case, that to recover a plaintiff must show not only that the statements about him were false but that they were made in reckless disregard of the truth. The author-plaintiff died before there could be a new trial, but not before he had been able to correct proofs.

The book describes at considerable length the backgrounds of both parties to the suit and in great detail the course of the trial itself. In an appendix some of Miss Koch's writings about Rose are set forth, as well as the texts of some bills co-sponsored by him in the legislature.

The account of the trial justifies the traditional advice of the lawyer

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to a client contemplating a libel suit: take care, as you will become in effect a defendant. Here defense counsel started his cross-examination of Rose about his participation in Jewish religious services. He tried to show that the 125 persons listed by Myrdal in his preface had Communist connections, relying mainly on reports of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Counsel even called Rose part of "the Jewish Shylock, the usury element." While cross-examining a member of Congress who testified as a character witness for Rose, the lawyer tried to show there was a Communist conspiracy by banks to overthrow the government—until the judge lost patience. He challenged another character witness because he was a member of the local branch of the Council on Foreign Relations, which the lawyer described as "the secret government of the United States." He even went as far back as Benjamin Franklin in his attacks on the banking system and brought in Israel, Alger Hiss, and the war in Vietnam.

The impact on the jury must have been prejudicial to the defense—indeed, one of the chapter headings reads: "The Defense Defeats Itself." The defendants' case consisted mainly of Miss Koch's testimony and an attempt to put in evidence several hundred books and articles which had to do with a supposed Communist conspiracy and Chief Justice Warren's treason, but did not even mention Rose—this on the theory that they bore on Miss Koch's "frame of mind" and so showed she had no malice toward Rose. Days were consumed by Miss Koch's trying to show Communist connections of many of the persons listed by Myrdal. At one point she said that the United Nations was "A Trojan horse brought in here to capture our own government." She claimed that President Kennedy had followed the Communist line for a time, then was killed because he stopped. She even charged that the Beatles were being used by Communists to "destroy us morally." Most of the "literature" was rejected by the court as having no relation to the case—with Miss Koch "almost in tears" and complaining that she felt "hampered." It was a pitiable exhibition of incompetence and hysteria. When Miss Koch's lawyer summed up he indulged in every conceivable prejudice and resorted to many misstatements: he said that Rose had called himself a "socialist," when in fact he had described himself as a "sociologist."

Despite the jury's vindication the book makes depressing reading. That a group of irresponsible fanatics could cause so much trouble and get the support of a local newspaper, the *Minneapolis Star*, makes even the most devoted believer in free speech pause. Perhaps the fault lies with the ease of access to unchecked material gathered by committees such as HUAC. The result on appeal understandably led Rose to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

criticize the rules laid down by the Supreme Court. And he justifiably was daunted by the prospect of a new trial, the ordeal and expense.

The case presents an important legal problem in connection with libels on public figures that should be taken care of either by the courts or state legislatures. Because it is so difficult to establish that a libeler acted in reckless disregard of the truth a procedure should be devised by which the injured party can get vindication regardless of the defendant's motivation. That could be accomplished by a two-step verdict: first, on the issue of truth, to be followed where falsity is established by the instructions required by the Supreme Court before damages could be assessed. In that way a judgment of vindication could be obtained, free from any defects in proof or judge's charge on the issue of motive.

OSMOND K. FRAENKEL
New York City

The Political Life of American Teachers *by Harmon Zeigler. Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1967.—viii, 149 pp. $4.95.*

This volume analyzes data collected in a study by Harmon Zeigler and associates at the University of Oregon of the political activities and interest-group affiliations of American high school teachers. Professor Zeigler's volume is primarily analysis rather than description—descriptive data from this study were published elsewhere—but enough data is presented here to support some of his principal points. His study suggests a similar one on elementary school teachers.

It is Zeigler's basic argument that education and teachers cannot be isolated from the real world of politics. He discusses factors influencing high school teachers' political behavior, and deals with such questions as socialization of high school teachers into professional associations and unions, differing male and female perceptions of the teaching experience, influence of vertical mobility within the teaching profession on political perceptions of the teachers, whether the teachers association really represents the teachers' interests, political attitudes of teachers in and out of the classroom, and community sanctions and other forces which inhibit the classroom teacher's political activity.

A controversial but plausible finding made by Zeigler is that male teachers (most of whom are in secondary schools, although professional associations have both elementary and secondary teachers as members) are the "underclass" or underprivileged group in secondary-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

elementary education. He describes them as "rebels in a female system," and suggests that they find educational associations unresponsive and teachers unions responsive to their felt needs.

Professor Zeigler also finds that because of professional norms, teachers are more likely to be politically active as citizens outside the classroom than in it.

Zeigler's work is only a tentative and exploratory study, but it does suggest important distinctions between the attitudes of men and women teachers and between the types of teachers who join unions and the types who join professional associations which some feel are dominated by school administrators. This work should be extended to other subgroups in education, and further study should be made of the relationship between teachers and professional associations and teachers unions.

WILLIAM C. SPRAGENS
Wisconsin State University, Oshkosh

Power, Presidents, and Professors *by Nicholas J. Demerath, Richard W. Stephens, and R. Robb Taylor. New York and London, Basic Books, 1967.—vii, 275 pp. $6.50.*

This book, though unique as an attempt at a systematic study of administrative processes and relationships in the American institution of higher education, tells the veteran of university life very little that he does not already know. He may read it, however, as one lends an ever-ready ear to gossip. But to the outsider the book will doubtlessly provide a revealing glimpse into an institution that few understand. The authors describe their task as that of examining "the structure of power and decision-making under conditions of mixed bureaucracy and collegium."

In a section on "The Presidency: Power at the Top," based on a study of secondary materials pertaining to forty-five major institutions, the authors report their discovery that the president's role is an amalgam of money man, administrator, father-figure, public relations man, and educator to the public. How he discharges these often incompatible responsibilities, faced as he is with a jealous and unsympathetic faculty, is discussed in some detail.

The section following is devoted to a case study of two successive administrations of the University of North Carolina, the first patrimonial, highly centralized, yet casual in its attention to educational policy, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

second a studied combination of bureaucratic procedure and faculty participation. Questionnaire data obtained from the faculty during each administration disclosed significant improvements as a result of the changed administrative style in attitudes regarding faculty influence on policy, university excellence, and personal satisfaction. From this the authors infer an optimum administrative strategy: "bureaucratic channels and procedures used by professor administrants to strengthen and facilitate collegiality." Perhaps the arithmetical errors in the tabular presentations should not be allowed to prejudice the authors' findings.

A third section analyzes the power structure and the character of faculty satisfaction within thirty departments in five universities: Chicago, Cornell, Indiana, Northwestern, and Pennsylvania. Evidently there is no consistent pattern in which the department chairman stands at the apex of a hierarchy. Moreover, individual satisfaction is found to be much more closely associated with the national reputation of the department than with equalitarianism among colleagues. Of greater importance is the implied acknowledgment that the power structure of a university is far more complex than is represented by the simple president-faculty axis. Interwoven among formal lines af authority, frequently subverting or neutralizing them, are various potent influences exerted by successful entrepreneurial members of a faculty, by entrenched cliques, and by expansive departments, schools and programs, and research institutes, to mention only a few of the more salient loci of power. It is this fact as much as anything else, in the reviewer's opinion, that harasses the administrative process within universities.

AMOS H. HAWLEY
University of North Carolina

The Younger John Winthrop *by Robert C. Black III. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1966.—xiv, 459 pp. $10.00.*

John Winthrop the Elder was the greatest governor of early Massachusetts Bay colony. John Winthrop the Younger was for many years governor of early Connecticut. Many people who know just a little about colonial history are aware of the second fact, but until now we have not really known what kind of man the younger John Winthrop was. Now Mr. Black has told us in this full and scholarly biography.

Young Winthrop grew up in favorable circumstances on Groton

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Manor in Suffolk, England, was educated at Trinity College, Dublin, and sailed to Massachusetts Bay a year and a half after his father in 1631. After fifteen years in Massachusetts Bay, where he dabbled in ironworks, he moved to the smaller colony of Connecticut, where he spent the rest of his life, first at New London, then briefly at New Haven, and finally at Hartford. Elected governor in 1657, he was re-elected again and again; he finally died in office in 1676.

As chief magistrate he found many problems before him—and most of them he somehow contrived to solve. He had to go to England to obtain a charter for Connecticut; he had to deal with a Royal Commission; he had to take part in a military expedition against the Dutch at New Amsterdam. In all these difficult assignments he was successful. Mr. Black makes it clear that the younger Winthrop had qualities that his more eminent father lacked. For one thing, he was not an idealist. He always recognized "the unwisdom of too uncompromising an opposition to facts" (p. 132). He was, in other words, a fine practical politician, probably rivaled by few men in public life in colonial America.

In other ways, too, John Winthrop the Younger was a more interesting man than his father. He had, for example, a lively interest in science. His favorite subjects were astronomy and alchemy. He corresponded learnedly with scientists like Samuel Hartlib, William Brereton, and Robert Boyle, and in 1661 was elected an "original Fellow" of the Royal Society. He had a large and well-chosen library. He was a good Puritan, but somehow not so rigid as his father: there was a dim vein of tolerance in him.

This is a good book—well researched and well written. It makes it easy for the reader to do what he ought to do—to become acquainted with the lesser men in American history and to appreciate their accomplishments.

FREDERICK B. TOLLES
Swarthmore College

The Origins of American Politics *by Bernard Bailyn. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1968.—xiv, 162, xix pp. $4.95.*

Professor Bailyn, describing the mid-eighteenth-century "configuration of politics in its broadest sense," modestly declares he will be satisfied if he does no more than "convey a useful point of view, and illustrate certain connections among events not commonly related" (pp.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

13-14). This objective he has certainly achieved. In the first of three lecture-essays, "Sources of Political Culture," he analyzes certain common characteristics of the British Atlantic world—the sense of triumphant but still very recent and incomplete emergence and of a success still vulnerable and sensitive. The "matchless constitution" maintained a balance between King, Lords, and Commons. In his long years of service Sir Robert Walpole developed expedients to secure stability. These in turn provoked fears of faction, corruption, and ministerial manipulation which continually stimulated the articulate but ineffective opposition press. By mid-century Englishmen and Americans read apprehensively books like John Brown's *Estimate of the Times*, and were prepared to believe the worst, and to fear the future.

Professor Bailyn, I think, exaggerates the limitations accepted by the crown after 1688—the veto, the use of which was still discussed in 1914; the appointment of clergy, from time to time influenced, for example, by both Caroline and Victoria; and the effects of Triennial and Septennial Acts. The crown could not act freely against the opinion of ministers, but was able, when it wished, as J. M. Beattie's recent study (*The English Court in the Reign of George I*, Cambridge, 1967) has shown, to exert considerable pressure on policy and administration.

The second essay, "The Structure of Colonial Politics," provides a brilliant exposition of the powers and situation of the governors, the overgreat prerogative they enjoyed being offset by the frustrations caused by inconsequential treatment at the hands of the home government. Professor Bailyn emphasizes the many factions and parties complicating the politics of the several colonies, and points out the absence anywhere of the restraints accepted in England and imposed by a limited franchise, extensive patronage, and ministerial direction. The last essay, "The Legacy," shows how the brittle, tumultuous political life of the colonies, fostered by widely read radical literature, was easily kindled to revolutionary action during the imperial frictions of the early years of George III.

An astonishing range of reading in contemporary tracts and modern authorities is manifest, and many aspects of British and colonial affairs are illuminated. As a political analysis this very important contribution will be hard to refute. Professor Bailyn will perhaps now put us even more deeply in debt to him by examining other aspects of the American revolutionary achievement and the contrast it offers to the slow progress of reforms in England, advocated early and strenously but vainly by her commonwealthmen. Along with his brilliant exposition of differing political factors on both sides of the Atlantic belongs a study of the effects in America of the absence of feudalism and an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

entrenched hierarchy, of the social climate and circumstance produced by this and by such factors as abundance of land, work, and food.

CAROLINE ROBBINS
Bryn Mawr College

The British Empire Before the American Revolution. Volume XIII: The Triumphant Empire—Part I, The Empire Beyond the Storm, 1770-1776; Part II, A Summary of the Series; Part III, Historiography *by Lawrence Henry Gipson. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1967.—xlii, 454, xxvi pp. $10.00.*

In 1936 Lawrence Henry Gipson published Volume I of his *British Empire Before the American Revolution*, an ambitious attempt to describe and analyze all parts of a political and commercial empire that stretched from the British Isles to the Mediterranean, from India to America, from Quebec to Florida. Now, almost one third of a century later, the publication of Volume XIII brings Gipson's major work to a close—except for the bibliography which will soon be issued as Volume XIV. Along the way Gipson has garnered a Loubat Prize (for Vols. I-VI), a Bancroft Prize (for Vol. VII), and a Pulitzer Prize (for Vol. X). Not surprisingly, Gipson has also earned a reputation as one of the most indefatigable and prolific spokesmen of the imperial school of historians—those who view colonial America and the rift with Great Britain in the broad context of the British empire of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries rather than through a hindsight glance at the origins of the United States.

This penultimate volume may well become the most widely read and frequently cited book in the series, despite its disparate contents and curious organization, for it not only brings the story to its conclusion but gives it added perspective both historically and historiographically. Part I briefly treats the portions of the empire which did not revolt in 1776: Ireland, Gibraltar, Minorca, East and West Florida, the several subdivisions of Canada, and outposts in India, Africa, and the West Indies. Although Gipson gives only brief attention to each area, he tries to suggest, wherever appropriate, the reasons they did not succumb to the spirit of '76. For historians who seek new perspectives on old questions through comparative history, Gipson's discussion of the "empire beyond the storm" will prove useful.

Most historians will probably make even greater use of Parts II and III, for they constitute a major discussion of both classic and re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cent historiography on the coming of the Revolution. Part II purports to be a summary of the series, and indeed it is. But it is more: Gipson has taken the opportunity to restate his own intepretation of the first British empire, and he does it more concisely and perhaps more convincingly than in Volumes XI and XII of this series or in his earlier volume in the New American Nation series, *The Coming of the Revolution* (1954). The ideas are not new. They are, however, given forceful expression in Gipson's "Summary" and may therefore serve in the future as the clearest statement of an important historical school.

Appended to the "Summary" is an eight-page note on recent literature on the causes of the Revolution. Readers may be baffled by its inclusion in Part II rather than Part III, especially since it is combined with the latter in a Historiographical Index. In any event, the "Note" provided Gipson with a convenient place to make brief comments on the work of Carl Becker, Louis M. Hacker, Merrill Jensen, John C. Miller, Daniel Boorstin, Bernard Bailyn, and a host of other historians who have in the present century made important contributions to our understanding of the period.

In Part III Gipson presents short historiographical sketches of sixty-eight British, Canadian, and American historians, beginning with George Bubb Dodington and ending with Robert Eldon Brown. Many are predictable—Trevelyan, Namier, Ramsay, Bancroft, Andrews, and the like—but others are unexpected entries—Robert Bisset, Henry Peter Brougham, Alexander Hewat, and John Drayton, to mention only a few. As a consequence, there is enough fresh information here to entertain specialists, while neophytes will find it a goldmine. That, of course, is true of Lawrence Henry Gipson's entire *magnum opus.*

ALDEN VAUGHAN
Columbia University

The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, Vol. XII: July-Oct. 1792, Vol. XIII: Nov. 1792-Feb. 1793 *edited by Harold C. Syrett and Jacob E. Cooke. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1967.—xv, 677, xiv, 620 pp. $12.50 each.*

With the organization of the national government, the Society of the Cincinnati became in good part synonymous with the field staff of the Treasury. Major generals and others of high rank in the Revolutionary army were entrusted, under the secretary, to collect the public revenue. Some adapted well in the transfer from battlefield and bivouac to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bureau, but not all had been trained in habits of business. Numbers were prone to deal in the large, for example in land speculation, and were obliged to learn exactitude at the ports. These, gifted at straining their own credit, might give too much credence to ship manifests. They could review a column of soldiers better than a column of figures. Hamilton, in civil command of veterans senior to him in years, must offer them tutelage mixed with tact. His correspondence with them, which occupies many pages in these volumes, exhibits politeness and friendship as well as firmness. In the end he did not forget his primary duty to apply the laws and protect the Treasury to the last jot and tittle.

John Lowell, a Massachusetts judge before whom a customs claim had come, must have been a comfort to the bedeviled secretary. "If [the papers] are mislaid," he wrote, "I will get them made out again & send them on, for If I can relieve a Moments Attention of a Mind perhaps almost over-plied with public Energies believe me Sir I not only think it the Duty of a Friend to his Country but I shall receive Pleasure from doing it." Not all were so solicitous to lighten Hamilton's burdens. When Otho Williams, an old comrade who properly valued himself, objected at being asked to serve as supervisor of the revenue as well as collector of customs at Baltimore, Hamilton took time and pains to write him a long letter, ten pages of print, some 3,500 words, both mollifying and admonishing.

These are volumes principally concerned with administration of the Treasury. The great reports, projecting policy, were earlier; the secretary now came to particulars of operation. It is suggested that Hamilton's Treasury circulars to officers of the revenue, and his interpretation of the statutes in individual instances will bear more detailed examination by students of public administration than this reader has come upon. Recently in conversation a colleague complained that treatments of historic inventions (for instance, Arkwright's spinning frame) offer too little exposition of precisely how the machine worked. In the Treasury directions and exchanges one sees the details of daily management. Like the elephant's trunk which can uproot a tree or pick up a pin, the secretary was master of both strength and delicacy. In an experimental situation he knew that he could be mistaken, and, especially since precedents were being set, consulted the views of others. In his reports to Congress on funding and bank he had English models to follow, while in procedural problems he was breaking new ground.

These volumes are by no means confined to administrative practice, accounting, and the like, for the papers are arranged chronologically, and thus political determinations and queries frequently appear, includ-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing the beginnings of the Whisky Insurrection and its suppression, and the office-seeking ambitions of Aaron Burr. The last, judged inimical to the claims of Vice-President John Adams, provoked the distaste of Hamilton and Rufus King. The events which violently reversed Hamilton's attitude toward Adams will be revealed in succeeding volumes.

These editors and their associates must have eyes in the backs of their heads and squinting sideways, for they are able to identify the least persons who are mentioned, even incidentally, in these writings, for example, the character recommended for third mate of a revenue cutter. The scholarship is impeccable, not only in completeness and accuracy, but in restraint that does not trench on the province of the biographer.

The reference value of the volumes is enhanced by the comprehensive indexes, compiled by Jean G. Cooke, who is an assistant editor. This is quickly said, but the care displayed is altogether admirable.

One hopes that these attractive books, like the others of the set, will induce more persons to read the less known as well as the more famous works of Alexander Hamilton. They are not all of a piece, and are apt to render the stereotypes of Hamilton questionable.

BROADUS MITCHELL
Rutgers, The State University

Between Two Worlds: Policy, Press, and Public Opinion in Asian-American Relations *by John Hohenberg. New York, Washington, and London, Frederick A. Praeger for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1967.—xiii, 507 pp. $8.95.*

The Opinionmakers: The Washington Press Corps *by William L. Rivers. Boston, Beacon Press, 1967.—xiv, 207 pp. $1.95, paperback.*

These two books represent serious efforts by academic journalists to explore the role of the press as a vital factor in the shaping of public opinion and public policy. John Hohenberg, professor of journalism at Columbia University, looks in detail at the structure of reportage between the United States and the major countries of Asia; and William Rivers, of the department of communications at Stanford University, scrutinizes those Navajos of American journalism, the Washington correspondents. Given our current lot of problems, in which both Asia and Washington loom large, one looks with special interest to these books

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for new insight or understanding concerning the political significance of the media of communication. But while they both display the knowledgeability that comes with firsthand observation and even participation, they are nonetheless disappointing: they lack the analytical perspective that gives larger meaning to discrete events. In short, like the journalism they study, they are descriptive, discursive, anecdotal.

Hohenberg is ostensibly concerned with the development of intelligent policy toward Asia in a setting where both Americans and Asians know so little about one another, and where, by implication, the press does an inadequate job of informing the public. In the attempt to develop and to document that concern, Hohenberg takes us on a *tour d'horizon;* country by country, descriptions of press institutions are served up with a mixture of foreign policy commentary, political history, and personal opinions and speculations. Pages of superficial history and journalistic trivia induce the same sensations as an evening spent with someone else's slides. The book gradually takes shape as a love letter to the foreign correspondents, and in the process, Hohenberg loses the thread of his central problem. At the end, he is left trying to figure out why, if the work of the American journalists is indeed so good, we know so little about what is going on in Asia.

William Rivers' study of the Washington press corps, which now appears in a paperback edition, is a highly personal, sometimes perceptive and refreshingly candid look at some of the kingpins of American journalism. Which is to say that, on the journalistic principle that "names make news," he has overlooked the press as an institution in favor of the press as a few leading personalities—chiefly Lippmann, Reston, Pearson, Brinkley, and *Time* magazine—together with the recent presidents who have tried to manage news. Mr. Rivers describes this (p. 1) as "a book about modern political journalism"; in fact, it is a pastiche of vignettes, a light and derivative piece of work. The depressing thought occurs that perhaps this *is* modern political journalism.

Mr. Rivers justly criticizes the tendency of reporters to borrow, without attribution, the words of others. Yet in a book with nary a footnote of documentation, I found three instances (pp. 28, 47, 76) where reporters and officials are quoted in language curiously similar to interviews I reported several years ago in a book on the press and foreign affairs. Scholarly insistence on adequate documentation may strike the journalist as quaint and dull, but it does serve to identify authorship.

In sum, these two books move the study of journalism and public affairs sideways, not forward.

BERNARD C. COHEN
University of Wisconsin

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The United States in World Affairs: 1966 *by Richard P. Stebbins. New York, Harper & Row, 1967.—487 pp. $6.95.*

Documents on American Foreign Relations: 1966 *edited by Richard P. Stebbins with the assistance of Elaine P. Adam. New York, Evanston, and London, Harper & Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1967.—530 pp. $9.50.*

The publication of a comprehensive but succinct, reasonably objective, readable account of American foreign policy in a single year—which the Council on Foreign Relations has attempted (with some interruptions) since 1931—poses a formidable challenge. It is a uniquely difficult enterprise for a year like 1966, when the crisis in Vietnam stood at the forefront of official and public concern and when nearly every day witnessed some new development in Southeast Asia or other key areas. Understandably, this latest volume in the Council's well-known series, *The United States in World Affairs,* begins and ends with an analysis of the Vietnam conflict.

In between, Richard Stebbins has included chapters focusing upon "polycentric" tendencies within the Marxist camp; the internal schisms characterizing the Western community; ongoing political upheavals in Africa; Red China's internal and external policies; major developments in Latin America; and the continuing problems besetting the United Nations. As is customary in this series, maps, cartoons, and a chronology of important events enhance the usability of the book.

In dealing with Vietnam and other challenges, the tone of Stebbins' treatment of events in 1966 is more pessimistic than in earlier volumes. Pervasive doubts at home and abroad about American leadership in Asia are noted. Although Stebbins discerns a tendency toward political "moderation" within many Afro-Asian societies, this favorable development may be offset by three other trends whose gravity has been insufficiently understood by most Americans. These are the global population explosion; the lack of significant progress toward economic development by many nations in the "third world"; and the accelerating global food crisis, generating famine conditions and expanding malnutrition throughout much of the world.

If any contemporary issue can serve as a test of an author's objectivity, perhaps none can equal the Vietnam contest in this respect. Whether Stebbins' appraisal successfully meets that test is likely to be substantially determined by the reader's own predilections. Stebbins begins his discussion with a necessary (but too often ignored) admonition: nearly all salient facts about the Vietnam dispute *are controversial,* even among recognized authorities on Southeast Asia. In keeping with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the general orientation of books in this series, the appraisal of Vietnam here is more favorable to national policy-makers than to their critics. Yet criticisms of American policy are fairly and adequately presented (if in most instances they are rejected). Not without considerable justification, Stebbins' evaluation of the Vietnam conflict is sobering and melancholy—affording little comfort to partisans of *any* particular viewpoint on what Stebbins calls the most complex and urgent challenge that has "confronted the nation since its first entrance upon the slippery stage of world affairs."

The companion volume—*Documents on American Foreign Relations: 1966*—provides a highly useful, not to say indispensable, collection of primary source materials on contemporary American policy. Containing the complete or abridged texts of official statements, diplomatic notes, treaties, UN resolutions, and the like, this compendium is the latest installment in a series upon which scholars, students, and laymen have come to depend in an effort to understand the foreign relations of the United States more intelligently.

CECIL V. CRABB JR.
Louisiana State University

England and the Fronde: The Impact of the English Civil War and Revolution on France *by Philip A. Knachel. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1967.—xi, 321 pp. $7.00.*

The first four chapters present the information which the French possessed, at court and in public, of what was happening in England after 1643. The sources are traditional; memoirs, published letters, and Mazarinades are woven together to make a synthesis. There is no attempt to discern how accurate the French information was about England, nor is there an analysis in detail of the effect of this information on French policies or the reading public.

Other things are lacking as well. To what extent were the facts about England fitted into an old fabric of ideas or rhetoric about rebellion, or, for that matter, about the "English character" as perceived by the French? This work is disappointing for anyone interested in political thought since there is no close analysis of the texts or exposition of the arguments made for or against revolution and other issues. The author chose to ignore the implications of J. Salmon's and J. Pocock's studies on the connections between French and English politics and thought in this period.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The last four chapters are quite different. Instead of discerning in detail the effects of such incidents as Charles I's execution, the author recounts the Anglo-French diplomatic and military relations from 1649 to 1658. Here the theme, though the author seems unaware of it, is to what extent the European states allied or fought with each other without regard for religious or constitutional differences. We see the Spanish seeking Cromwell's friendship against the French at one point, and the possible invasion of France by England, which is soon followed by improved relations between the French and English. This is a fresh narrative account from archival sources. But the focus should have been sharper on certain critical negotiations and persons conducting them, in order for this to qualify as first-rate diplomatic history.

This is really two books in one. The author should have had a clearer sense of purpose and concentrated his research on one subject or the other. Nevertheless it is a useful book, and a well-written one, though the author's love for the words "naturally" and "obviously" confirms the reader's uneasy feeling that he is reading a superficial synthesis.

OREST RANUM
Columbia University

Parliament, Parties, and Society in France: 1946-1958 *by Duncan MacRae Jr. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1967.—xiii, 375 pp. $10.00.*

This is a book for specialists, and a very good one indeed. It contains an immense quantity of highly detailed information, not collected for its own sake but directed toward answering well-formulated hypotheses about important questions. In general the author seeks to test by statistical evidence generalizations put forward by previous writers, and though the material sometimes does not allow him to reach conclusive results, his answers are always suggestive. He writes very clearly, without elegance but without polysyllabic jargon, and he has the great merit of bringing together topics which are usually treated in isolation, and discussing the relations between them.

Some British reviewers are prone to criticize all practitioners of mathematical politics for taking it for granted that any question is important if it can be answered with figures and negligible if it cannot; or for a pointless concern to quantify what everyone knew already; or for vitiating their answers by formulating questions in an unsophisticated way, owing to insufficient knowledge of the social and historical context.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These complaints are sometimes justified, but they cannot be fairly applied (though they have been) to MacRae. He is thoroughly acquainted with French society and the intricacies of French politics, and very sensible about the use and limits of his technique. In some chapters he has to work with opinion-poll material which is not always very reliable and where the sub-groups are frequently minute; he is aware of the dangers and does not make excessive claims for his findings.

While he has many useful insights into extra-parliamentary behavior, he concentrates heavily on parliamentary analysis. This is justified, both because the National Assembly was the center of activity in the Fourth Republic and because the numerous roll-call votes in the Assembly (he neglects the upper house, which voted less often) provide a mass of material from which he can draw convincing conclusions. But chapters 4 to 7 which analyze this material are hard going, and could well be skipped by readers interested in the conclusions rather than the details, or in French society rather than in the intricacies of Fourth Republican politics. Baldly stated, MacRae argues that the main source of instability was neither the ordinary voter not the political leaders but the political activists in the constituencies and the rank and file deputies who were close to them in certain parties. It is particularly useful to have his demonstration that potential ministers were more disposed to prolong than to shorten the life of governments; for though MacRae has been criticized on the ground that no one worth mentioning ever thought otherwise, in fact the contrary view—widely held among Gaullists—was responsible for many of the absurdities of the present French constitution. In his assessment of the failures of compromise in France, he avoids the common mistake of taking the United States as the norm. "Compromise . . . is at best a means to some desirable end . . . . To a Frenchman . . . this argument will be obvious. Its very lack of obviousness to some Americans reveals our need for preserving certain 'ideological' characteristics that are found in French politics."

This, then, is an excellent example of how to employ statistical techniques to test familiar hypotheses: useful in showing both unprejudiced skeptics how much can be found out in this way and enthusiastic practitioners how much political sense and information is needed to make the operation a success. The general chapters will provide many suggestive ideas to those interested in modern France, while for anyone working on the Fourth Republic this book will be essential.

PHILIP M. WILLIAMS
Nuffield College, Oxford

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Rise of Fascism *by Francis L. Carsten. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1967.—257 pp. $6.50.*

The scholarly literature on fascism concentrated until about 1960 on developments in individual countries, primarily Italy and Germany, with some study of the Fascist movements in France and Spain. Only in recent years has there begun to be an effort to look at the various European Fascist parties in a broader way. To the analytical work of Ernst M. Nolte's *Three Faces of Fascism* (London, 1965) and the series of essays collected under the title *The European Right* by Eugen Weber and Hans Rogger (Los Angeles, 1965), Francis L. Carsten has added a brief survey of European Fascist parties that provides an exceedingly useful preliminary synthesis of a field of study that is really only beginning.

A chapter on the pre-World War I development of Fascist parties is followed by a study of the rise of fascism to power in Italy. In this the causes and factors in Italy come out especially clearly, as do the hesitancies of Mussolini, the acquiescence of the state authorities, and the way in which the corporative structure operated to strengthen the position of the employers. The largest part of the book is devoted to a history of the origins and development of the National Socialist party in Germany; the account ends, as in the case of Italy, with the achievement of total control. While this part of the book is the one in which Carsten brings to bear original archival research of his own, it is in some ways the least satisfactory. This is not a question of a few minor errors; it is a basic disproportion in thoroughness. The presentation is too short to be comprehensive, but too detailed by comparison with the other portions of the book.

The usefulness of Carsten's work lies primarily in his thoughtful survey of the subject, so that the reader is shown a general view of modern European fascism and its specific development in various countries, as well as its common features. Of these, one that occurs often in the book but is never identified as such is the opposition to alleged conspiracies of terrifying proportions. At the same time that Carsten gives both the student and the general public a well-written handbook, he also identifies by implication some of the areas where more research is clearly needed. In regard to individual countries, the Fascist parties of Belgium, Hungary, and Rumania are shown as in particularly obvious need of research. As to the broader picture, more work is required to delineate the relationship of various Fascist groups to each other. Nothing is said about the impact of American events, authors, and movements on the European scene, although Ger-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

man racialist literature, for example, drew heavily on American "sources." In a real sense, the study of fascism as a broader phenomenon is in an infancy Carsten has helped to define. This reviewer wishes he could share entirely the author's concluding confidence that the present sober and dull atmosphere in Europe is not one in which fascism could thrive.

GERHARD L. WEINBERG
University of Michigan

Munich: "Peace in Our Time" *by Henri Noguères, translated from the French by Patrick O'Brian. New York, Toronto, and London, McGraw-Hill, 1965.—423 pp. $7.50.*

This narrative about the emergence, the negotiation, and the reception of the Munich agreement is not as comprehensive nor as systematically structured on source records as the more thorough work of other historians, like Wheeler-Bennett and Celovsky. But its merit entitles it to favorable regard. Despite minor errors of fact, it is generally accurate and a true and penetrating account of what occurred.

By deft but valid selective use of contemporary reports and memoirs as well as official correspondence, Noguères, while sparing the reader long and dusty residence in the documents carries him excitingly along with Chamberlain on his travels, acquaints him intimately with the chief personalities—especially the French ones—and causes him to feel almost as if he were at the fateful meetings with Hitler. Shaping his narrative is his mindful grasp of the causes and meaning of what occurred. Without pedantic pointer his history shows with woeful clarity how great was the chasm between appearance and reality, and the self-deceptions and deceptions which for the time being disguised conduct and consequence.

The narrative flow is chronological and standard: part one, the Nazi absorption of Austria and the start of the assault on Czechoslovakia; part two—on the slope—the descending inclination of Western diplomacy toward its fall before Hitler; part three, the rendezvous at Munich —the meeting, the settlement, the initial reception—"peace in our time"; and, finally, the balance sheet of what the West won and lost by yielding.

About two matters of lasting historical interest Noguères appears to me particularly to have clarified our knowledge. So clear and pointed is his record of the constant efforts and cunning intrigues of Georges

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister, that henceforth he must be awarded first place for his part in bringing about the denunciation of the French pledge to Czechoslovakia. After his notations of the proposals made by the Soviet government at various junctures to join with the West, in and out of the League of Nations, to restrain Hitler it is hardly possible any longer to sustain the conclusion that the opinion of some other historians, among them George Kennan in his *Memoirs*, that these proposals were simply feints or lures. Noguères tells of them without stressing the depth of resentment at Western evasions. (See V. A. Volkov's study of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and England during this period, reviewed by Professor Arthur E. Adams in a recent number of the *American Historical Review.)*

Noguères' narrative features personalities and their behavior. But it may well be that the most decisive factor in the outcome was not the nature of the personalities, nor the faultiness of their diplomacy, nor inadequacies of the forces in being to fight Germany, but the memory and depletion of will and energy in the First World War.

In retrospect the most upsetting quarrel over Czechoslovakia and the outcome in the Munich accord seems almost inevitable. Would it not have occurred sooner or later—unless at the time of the Versailles Treaty and formation of Czechoslovakia it had been arranged that the Sudeten Germans should be moved to Germany—as was done in 1945 —but more humanely, gradually, with compensation, perhaps optionally? For in this situation the cursed spirit of nationalism found its most destructive opportunity, Hitler his most natural and vicious battle cry.

HERBERT FEIS
York, Maine

The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War *by George W. Baer. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967.—viii, 404 pp. $9.50.*

"Abyssinia" was one of the milestones on the road to war in the nineteen-thirties. Dr. Baer's story is a familiar one, but he tells it well and in considerable detail. He has used Italian, German, and American sources, but not the Cabinet and other records of the British government which have been opened since he wrote. It is a pity that he has not discussed his sources; a long alphabetical bibliography without critical notes is of little use save as evidence of the author's industry.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Italy's interest in Ethiopia was, of course, of long standing, and had been accepted in a general way by Britain and France. Mussolini only took it up in 1934, following the virtual failure of his bid for recognition as a major force in Europe by means of the four-power pact of 1933. Colonial conquest also offered a distraction from the troubles of depression and a limping social policy; and in his colonial minister, Emilio de Bono, he had a tempter at his ear. What followed seems foreordained. Britain and France needed Italian friendship against a rearming Germany, but were not willing to pay the price, a guarantee of an independent Austria. The best they could do was to pretend to ignore Mussolini's warlike designs against Ethiopia. Pierre Laval tipped Mussolini the wink at Rome in January 1935; the British government was more evasive, especially at the Stresa conference in April (the account of George Thompson's ludicrous breakfast with Sir John Simon is an amusing footnote [p. 120]: Thompson was a Foreign Office official). Already the necessary "incident" had occurred in December 1934 at Walwal, fifty miles inside Ethiopia across the undemarcated border with Italian Somaliland. It is significant, however, that though the Italians had occupied Walwal in 1930 Ethiopia only challenged them with military patrols in the autumn of 1934, when a joint British-Ethiopian boundary commission visited the Ogaden area in view of its possible transference to British Somaliland. After this, Mussolini's policy was to stave off intervention until his military preparations were complete; long drawn-out arbitration prevented Haile Selassie's appeal to the League of Nations from having immediate effects. British policy changed, however; Anthony Eden's influence, the Peace Ballot, Baldwin's sensitiveness to public opinion compelled apparent support for the use of sanctions against Italy if attempts to buy off the intended aggression failed. Sir Samuel Hoare's ringing speech to the League Assembly on September 11, 1935, was bluff, and dangerous bluff unless it led Mussolini to consider negotiation at the eleventh hour. The surprising thing, in retrospect, is that anyone should have taken it seriously. "Abyssinia" only demonstrated the hollow nature of world order by the mid-thirties. As far as personal reputations go, Dr. Baer's study devalues Eden and Hoare and puts Laval in a more favorable light, as a realist without illusions. But all the actors in the piece seem miniscule now.

C. L. MOWAT
University College of North Wales, Bangor

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Russian Revolution of 1905: The Workers' Movement and the Formation of Bolshevism and Menshevism *by Solomon M. Schwarz, translated by Gertrude Vakar. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1967.—xxiii, 361 pp. $8.95.*

Prelude to Revolution: The Petrograd Bolsheviks and the July 1917 Uprising *by Alexander Rabinowitch. Bloomington and London, Indiana University Press, 1968.—xi, 299 pp. $8.50.*

This is the season for studies concerning the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia in 1917. Not surprisingly, many contributions tend to be superficial and ephemeral. By contrast, the two books under review, although not meant to commemorate the Communist revolution, add to our understanding of "the Great October" while dealing expertly with their own, slightly earlier topics. Both are precise, detailed studies of revolutionary politics in Russia during crucial brief segments of time: Mr. Schwarz concentrates on late 1904 and on 1905, Professor Rabinowitch covers June and July 1917. Both combine intelligence, intellectual integrity, and a thorough knowledge of the subjects under discussion. Both give us nuanced and convincing non-Bolshevik versions of important stages in the history of Bolshevism. Otherwise the two works have little in common.

Mr. Schwarz was an active Bolshevik in 1905; shortly after, he became, and has remained since, a prominent Menshevik. He writes as an insider, wih commitment and controlled fervor, and with a kind of mastery of his material which no number of graduate courses or academic degrees can give. In fact, one possible criticism of Mr. Schwarz's study would be that it assumes too much knowledge in the reader, that its value rises steeply in direct relation to the reader's competence in the subjects under discussion. Also, because 1905 was above all a personal experience for Mr. Schwarz, narrative and analysis are frequently combined in a manner which complicates further this already difficult book. Yet, in spite of the very numerous trees, one is aware of the forest. "Fundamentally, Bolshevism stressed the initiative of an active minority; Menshevism, the activization of the masses" (p. 29). The 250 pages of text are followed by another hundred pages devoted to twelve fascinating appendixes which are specific *mises au point* and at times more extended special studies of certain particular problems of the Russian revolutionary movement in and around 1904 and 1905. *The Russian Revolution of 1905* is the first volume of the new series on the history of Menshevism directed by Professor Leopold Haimson, who supplies a valuable introduction to the book. It is a fine beginning.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As an attractive photograph on the jacket and the rank of assistant professor indicate, Professor Rabinowitch was not born when Mr. Schwartz participated in the revolution of 1905, nor even when the subject of Rabinowitch's own book became history in 1917. Yet thorough academic training, as well as apparently certain advantages of personal background, including a long and close acquaintance with the late Boris Nicolaevsky, enabled him to write an expert work on the Bolsheviks in the summer of 1917. While neither personal, nor personally authoritative in the Schwarz manner, it is remarkable for its objectivity, judiciousness, and its sure handling of the available evidence. Professor Rabinowitch stresses the lack of unity among the Bolsheviks between February and October, which goes a very long way to explain confusion and contretemps among party members in the tumultuous days of June and July 1917. Not that the author minimizes the leadership of Lenin or the usual superiority of the Bolshevik organization and propaganda to those of their rivals. It is simply that reality was more complicated and, so to speak, more disorganized than the prevalent, now canonized, view of the supremacy of Lenin and the monolithic party under him would allow.

Indeed, it is the sense of complex and fluid reality at critical points of Russian history that the reader finds especially enlightening in these two different valuable books.

NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY
University of California, Berkeley

Russia 1917: The February Revolution *by George Katkov. New York, Harper & Row, 1967.—xxxviii, 489 pp. $8.50.*

The primary virtue of George Katkov's controversial reconstruction of the fall of the Russian monarchy is that it is thought provoking; Professor Katkov does, in fact, challenge virtually every assumption of recent Western scholarship regarding the causes and nature of the February revolution.

In the past few years a number of specialists have argued persuasively that on the eve of World War I Russia was faced with a mounting political and social crisis and that the outbreak of war probably delayed a major upheaval which might otherwise have occurred sooner. One of the major weaknesses of Katkov's analysis is that it skirts long-term political and social problems almost completely. But implicit in his view of the revolution is that in 1914, and indeed even in 1917, the Russian political and social system was viable and fundamentally stable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Similarly, the burden of most serious non-Soviet studies of the February revolution is that the latter was a natural, essentially spontaneous, consequence of expanding popular frustration and dissatisfaction with the tsarist government. Yet in Katkov's view Nicholas II's regime was no less competent and effective than the governments of the other warring powers. The Russian monarchy failed, Katkov contends, not because of incompetence or genuine popular unrest, but as a consequence of carefully planned conspiracies on the part of its internal and external enemies.

Who were the villains who consciously subverted confidence in the tsar, fomented unrest, and led Russia on the path to ruin? To Katkov the answer is clear—misguided Russian liberals and German agents. Russian liberals, working through the Voluntary Organizations, the Masonic movement, and the Duma, sought to utilize wartime pressures to destroy the monarchy and to establish responsible parliamentary government almost from the outbreak of the war. At the same time, the German government was successfully establishing a network of agents among the workers of Petrograd. In February 1917 the liberals, frantic lest a successful spring offensive permit the tsarist government to slip off the hook, hoodwinked the generals and the Russian people at large into pressuring Nicholas II to abdicate, a campaign which took an unexpected and, from the liberal point of view, an unfortunate turn as a consequence of strike agitation by German agents in the factories.

Future scholars of the Russian revolution will want to consult Katkov's absorbing and meticulously researched study; however, it is unlikely that many will agree with the neo-monarchist aspects of his interpretation. To this reviewer, at any rate, one of the striking features of the popular Russian response to the outbreak of war in 1914 is the way in which the liberals rallied to the side of the government. Not until the summer of 1915, when the utter incompetence of the national administration became fully apparent, did the Duma initiate a concerted campaign for political reform. If the liberal campaign for a "ministry of confidence" was intensified on the eve of the February revolution, it was not because of fear that victory was just around the corner but because of a universal feeling that at home and at the front Russia was on the verge of collapse.

Also of dubious validity is the argument that the explosion of Petrograd workers was directed by German agents. Certainly, there is no doubt that the German government was genuinely interested in promoting mass unrest in Russia and that it expended considerable sums in pursuit of this aim. However, as Katkov is forced to acknowledge, there is no evidence that German agents were either directly or in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

directly involved in the labor unrest which led to the fall of the tsar. More than anything, the meager results of his exhaustive research testify to the organic nature of the February revolution.

ALEXANDER RABINOWITCH
Indiana University

Eastern Europe in Transition *edited by Kurt London. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966.—xx, 364 pp. $8.95.*

Another conference, another book. In this case, it is the Fifth International Conference on World Politics, held in the Netherlands in 1965 and devoted to "Eastern Europe in Transition" (to what is not made clear). Various papers are presented and in time reappear as the chapters of this book. There is doubtless great functional significance in hardcover publication; but this reviewer at least wonders whether some more intermediate form of public dissemination (annals, special issues of learned journals, and the like) would not be more appropiate to a mixed set of essays, some explicitly tentative in their explorations and all overwhelmed by the onrush of events, than a nine dollar book.

As one of a type, this conference-into-book with sections on nationalities, economies, parties, and armies is generally satisfactory, although one can question the editor's rather smug assertion that (p. x) "Conferences with communists . . . are without value in meetings where free and uninhibited exchange of views among scholars is essential." Might a Yugoslav or Polish or Rumanian scholar not have added useful perspectives on the conference's topic? (See on this point the remark of Klaus Mehnert, p. 311.)

The only fair way to review a set of essays is to concentrate on those of general import and the reviewer's interests. Andrew Gyorgy's essay on the role of nationalism makes a much-needed effort to understand the evolution of Eastern Europe in terms of general categories. Sometimes he drives his categories too hard, as when the same phenomenon is held to account for the fall of both Rakosi and Slansky. More questionable is Gyorgy's view that pre-1956 nationalism was directed against local rule but not against Soviet overlordship, while since 1958, the targets of nationalist resentment have been reversed.

Kurt London usefully distinguishes between polycentrism and "splittism" (that is, taking Sino-Soviet sides), but allows polemical vigor to lure him into errors concerning especially the post-1945 seizure of power. Furthermore, his definition of polycentrism as not "abolishing Mos-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cow's Communist primacy" makes too little of real changes. Thus he argues that Rumania, "the most independent of them," remains bound to Soviet political and military policy."(!)

Wolfgang Kraus contributes an unimpeachable narrative of the East Berlin insurrection of June 1953. Discussing the causes of the tumult, Kraus properly emphasizes the division and confusion of the wielders of power—both those in East Berlin and in Moscow. However, the non-participation of the intellectuals is only mentioned briefly, and the ideological and sociological significance of a workers' uprising in a Communist state is largely ignored in favor of enjoyable evidence of party discomfiture over these facts.

Noteworthy among the other contributions are Klaus Mehnert's surprisingly disappointing survey of East-West contacts, a chapter which might better have been assigned to an anthropologist; and Thomas Wolfe's excellent survey of the Warsaw Pact, especially noting its upgrading by the U.S.S.R. in recent years and the growing problem (paralleling that in NATO) of multilateral versus unilateral control of nuclear weapons.

HENRY KRISCH
Columbia University

Poland's Politics: Idealism vs. Realism *by Adam Bromke. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967.—x, 316 pp. $9.95.*

The nub of this book's argument is in its subtitle. Polish politics, insists its author, have for at least two centuries oscillated between "idealist" and "realist" responses to the nation's geopolitical dilemma of being situated between the more powerful—and usually hostile—neighbors, Germany and Russia. Indeed, Professor Bromke believes, modern Polish history and contemporary politics become comprehensible only when the student brings to bear upon them, as an analytical tool, this "idealist-realist" typology. "Idealism," briefly, is the strategy of challenging one of these neighbors, usually Russia, with military-insurrectionary struggle in an effort to achieve Polish independence and/or to wrest from Russia the contested marcher areas which once belonged to the historic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Theoretically, such a strategy—which is, incidentally, always launched in the expectation of Western help—would, if successful, kill two birds with one stone: directly weaken Russia and indirectly also strengthen Poland relative to Germany. The strategy of "realism," in turn, is one upon which

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Poles recoil after the periodic defeats which an incorrigibly stronger Russia inflicts upon their "idealist" insurrections—insurrections in which the expected Western support proves to be either illusory or platonic. This is the strategy of cutting one's losses, of accepting Poland's military inferiority to Russia as given and accommodating oneself as junior partner to Russia in a joint Slavic effort to stem the ultimately more dangerous Teutonic threat to Poland's survival. At the same time "realist" Poles would strive to render Poland a credible and significant weight in these scales by concentrating on her economic and cultural, rather than exclusively her military, development.

Professor Bromke would presumably be the first to concede that as an intellectual schema this interpretation of Polish history is not original but, in essence, derives from the so-called Cracow school of historiography of the second half of the nineteenth century. What is new in his book is the effort to apply it through even current political and ideological developments in Gomulka's and Wyszynski's Poland. And it is precisely in this ambitious and difficult endeavor that the schema as an analytical tool becomes unhelpful—a blunted tautology. The "idealism -realism" analysis requires considerable distance and wide perspectives. It can perhaps be applied to interpret Polish history in spans of centuries, generations, possibly of decades, but it is unconvincing as an interpretive tool applied to the nuances of today's daily news, parliamentary debate, press polemic. It is unconvincing because it is gratuitous; it simply does not help in organizing and aggregating the materials covering the contemporary decade. These materials, which Bromke's assiduous and scrupulous research gathers for the benefit of the English-speaking reader, are so compelling and so vividly presented that they can well stand without any "idealist-realist" straight-jacketing. Indeed, Bromke seems at times unconsciously to recognize as much, for some of his best sections—Chapter 8, for example, on Poland and the U.S.S.R. during and since 1956—slough it off.

Bromke is particularly interesting in his discussion of the several Roman Catholic political groupings in today's Poland: Pax, the Christian Socials, Znak (Chapters 11 and 12). He is also very good (and right) in his discussion of the significance to the Poles of the Oder-Neisse acquisitions (Chapter 13) and in his analysis of the reasons for the Polish nation's post-Stalin readiness for an accommodation with the U.S.S.R. (Chapter 6), although in this reviewer's opinion the Soviet (and Chinese) leaders also deserve some of the credit, which Bromke monopolizes for the Poles, as to why the 1956 crisis was alleviated without a Polish-Soviet military clash.

Throughout this book there runs implicitly—and occasionally sur-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

faces explicitly—Professor Bromke's fascination with and admiration for Roman Dmowski, a Polish political figure prominent in the period (roughly) 1890-1930. Bromke regards Dmowski as wise, judicious, even prophetic, and completely modern. Inevitably, the other side of this coin is a certain condescension toward the supposedly unrealistic and allegedly near-fatal nostalgic romanticism of Dmowski's victorious antagonist in twentieth-century Poland, Jozef Pilsudski. I suppose that above and beyond the evidence (about which honest men can disagree) this Dmowski-Pilsudski problem has become almost a subjective matter of taste, and I must confess to finding the admittedly gifted, sharp, and articulate Dmowski a repelling epitome of petit-bourgeois bigotry, a sort of quintessence of lumpen-Darwinian political vulgarity. As one aspect of his rejection of Pilsudski and Pilsudski's epigoni, Bromke joins in the familiar chorus of denigration of their allegedly frivolous romanticism which supposedly left Poland totally unprepared to face the German onslaught in September 1939. "The moral strength of the Polish armed forces was [supposed] to compensate for its [*sic*] physical weakness and carry it [*sic*] to victory," he scoffs on page 42, and goes on to cite the familiar apocryphal tales of Polish mounted lancers charging German tanks. Now, Professor Bromke is, of course, as entitled to his distaste for Pilsudski as I am to mine for Dmowski, but I would like to close this review with a word about the allegedly quixotic Polish military performance in September 1939. According to the German records, this was the hardest campaign which the Wehrmacht was obliged to fight until the one before Moscow two years later. Compared with it, the Scandinavian and French campaigns of 1940 and the Balkan one of 1941 were pushovers. Any judgment of Poland's war preparedness under the Pilsudskist stewardship should take that into account.

JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD
Columbia University

Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory *by J. W. Burrow. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1966.—xvii, 295 pp. $8.50.*

The central thesis of this study of social evolutionary theory in England is that the theory arose, mainly in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, in response to a growing awareness of inadequacies in utilitarianism. A significant feature of this awareness lay in a recognition that men and societies had changed in the course of history, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the resulting diversity could not be understood in terms of universal propositions about human nature. The turn from utilitarian to evolutionary theory did not, however, involve an abandonment of positivism; on the contrary, there was an even more concerted quest for ethical and political certainty, but now within an evolutionary framework. Thus, argues Dr. Burrow,

> The specific attraction of evolutionary social theories was that they offered a way of reformulating the essential unity of mankind, while avoiding the current objections to the older theories of a human nature everywhere essentially the same. Mankind was one not because it was everywhere the same, but because the differences represented different stages in the same process. And by agreeing to call the process progress one could convert the social theory into a moral and political one (pp. 98-99).

The author recognizes, of course, that he is not dealing here with a battle of abstract ideas. A declining faith in absolute religious principles at a time of rapid and distressing social change, coinciding with the emergence of new perspectives on the nature of scientific explanation (particularly in the field of life sciences), provided a setting favorable to acceptance of social evolutionism. In connection with this latter point, however, it is gratifying to note that Dr. Burrow's careful scholarship guards him against the common notion that Darwin or Darwinism were vitally involved in the appearance of social evolutionary theory.

This explanation of English social evolutionism is accompanied by a persistent, if somewhat diffident, attention to the relationship between functional and evolutionary approaches in sociology and social anthropology. Dr. Burrow is quite aware of the concern with function and structure among classical evolutionists—Herbert Spencer, especially. But his argument is that the requirements of an ethical and political theory satisfied by evolutionism diverted English social science in the nineteenth century from that "relativism in which the study of the social functions and interrelations of institutions might have been expected to flourish" (p. 218). While the author says that he is interested primarily in understanding and explaining the rise of social evolutionary theory in England, it is evident that he would attach to that explanation an accounting for the delay there of a functionalist orientation in social theory. His case is persuasively presented, especially in his detailed analyses of Maine and Spencer.

Dr. Burrow's study is historical in type. His avowed object is to understand a particular tendency of thought in a particular place at a particular time. It is not to discover or derive a more useful social theory from an examination of past failures or successes. If this pur-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pose seems at times to be adulterated by the judgment that English social scientists would have sooner reached a "modern" theoretical stance had they not been burdened by evolutionism, social theorists, if not historians, would probably ask only that Dr. Burrow be more explicit on the point.

But that request for explicitness might induce a more probing inspection, not only of the functionalist aspects of classical evolutionism, but of the increasingly manifest evolutionist aspects of modern functionalism. This introduces, of course, a variety of complicated questions quite beyond the intended scope of Dr. Burrow's book—questions to which I would hope he will find time to give his clearly expert attention.

It is appropriate to remark, in view of the common appearance of murky expositions in the field of intellectual history, that this study is presented in exceptionally lucid and engaging prose.

KENNETH E. BOCK
University of California, Berkeley

A Sociology of English Religion *by David Martin. New York, Basic Books, 1967.—158 pp. $5.00.*

Professor David Martin has examined community studies, public opinion polls, and historical accounts with a keen eye, and the result is a penetrating interpretation of religion in England. He has succeeded in transforming what might have been a rather dreary listing of statistics—who believes what, who belongs, or does not belong, to which church—into a significant analysis of religion and society. The work is strengthened by an engaging style, at times reminiscent of Tawney, and a consistent recognition that the data become meaningful only when related to the major questions of theory. In examining the argument, one learns not only about English religion, but about English society generally.

This is perhaps the first systematic review of polling data and community studies concerned with English religion. There are few surprises. England is one of the least religious nations, if measured by church membership and attendance; yet the great majority maintain some semblance of attachment to a church, and traditional beliefs, both religious and magical, are widely held, in a pattern similar to that of the United States. Martin summarizes the situation well:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> . . . far from being secular our culture wobbles between a partially absorbed Christianity, biased towards comfort and the need for confidence, and beliefs in fate, luck and moral governance incongruously joined together. If we add to these layers of folk religiosity the attraction of Freudianism and of Marxist mechanics for segments of the intelligentsia, it is clear that whatever the difficulties of institutional religion they have little connection with any atrophy of the capacity for belief (p. 76).

One of the central tasks, of course, is to describe the range of religious beliefs and actions, and to study the association of that range with other social facts—region, class, politics, ethnic group, education. The English situation is too complex to summarize here. Perhaps it can be suggested by noting the five subsystems or patterns of attitudes that Martin describes "to provide a feeling for the varieties of British religious experience," the Catholic, the evangelical, the aristocratic, the working class, and the progressive. In his examination of these patterns, the author compares them with one another and relates them to life style and to the social structure.

In chapters four and five, "Structures and Patterns" and "Explanations," Martin takes a more macroscopic view. There is a tantalizingly brief but cogent comparison of the religious situations in Britain, the United States, and France, in which he examines the way in which religious pluralism in the first two has contributed to social stability. Particularly in the United States, where secular regimes are not given a kind of ultimate legitimacy by religion, one does not need to attack the very grounds of social order to secure change. Paradoxically, because of this pluralism, religion can serve as a source of common identity, providing "the obfuscating but necessary rhetoric of public harmony." In this section, he is dealing with the great problems of a sociological theory of religion: the relationships of religion to social order and social change. His position is close to that of Durkheim.

The book ends with a chapter on "Perspectives for Research." Martin stresses the need for research on a topic of enormous importance in a world in flux and describes several critical problem areas. In a concluding "Unscientific Postscript," he observes that opposition to sociological research on religious or other grounds because of its presumed "determinism" misses the mark: by identifying the limits of social action, sociology can free us to move within them, free us from the constraints of our deterministic prejudices and beliefs.

This slender volume deserves a careful reading. It is a first-rate job.

J. Milton Yinger
Oberlin College

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

No End of a Lesson: The Inside Story of the Suez Crisis *by Anthony Nutting. New York, Clarkson N. Potter, 1967.—205 pp. $5.00.*

Mr. Nutting's account of the period leading up to the Suez crisis derives its special poignancy from the interplay between his personal drama and the fateful progression of British diplomacy. His resignation from the post of minister of state for foreign affairs in the Eden Cabinet in protest against his chief's policy brought to an abrupt end a brilliant Foreign Office career. And the more distance accrues from the events he describes, the more the conviction grows that 1956 wil figure in the history books as the year that saw *finis* writ to the empire.

Most of Mr. Nutting's revelations are no longer startling; the "collusion" story in particular has largely been pieced together by journalists and opposition politicos, so that Nutting's authentication merely anchors some key pieces in the jigsaw puzzle more firmly into place. He adds significant detail, however, to the intricate, sometimes grotesque, maneuvering among Israel, Jordan, Britain, and Iraq that preceded the Sinai-Suez campaigns, and on Nasser's apparent willingness to compromise on the Canal's operation in the talks which Selwyn Lloyd conducted with Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi at the United Nations. But perhaps the most piquant item, from a 1968 vantage point, is in another area entirely: at a time when French Premier Guy Mollet was eager for British participation in the European community, Eden rejected his lieutenant's suggestion that Britain declare itself ready to enter the incipient Common Market.

Mr. Nutting's caustic portrayal of Sir Anthony leaves the reader in no doubt as to who the villian in the piece is meant to be. And yet the Prime Minister emerges as a melancholy, almost tragic figure, brought down not so much by wickedness as by the circumstances that brought him to his office too late, at a time when his physical power was nearly spent and his view of the world and of Britain's place in it no longer in tune with reality.

If there was a villain somewhere, it would seem, it was France, which hatched the Suez plan and acted as the catalyst in bringing about its execution. Eden's obsession with destroying Nasser, which Nutting sees as the main motive force of British policy, clearly had in it an element of the irrational. But the French built on it, and on Israel's difficulties with Egypt, in a way that was coldly calculating. Be it said that Israel, in Nutting's telling of the tale, is a reluctant dragon; a far from pugnacious Ben Gurion, whose objectives are Gaza and Sharm-el-Sheikh, is loath to get involved in what he views as a dispute between Egypt and the Western powers. Only on October 25, four days before his troops were to cross

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into Sinai, did he succumb to French blandishments and to Britain's assurances (given through France) that she was not up to some deception.

The verse from which Mr. Nutting drew the title of his book is one of Kipling's less felicitous pieces of doggerel:

> Let us admit it fairly as a business people should:
> We have had no end of a lesson, it will do us no end of good.

Mr. Nutting mercifully does not press the parallel with the Boer War, and his narrative is sufficient proof in itself that the lessons of 1956 hardly did his country "no end of good."

ERNEST STOCK
Brandeis University

The Road to Jerusalem: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967 *by Walter Laqueur. New York, Macmillan, 1968.—vii, 368 pp. $6.95.*

Israel and World Politics: Roots of the Third Arab-Israeli War *by Theodore Draper. New York, The Viking Press, 1968.—x, 278 pp. $5.75.*

The June 1967 war between Israel and a coalition comprising Egypt, Syria, and Jordan contained all the elements of high drama as years of relative quiet gave way, suddenly and unexpectedly, to a seeming Arab determination to wipe Israel off the map of the Middle East. As the United Nations and the great powers proved either unable or unwilling to intervene, Tel-Aviv seized the initiative and defeated its Arab adversaries.

The books under review represent efforts by two distinguished authors to shed some light on the events which precipitated the third round in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both cover essentially the same ground and arrive at similar conclusions: small nations in crisis situations cannot rely on the big powers for help; the superpowers, because of the nuclear stalemate, are not able to control "minor crises." Therefore, encouragement of "wars by proxy" is dangerous—there is no guarantee that they might not escalate into a "major crisis" (Laqueur, p. 244; Draper, p. 134).

Their argument runs as follows: the 1967 war had its roots in the unhappy history of the Arab-Israeli rivalry for control of Palestine. Yet, like any other military confrontation, it contained an element of uniqueness which manifested itself in part in "a peculiar combination

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of internal and external forces" (Draper, p. 3). Among the latter, the role played by the USSR deservedly attracted the authors' attention. Both agree that the outbreak of the war was greatly facilitated by the policy pursued by the Soviet leaders. Thus, Moscow appears to have encouraged Nasir to move his troops into the Sinai and to have secured Washington's consent not to become directly involved in the conflict. The authors do not believe that Russia wanted war but rather was seeking to relieve pressure (largely domestic) on its client-government in Syria.

This may, indeed, have been so. Yet a close examination of the facts suggests another, more disquieting, possibility. Having reached the above understanding with the United States, Moscow also warned Cairo not to count on direct Soviet military support (Laqueur, pp. 181-82; Draper, p. 80). The USSR was thus protected no matter what the outcome of the seemingly imminent showdown. Did the Kremlin leaders pursue this course of action because they were confident of an Arab victory? Would the latter have been in Moscow's interest? Could it not be argued that the rapid growth of Soviet influence in Egypt has been due, to a considerable extent, to the setbacks suffered by Cairo in its foreign ventures?

Two other arguments are worth noting. Laqueur holds that the "Russians were more acutely aware of the dangers facing" Damascus than the Ba'thi government itself (p. 80). This is not borne out by his previous conclusion, substantiated by facts, that in early 1967 the Syrian government was "in a state of *panic*" (p. 78, italics added).

Finally, it is unlikely that Damascus stepped up its efforts to bring Cairo into conflict with Tel-Aviv because the Ba'thi leaders "lost patience with their own predictions" concerning the success of the guerrilla "war of liberation" and felt that the participation of the "senior partner" was necessary to destroy Israel (p. 49). Rather, the revolutionary talk, coupled with the encouragement of guerrilla warfare, appears to have been designed to bolster the Ba'th's extremely tenuous hold over Syria.

All in all, the Laqueur volume is without doubt the better of the two. It is more carefully researched, more fully documented and, most important, more objective. The author blames Israel for not having done more to help solve the refugee problem (p. 51), while criticizing Tel-Aviv for some of its misguided retaliatory raids into Lebanon and Jordan (p. 58). Laqueur reports also that, in late May, along with manifestations of high morale, there were also instances of panic and hysteria in Israel (p. 131). Finally, along with Draper, he does not believe that U Thant can be held responsible for the outbreak of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

war. Since Nasir appeared determined to effect the evacuation of UNEF and to implement the blockade, the Secretary-General was in no position to stop him.

Once the blockade was imposed and, more significantly, once the military pacts between the various Arab governments had been consummated and forces massed along Israel's frontiers, Tel-Aviv was left with little choice but to strike. The decision, however, was not an easy one. Laqueur, in particular, draws a striking picture of the agony which gripped the government and people of Israel. His is an important contribution to the study of the June war.

O. M. SMOLANSKY
Lehigh University

Friends Not Masters *by Mohammad Ayub Khan. New York, London, and Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1967.—xiv, 275 pp. $7.50.*

Oral history memoirs come of age and contemporary importance in this engaging, exhortative, and passionate book, presenting the most interesting chronicle thus far of the vision, style, and character of Pakistan's leadership since 1958. It is remarkable that a head of government of such a politically bereft country should have found the time and interest for the project, even more surprising that a modern Cromwell would bait the democrats in their own lair and in their own terms.

The book begins with a diagnosis of Pakistan's critical problems before martial law, which the author sees as almost entirely political. "The constitution, by distributing power between the President, the Prime Minister and His Cabinet, and the provinces, destroyed the focal point of power and left no one in a position of control" (p. 54). This incisive analysis is embroidered with *ad hominem* examples from "the old gang in politics" era, 1947-58.

The second section of the book is an intelligent guide to the salient public problems of Pakistan, and document what might be called a humane technocratic view of national development priorities.

A third quarter of the book is a striking commentary on Pakistan's foreign policy. It has both stoicism—"we must, therefore, accept the situation of implacable Indian hostility and learn to live with it" (p. 117) —and tactical guile, as when the author describes a foreign policy of friendship with the U.S., U.S.S.R., and China as "walking on a triangular tight rope" (p. 119).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The last portion of the book analyzes the impediments to Pakistan's modernization. As for the religious groups, the *ulema*: "The history of the *ulema* in the subcontinent has been one of perpetual conflict with the educated classes" (p. 200). As for the equally hostile educated classes, "the big turban of one basic democrat was enough for the intellectual to distrust the whole system" (p. 229). In short, Ayub Khan sees himself as a modernizing populist, shying away both from moribund tradition and alien institutions.

In order to discredit the previous system of government and its champions, and to legitimize the coup d'état of 1958 and its new structures, the author has been harsh in his criticisms of political men in his own generation. Leaving aside these arguments, about which there can be honest disagreement, the book remains important both for its intellectual and its political contributions. No student of the modernization process can afford to neglect Ayub Khan's thoughts, and no observer of South Asia dare miss the selected revelations that flavor the dish. But there are broader audiences that should be concerned with Asian populism, autocratic but humane centralism, and the impact of twentieth-century world politics on porous new sovereignties.

WAYNE WILCOX
Columbia University

Succession to High Office *edited by Jack Goody. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1966.—viii, 181 pp. $6.50.*

Few social processes seem at first as simple to describe and explain as succession. Essentially it seems to consist of a two- or three-step sequence: at one time some particular person occupies a well-defined office or social position and when he leaves it someone else comes in to occupy it. The main questions to be answered thus seem equally obvious: How did the post (or posts) come to be vacated and how did the successor (or successors) come to be chosen? No more than a cursory listing of examples is needed, however, to suggest the complexity that lies immediately beyond such engaging simplicities: a king dies, and his eldest son inherits the crown; a professor retires, and a dean fills the post on the advice of an *ad hoc* committee; a tribal chieftain falls in battle, and his followers forget the enemy and turn upon one another in an all-out succession war; an incumbent president is voted out of office, and his principal opponent, in; a colonel jails the civilian head of government and proclaims himself prime minister. Moreover,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

we really do not know yet just how complicated matters may be, for succession has been systematically studied by only a handful of scholars. And this despite the evident significance of succession in historical studies; the general interest it excites; its importance as a strategic focus in research on political systems, religious hierarchies, and all forms of complex organization; and its relevance as a mechanism or process to the continuous functioning of any corporate body.

The five papers brought together here by Jack Goody, then, do what should be done more often, address themselves to a topic in the social sciences that is truly difficult, neglected, and important. Moreover, because they depict events and practices in four African kingdoms, rather than in, for example, charismatically-led movements or modern bureaucracies, they provide information on succession in settings which for the most part have not been discussed in other writings on the subject.

Considered singly, the papers are of varying quality and general interest, as might be expected. Goody, a lecturer in social anthropology at Cambridge, has supplied two of the essays himself and drawn upon two colleagues and a former student in the department for the other three. Those by G. I. Jones and R. G. Abraham are brief descriptive case-studies of chiefly succession in Basutoland and a Tanzanian tribe, the Nyamwezi. Of the two, Jones' contribution is by far the more solid; the empirical materials Abraham is able to marshal are simply too sparse and tentative, and his rapid sketch ends up being a rather smudged historical outline of some probable events and some equally probable practices. The two other substantive papers, one by Martin Southwold and one by Goody, are both longer and much more analytical, and should prove of considerable general interest. Southwold's essay on royal succession in Buganda, one of four former kingdoms in currently republican Uganda, is additionally noteworthy for its methodology: in order to reconstruct the succession "rules" which the Baganda followed at various times in their history, he treats their oral traditions (which were first written down at the turn of the century) as if they provided contemporary accounts, and examines the various events which reportedly took place during each of the thirty-four recorded accessions to the office of *Kabaka*, the highest position in Buganda's traditional hierarchy. As presented here, the nature of these "rules" is a little vague: are they rephrasings of statements made (presumably) by participants, or observations contributed by twentieth-century Baganda commentators, or regularities discerned by Southwold in the historical record, or some combination of all these, or what? That seeming weakness aside, however, the paper is an instructive, highly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

readable, and, probably, controversial contribution to historical anthropology.

Of the 170-odd pages of text, Goody's own contributions take up well over half and are, I think, the best in the book. The first, entitled "Introduction," is less an introduction to this particular symposium than to the general subject of succession, for it draws on a wide variety of materials as it explores in an original and provocative fashion a number of topics with which any analyst of succession must at some point deal—the timing of accession and its effect on the outcome, the more or less standardized procedures for obtaining successors, the post-succession handling of those who were eligible but not chosen, and so forth. The other essay comes last in the book and is a remarkably lucid account of succession practices among a people of northern Ghana, the Gonja, and of the structural arrangements—an approximate balance of power among the different kinship groups within the ruling class—on which their system of "circulating succession" depends.

For all their merits, however, Goody's two contributions are weaker, less forceful and less conclusive, than they might be. It is not easy to say why this is so, but perhaps his use of three rather disparate points of view is the cause. For while each used alone is capable of leading to important results, when combined they seem to get in one another's way. One of these perspectives is the conventional anthropological view: social practices—here succession-patterns—are seen to recur with whatever regularity they exhibit because those who carry them out are playing more or less well-defined roles in a generally articulated and slowly changing social structure. The functional or "dynamic" part of the perspective, however, which instructs the analyst to examine the effects of the practices both on the immediate settings in which they occur and on the overall structure of which they are a part, and which thus leads to the interesting inferences, is used by Goody hardly at all and then only in a casual or haphazard manner. A second perspective he employs comes from formal economics: a society's high offices, he suggests, are among its and its participants' "scarce resources"; their use (that is, how they are filled) thus requires that "choices" be made by the participants, both collectively and severally; finally, whatever mode of succession a society "chooses," it will entail for that society a particular combination of "gains and costs." But this set of categories is used even less systematically in description than the anthropological categories, and the explanatory paradigm it implies is never used at all. The third perspective is the Weberian view: here succession appears primarily as a process central to the distribution

LICENSED TO UNZ:ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of power in a society. Each time Goody uses this viewpoint, however, he drops it much too soon, and the resulting analyses are simply inadequate. For example, he ends a discussion more than once with an observation to the effect that, in the end, force, and thus the military, is often the final arbiter in succession-crises; but in this perspective—and even more so when the cases are of the sort treated in this volume (as Southwold explicitly remarks, p. 9)—one views a group's capacity to exercise force less as a determinant of its political strength than as a reflection of its political support.

Despite his uncertain angle of vision, Goody has nevertheless given us an unusually stimulating account of succession. Moreover, both his general essay and his substantive analysis do in fact have a unifying point of view, although it is not one, I think, that was intentionally supplied. For when an author's hold is loose, his subjects sometimes write their own lines, and what emerges as the implicit perspective throughout these two papers is the way succession appears to those who take part in the process. As a result, the essays cover in a relatively orderly manner a considerable array of topics, if not problems; moreover, since the features uppermost in the minds of participants are surely always of consequence, the topics covered are far from trivial ones. A social psychology of succession, however, provides no more than a part of the total picture. Since for many purposes the part it omits is the more important, let us hope Goody comes out with another installment on the subject in the near future—one with a steadier point of view and firmer conclusions.

TERENCE K. HOPKINS
Columbia University

British Honduras: Colonial Dead End, 1859-1900 *by Wayne M. Clegern. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1967.—214 pp. $4.50.*

British Honduras is the last British Crown Colony left in the Caribbean area. It is one of the least known and least studied territories of the region. The present volume is one of the few serious studies which have ever been published about the colony.

Although Professor Clegern's book does not deal principally with twentieth-century British Honduras, it sheds considerable light on the problems which still face the region. It emphasizes the sparsity of its population, which was a difficulty in the nineteenth century as in the present. It discusses the territorial claims which both Mexico and Guate-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mala have traditionally had on this long-time British colony, a problem which is also still existent, although perhaps less pressing than it was in the latter half of the nineteenth century. It also underscores the difficulties which the British Hondurans have had in developing a profitable agricultural economy to substitute for the forestry which was the traditional economic activity of the region—another problem which has not yet been fully resolved.

Until the middle of the last century, British Honduras was only a "settlement," not a colony. It had been first populated by British pirates and privateers, who used it as a base to prey on Spanish trade with Mexico and Panama. Subsequently, the exploitation of the region's very fine hardwoods and the growing of sugar superseded privateering as the territory's principal occupation, and resulted in the importation of the Negro slaves from Jamaica who became the ancestors of about half of British Honduras' present population. Sugar declined at the end of the eighteenth century as it did in the West Indies, and through the end of the last century logging remained the principal productive activity of the territory.

During the last century of Spanish colonial rule over Central America, illicit trade with Spanish territories was another major economic activity of British Honduras. With the independence of Central America, Belize, the British Honduran capital and port, continued to be a major entrepot of trade between Britain and Central America. However, with the opening of the Panama Railroad in 1855, its importance declined sharply.

Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, the citizenry of British Honduras were greatly concerned with trying to develop a viable agricultural base for their country's economy. However, because of the landholding system, which left most of the land in the hands of about a dozen people, and the unwillingness of the government or the landowners to provide an adequate incentive for immigration, these efforts came to naught.

The country's continuing economic crisis, plus incursions in the northern part of the territory by Indians from Yucatan, also had profound political consequences. Those who controlled the legislature were unwilling to tax themselves to deal with these problems. Rather than do so, they were willing to give up self-government and to substitute rule by an appointed governor. It was not until 1936 that this system was substantially modified and a degree of self-government resumed.

Within the next half-dozen years, British Honduras will take its place as an independent nation. As Professor Clegern points out, the British have indicated that the colony can have its independence when-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ever it wishes to assume it. However, it will continue for some time to be plagued by the problems of a small population, an underdeveloped economy, and uncertain relations with its neighbors which troubled it during the period which Clegern discusses. This volume is one of the few places where one can acquire authoritative information on the problems facing this small but strategically located American nation.

ROBERT J. ALEXANDER
Rutgers, The State University

Death In Life: Survivors of Hiroshima *by Robert Jay Lifton. New York, Random House, 1968.—viii, 594 pp. $10.00.*

"We are all survivors of Hiroshima and, in our imaginations, of future nuclear holocausts. The link between Hiroshima and ourselves is not only metaphorical." So writes Dr. Lifton, who strives in this book for a general psychology of the survivor based on a psychoanalytic study of his many interviews, each of about two hours' length. Through excerpts and through his careful analysis of what was said, he tells how survivors managed their later lives which of necessity bore the impact of their encounter with mass death.

Though many more died in German concentration camps than in Hiroshima, and though several psychiatric studies of concentration camp survivors have been published, Lifton's book is the first comprehensive psychiatric report on survivors of an extreme situation. And this though one might have assumed it would be easier to understand the reactions of people in our own culture, compared to the more alien setting of Japan. It may be that cultural distance makes it easier for the foreign observer to generalize on how survivors manage their experience. If so it might explain why Dr. Lifton was able to generalize, where this reviewer, who has studied the German concentration camps and their after-effects so much longer, could not. Maybe it made a difference that in Hiroshima the bomb exploded, and everything that happened after that one moment was a struggle for survival, no longer impeded by renewed enemy attacks—while the camp experience was one of living for years with the unrelieved threat of imminent death hanging over one's head. Maybe, too, such a massive and devastating encounter with death is experienced differently in different cultures. Be this as it may, Dr. Lifton has given us a masterly study of how those who survived dealt with their personal experience.

Whether one had endured Hiroshima or the German concentration

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

camp, what survivors suffer from most are guilt about being among the few who were spared and wonderment as to why they were so lucky. For many (though not all) the consequence of these feelings is a deeper sense of the meaning of both life and death. It is an experience that not only makes life more meaningful but more difficult; it no longer permits easy solutions.

This is so much so that survivors "strongly doubt the possibility of communicating what they have been through to anyone who has not himself undergone the ordeal," particularly of conveying to others why and how the experience has changed their view of life. To cite only one example, that relates to the present: Because of their intensely direct encounter with death in war time, survivors find it very hard to accept as genuine the peace movements now prevalent in many cultures, including our own. To survivors they seem sparked by counterfeit emotions. As one of them put it: "they cease to represent the feelings of the people who died . . . and become utilized for other purposes."

Dr. Lifton examines the reactions of survivors by means of five main themes, those of the "death imprint, death guilt, psychic numbing, nurturance and contagion, and formulation." Space permits me to mention only the two that seem most important, though it is the first one, the death imprint, which forces the survivor forever after to live with the impact of death as the central experience of his life. Against this he tries unsuccessfully to defend himself; the only constructive solution is to come to terms with it by means of what Dr. Lifton calls new formulations.

"Death guilt" is one of the new realizations forced on the survivor. "From the beginning [he is] torn by fundamental ambivalence; he . . . pays homage to the dead, and joins in various rituals to perpetuate his relationship to them; but he also pushes them away, considers them tainted and unclean, dangerous and threatening." On the basis of numerous survivor statements Dr. Lifton concludes "that each survivor simultaneously feels himself to be that 'stiffened corpse,' condemns himself for not being it, and condemns himself even more for feeling relieved that it is the other person's and not his own." It is this feeling of relief about the other person's death which is at the core of the death guilt.

For the survivors

> the dropping of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima annihilated a general sense of life's coherence, as much as it did human bodies . . . . Mastery of the experience depended upon re-establishing from within [formulations through] which not only the death immersion but the survivors' altered identity could be grasped and rendered significant. This quest for formulation turns

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> both Hiroshima and concentration camp survivors into what has been called "collectors of justice." Beyond medical and economic benefit as such, they seek a sense of world-order in which their suffering has been recognized.

But to find a better world order is no easy task for the individual. "The survivor cannot formulate from a void. He requires the psychological existence of a past as well as a present, of the dead as well as the living. Without these, neither mastery of his death encounter nor a place in human society is possible." So the best he can do is "to reassert [his] connection to continuous life." To achieve this "the survivor reverts not only to his personal past but to his historical past as well." Striving for and finding satisfaction in the continuance of life is the best "formulation" available to him.

I might end this review with Dr. Lifton's own concluding statement.

> Hiroshima was an "end of the world" in all of the ways I have described. And yet the world still exists. Precisely in this end-of-the-world quality lies both its threat and its potential wisdom. In every age man faces a pervasive theme which defies his engagement and yet must be engaged. In Freud's day it was sexuality and moralism. Now it is unlimited technological violence and absurd death. We do well to name the threat and analyze its components. But our need is to go further, to create new psychic and social forms to enable us to reclaim not only our technologies, but our very imaginations, in the service of the continuity of life.

This need is amply demonstrated by Dr. Lifton's findings, by the terrible fate of the dead and of many survivors. We look forward to a promised second volume that will tell us how to create new psychic and social forms that will assure us about the continuity of life.

BRUNO BETTELHEIM
University of Chicago

Formosa, China, and the United Nations: Formosa in the World Community *by Lung-chu Chen and Harold D. Lasswell. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1967.—xi, 428 pp. $8.95.*

Although there may be many false starts, it seems probable that ultimately negotiations will get under way that will restore peace to Vietnam. When and if this occurs, the problem of the status of Taiwan will likely come once again to center stage. Mentioned by its authors, this eventuality has not supplied the main motivation of this book. Instead, Dr. Chen Lung-chu, a legal scholar who is research associate at Yale Law School and a native Formosan, and Harold Lasswell, Yale's eminent and pioneering Edward J. Phelps Professor of Law and Politi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cal Science, present the case for an independent Formosa in its own terms, relying upon self-determination as a moral imperative. The instrument by which they wish this major political change to be accomplished is the United Nations, and the mechanism a plebiscite. In addition to discussing the effects of such a change upon the United Nations, the authors assess the possibilities of obtaining such actions as may be necessary to accomplish the desired end.

Obviously, the present government in Taiwan, the Republic of China, will oppose such a course with all the power it can command. As Chen and Lasswell suggest, the Nationalists are certain to insist that the matter is a substantive one when it is brought before the United Nations and this judgment, if sustained, would make its decision subject to veto. The remedy, the authors assert, lies in the attitude of the United States which, in any event, will be crucial. Without U.S. support, they argue, "the Nationalists will fall far short of the nine votes needed to reverse the presidential ruling" (p. 64) which they assume will favor treatment of the issue as a procedural matter, hence not subject to veto. In support of their argument they cite as precedents the Security Council's handling of the Taiwan question in 1950 and the Laos question in 1959. Most of the book, then, is an interesting and closely reasoned brief for such an action and suggestions for obtaining it. For reasons indicated above, the book is aimed unabashedly at opinion in the United States.

Chen and Lasswell also consider the likely reactions of the People's Republic of China to attempts to create an independent Formosa. They are under no illusions in this regard and accept the fact that the two Chinas are in complete agreement in viewing Taiwan as an integral part of the Chinese state. However, they believe that the People's Republic of China lacks the physical power to accomplish its aims in Formosa through direct military intervention, although they speculate fearfully on the possibility of a rapprochement between the Nationalists and the Communists that would deliver Taiwan to the Mainland government. Barring such a development they are optimistic, asserting that whatever Communist China may do "to obstruct a rational solution ... no nation, large or small, can safely defy world opinion indefinitely" (p. 81).

Although the arguments of Chen and Lasswell are multiplex and sophisticated and prevaded by a determined effort to deal with political realities, this reader's impression was of a hierarchy of improbable conditional events. Little strength has been added by what seems to have been the Lasswell contribution—the use in analysis of such concepts as "authoritative decision-makers," "decision processes," and "author-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ity and control allocations." In sum, there is little of the new political science and much of determined old-fashioned pleading in this book.

That is not necessarily a fault. The tragedy is that there is much truth in the basic position taken by Chen and Lasswell. Taiwan is ruled by an oligarchy, a relatively small clique that really represents neither the basic Formosan population nor even the two million or so Mainlanders who arrived after the 1948 collapse. While the reviewer believes that Nationalist Chinese rule on Taiwan has somewhat ameliorated since the very dark days of twenty years ago, there can be little question that it remains repressive. Indeed, it is precisely because free political discussion is not permitted in Taiwan that the present review must be contributed anonymously. Should the author's identity be discovered it is likely that he would find it exceptionally difficult to return to Taiwan to pursue scholarly work. Far worse, those Taiwanese, and even the Mainlanders, who have been his friends, who have previously assisted or been associated with him, might suffer interrogation, imprisonment, or other persecution.

Sad as this may be, the existence of a repressive government has not until now been sufficient cause for legitimate international action. A substantial question remains as to whether the issue of Formosa is an internal matter for the Chinese state, no matter how defined. Chen and Lasswell consider this question and come to the expected conclusion that despite shared background Formosans are entitled to separate status because, having undergone a unique political experience, they are distinct from the Chinese (p. 94). Such an argument is not entirely secure, although the existence of deep-rooted and very widespread feelings of separatism must be admitted by any objective observer who has had contact with Formosans. The fact is that different parts of China have had different political experiences as a consequence of China's "semi-colonial" condition for more than a century, and this diversity is complemented by other sources of variation, so that, in a real sense, each province has a highly distinctive character.

One of the most disappointing things about this book, however, is the handling of a major aspect of the basic theme. Chen and Lasswell base their case on a vision of the world in which self-determination and political freedom are dominating and motivating values. How free, then, would be the independent Formosa for which they plead? The authors are unequivocal: "the exercise of freedom must be kept within limits compatible with national development . . ." (p. 292). The denouement is equally blunt. "Free Formosa," like "Free China," will outlaw the Communist party and, by implication, any groupings on the left that might peril the stability of the government (p. 293). Fur-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thermore, as described by Chen and Lasswell, "free" Formosa will continue to depend upon the direct military protection of the United States. Indeed, the level of such protection would probably have to be raised, for they call for a sharp drop in the military establishment to be maintained by the Formosans in contrast with the present Nationalist government. Actually, as the authors indicate, the most probable means that would be used to bring an independent Formosa into the People's Republic of China involve infiltration, subversion, and "people's war." Surely this conjures up the specter of another war like that in Vietnam. How would it fulfill the hopes of Chen and Lasswell if, in the process of creating and saving an independent Formosa, it were subjected to the lavish destruction which seems to be our contemporary preservative?

Unfortunately, the people of Taiwan face an uncertain fate. As their future becomes clearer other alternatives may appear. Presently, however, there is a repressive political climate in Taiwan; most objective observers who have visited the island for lengthy stays and who, unlike most casual visitors, have gotten to know Formosans rather than Mainlanders, agree that there are deeply rooted and widespread feelings of antagonism between Mainlanders and Taiwanese. Equally apparent is the previously mentioned current of separatist feeling in the Formosan community. At the same time it should be noted that the adverse political situation is associated with widespread, if not universal, prosperity, reckoned by Asian standards. This observer of Taiwan believes that for the sake of enjoying and continuing this prosperity most Formosans, including the politically disposed elite, have themselves turned away from confrontations with the Mainlander-controlled power structure.

Some say that they have done so because they are confident in the thought that the generation of the Mainlander conquerors is passing and that the Formosan majority will engulf its Mainlander minority. Comforting as this rationalization may seem, there is little in Taiwanese history to recommend it. After more than three hundred years the Hokkien and Hakka of Taiwan still regard each other with suspicion and sometimes hatred. Members of both populations, after a lapse of centuries, can pinpoint the mainland villages from which their ancestors came. Nor is this merely a matter of antiquarian interest, for these origins are the basis of associations of all kinds—social, economic, religious, and political.

It is not the intention of this review to say that the cause of an independent Formosa is quixotic or completely beyond realization. The question is a worthy one and the present time particularly appropriate

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for its discussion. But the problems it engenders are more frightfully numerous and weighty than Chen and Lasswell make out.

This review is contributed anonymously for reasons stated in its text.

Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science *by Paolo Rossi, translated by Sacha Rabinovitch. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968.—xvii, 280 pp. $5.95.*

The reputation of Francis Bacon as a pioneer of scientific method, which seemed secure for three hundred years after his death, has been challenged in the last forty years on two grounds. One is historical: it is claimed that the rejection of deductive and syllogistic reasoning about nature, the appeal to systematic experiments, and the inductive method of generalizing from them were all advocated before Bacon—and can be found, for example, in Robert Grosseteste nearly four hundred years earlier. The other ground is philosophical: having failed in the last two hundred years to find a logical justification for induction, or even (and more perplexing) a formal procedure for it, philosophers have turned a little sourly to argue that science does not really use induction anyway.

It was therefore timely to review afresh the whole body of Francis Bacon's writings on science (which cover more than twenty years, and change in important ways in that time) and to assess both their historical connections and their philosophy from the bottom up. And, in fact, Professor Rossi's book was recognized from its first publication in Italy in 1957 as a major advance in scholarship and in intellectual evaluation. For it not only restores the balance in the ups and downs of Bacon's standing; it adds a new depth to our view of him, by taking him out of the insular tradition of British thought and putting him for the first time into the context of Renaissance speculation about magic and science.

The word "magic" may strike the mind oddly here and in Professor Rossi's title. But Professor Rossi's work is bound up with the school of Italian intellectual historians who have traced the pervading influence in the Renaissance of the ideas of natural magic that Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola took from the Hermetic books in the latter part of the fifteenth century. That was a hundred years before Francis Bacon was born, yet it was that conception of man's power over nature which (Professor Rossi shows) Bacon first absorbed and then struggled to rationalize and finally to transform. In this way,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Professor Rossi makes sense of the sequence of Bacon's works, including the neglected treatment of the classical fables, through the *Advancement of Learning* in 1605 to the *Novum Organum* in 1620.

There is a lingering assumption among historians of science, fostered by the books of Professor Lynn Thorndike, that medieval and Renaissance magic was just an early set of amateur formulas that gradually were improved and became empirical science. Professor Rossi does much to correct this simple view, and more has been done (and remains to be done) since his book. When Francis Bacon wrote, the medieval conception of black magic (whose aim is to *reverse* the laws of nature) had already given place to white or natural magic (whose aim is to *exploit* them). Yet nature was still conceived animistically, and the Renaissance *magus* still hoped to trap her with a formal spell, as an inquisitor looks for a form of words to trap a man on trial. The puritan element in British thought made Bacon ill at ease with this too human picture of the role of the *magus* as a sly bully. So in Bacon's colder eye the trial of nature became a struggle not for domination but for understanding; and the scientist as inquisitor was seen to be trying to win her over, not by a trick, but by entering into her behavior so that her laws were revealed of themselves.

Francis Bacon was not alone, of course, in forming this new picture of the relation between the scientist and the nature he questions. It can be argued that active men like Kepler and Galileo did more to spread it and make it vivid than Bacon could do. Yet, as Professor Rossi traces it, we can see why it was Bacon who believed that experiments would reveal the laws of nature in a form which would be self-evident; and why, in this sense, the method of induction was indeed his great discovery.

J. BRONOWSKI
Salk Institute for Biological Studies

Max Scheler, 1874-1928: An Intellectual Portrait *by John Raphael Staude. New York, The Free Press, and London, Collier-Macmillan, 1967.—xv, 298 pp. $6.95.*

This book is the first effort, in any language, to present "an intellectual portrait" of Max Scheler, although since its purpose "is to explain the development of Scheler's social and political ideas" (p. viii), it barely touches on, above all, Scheler's work and achievement in philosophy. The study is based on Scheler's opus and the secondary literature, but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

also on unpublished material, including letters, and on interviews with many persons, most important among them his second wife and his widow. It deals, in roughly chronological order, with Scheler's critique of bourgeois civilization, with his two conversions to Catholicism, his glorification of the war, his expectations for democracy, his turning from philosophy to sociology, the clarification and educational therapy he hoped for from the sociology of knowledge, and his philosophical anthropology, especially in its bearing on his conception of history in general and his time in particular. The merit of the study derives partly from the man it treats, partly from what success this treatment has. Some of those who knew Scheler tell us that he was far more charismatic than his writings, many of which had an extraordinary impact when they appeared, and some of which deserve sustained study now. But we do not obtain an understanding of the conception—better, the conceptions—Scheler had of himself; surely, there must be more clues and more explicit ones than his referring to his major work in the sociology of knowledge as "a rhapsody." Such distance between him and us in Staude's work is only one of the manifestations of the little headway the author has made toward a psychological approach to his subject (contrast Erikson on Luther); if this is justifiable in an "intellectual portrait," Staude does not undertake to justify it. The question of the relevance Scheler has for him and thus for us is articulated in the questions about Scheler's "contributions to modern thought" and his "historical significance in twentieth-century Germany." The answer is: "A list of Scheler's intellectual achievements is impressive; he contributed to the development of ethics and value theory, social psychology, sociology of knowledge, and philosophical anthropology"; to which the author adds a list of "the most notable men who came under his influence" (p. 255), among them Cassirer, Heidegger, Ortega y Gasset, Mannheim, Gabriel Marcel, Maritain, Joachim Wach. Much of the study, however, shows Staude to be closer to his subject than this question and its answer indicate: he describes and analyzes Scheler's work as a response to the time in which he lived—imperial Germany in peace, imperial Germany at war, the Weimar Republic—but the closeness is no greater than this, such that it would carry the author either to recognizing the continuity between his time and ours or to recognizing the relevance of comparing Scheler's response to that of other social and political thinkers—say Max Weber on the one hand or Lukacs on the other.

Staude is very skillful in moving back and forth between biography and exposition of work, although the latter is not as substantial as Bendix's *Max Weber* (also subtitled "An Intellectual Portrait") nor as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

politically keen as Wolfgang J. Mommsen's study of the same man. His book is very readable, however, and may rouse the interest of different kinds of readers in different works of Scheler's, too few of which have thus far been translated into English. "May," though, because Staude tends more to stress Scheler's weakness than to show his strength, to consider him more as "ideologist" than as philosopher and sociologist, so that some of his readers might turn away from Scheler with a superior smile if not a sneer.

Part of the merit of this first attempt at a comprehensive presentation of this puzzling and fascinating thinker is that Staude's work raises many important questions. Two have already been mentioned by implication: How can we best understand this enormously changeable and yet in some respects thoroughly consistent if not indeed rigid person? How can we best understand the nature of his relation to his time and how can we account for it? Other questions go even beyond Scheler. In his search and in his violent shifts—for instance, his spiritualization of imperialism or the Church or Germany—he undoubtedly was, among other things, a mystifier mystified; but so, it seems, have been more German intellectuals more of the time than have their counterparts elsewhere. In this form or in one of many others, the phenomenon raises a question that is addressed to the history, politics, sociology, and psychology of Germany herself. Scheler is a promising source for its fresh examination, and along with the other questions indicated, Staude's Scheler can serve to pose it again.

KURT H. WOLFF
Brandeis University

As a Tale That Is Told: The Autobiography of R. M. MacIver. *Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1968.—ix, 269 pp. $7.50.*

"When I had reached the age of gray-haired reminiscence and was told I should write my autobiography, I swore I never would." So begins one of the most charming, literate, and engrossing autobiographies written in our day by any social scientist. Good is it that Robert MacIver was persuaded—or, knowing his Scotch stubbornness to blandishments of others, persuaded himself—finally to write it. His life, now in its eighty-sixth vigorous year, has touched many lives, in diverse spheres on all continents where the social sciences are known, and can be assessed by the criteria of distinguished teaching, scholarship, professional consultantship, and university administration, quite apart from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the criteria of humane citizenship. His is a remarkable life, and we can be grateful indeed that, added to the many other fine books Robert MacIver has written, there is now this one about himself, the influences that have shaped him, and the sorts of things that creative minds are likely to be turning over when they are not actually creating.

The book begins in Scotland, his native heath, and surely the temper of Scotch Calvinism has never been more felicitously, even affectionately, portrayed than by this man who, though reared in its iron pieties, foreswore them as he was to foreswear all convictions that did not spring from personal experience and reason. From his native Stornoway in Scotland we move to the University of Edinburgh (where the great Saintsbury was one of his teachers), to Oriel College, Oxford, where he went "with good-sized scholarship masquerading as a Bible clerkship," and thence to lecturerships at Aberdeen, in both political science and sociology, and on to a professorship at, first, Toronto and then, in 1927, at Columbia University, from which he retired as Lieber Professor of Political Philosophy and Sociology in 1950. At Columbia he had key influence in developing a department of sociology that was to include such eminent scholars as Robert Lynd, Robert Merton, and Paul Lazarsfeld, among others. A second career began with retirement at Columbia, one of more than a decade of directorships of vital research projects in the areas of juvenile delinquency, academic freedom, and the United Nations. And in 1963 a third career commenced with his accession to the presidency of the New School for Social Research at age 81. High honors came regularly to this remarkable man, among them honorary degrees at Harvard, Princeton, Yale, Jewish Theological Seminary, Columbia, and, in 1952, his *alma mater*, Edinburgh. Books flowed continuously from his pen, beginning with *Community* in 1917, which this reviewer regards as the single most distinguished book yet written on that subject, and including *The Modern State* (1926), which for many of us was the introduction to the sociology of politics, as well as to the great British pluralist tradition. In all, some twenty books, not to mention articles and addresses, keep the name MacIver as fresh today as at any time during the half-century in which they were written.

I would be doing this lovely book a disservice if I left the impression that it is solely or even chiefly about its writer. Mostly it is about others—family, friends, teachers, students, colleagues, administrators, political figures—and the glimpses we are given of these range from the penetrating to the affectionate. Rifts and tensions there were bound to be in a public career as long and active as his, but the book is singularly free of the belated *riposte* that so often figures in autobiogra-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

phies of the great. The glimpses we are given of family life, including his wife of fifty-seven years, Ethel, are charming in every detail.

As a Tale That is Told (the title comes from Psalm 90: "We spend our years as a tale that is told") is a book not merely for the many whose lives have been shaped by this great teacher and mind, but for all who are interested in the events of the past three-quarters of a century as seen through the eyes of one of its most distinguished observers. Social scientist, he is also, proudly, a philosopher; I like to think of him as perhaps the last of the line of Scottish moral philosophers that began in the eighteenth century, one of the most influential lines of intellectual ancestry in modern history. If there is an academic hereafter, Robert MacIver will surely find a comfortable seat waiting for him near Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and the others who founded the line. Like each of them, he is a man for all seasons.

ROBERT A. NISBET
University of California, Riverside

The Principles of Politics *by J. R. Lucas. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966.—xiv, 380 pp. 50s.*

This book is not about politics. It provides a rationale of the moral, legal, and administrative principles of constitutional government in England, somewhat loosely organized into seventy-eight sections with such titles as Human Nature, Communities and Disputes, Sovereignty, Constitutionalism, The Rule of Law, Rationality and Universalizability, Freedom, Property, Public Interest, Equality, Individualism, The Minimum State, Rationalism, and Empiricism.

Mr. Lucas is a philosopher. He is also a conservative who distrusts rationalists, especially socialist ones with blueprints for radical change; he is a libertarian who believes that "I want to" is a good argument, if not a conclusive one, in a free community; he prefers privilege to the difficult and dangerous notion of equality; he denies that the state exists only to protect individuals' rights and insists that it is based on shared values; and he is aware not only that men are imperfect but also that their ideals and values may be incompatible: legality must be weighed against equity, freedom against harm to others, official accountability against efficiency.

The book aims at a philosophical commentary on political ideas and institutions. There is a useful examination of sovereignty and constitutional limitations and a thorough discussion of a family of legal

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

terms: the rule of law, process of law, justice, legality and equity. Even better is the provocative attempt to flush out and extirpate all the meanings of equality and the argument, imitating David Hume's, that if human nature were different, society would be different. By varying the characteristics of human nature, Mr. Lucas displays a set of social models from Hobbes to Heaven by way of Areopagite, MRA, Stoic, Kantian, Civil Service, and Church Militant societies (pp. 5-10, 371).

But why are there so many significant omissions? A community is defined as a group possessing a common decision procedure, but Locke's similar definition is not mentioned; Methodological Individualism is attacked, but Popper's name is never dropped; rationalism is denounced and empiricism (modified by reasonable argument) praised, with much conjuring up of Burke but none of Oakeshott. Mr. Lucas might be excused as wearing his learning lightly were not what he shows of it so threadbare: Hobbes is supposed to have required that the sovereign be a single human being (pp. 27, 78); Locke's second *Treatise* is bizarrely cited as the *True End of Civil Government* (p. 34); Mill is accused of believing that truth will prevail (p. 308); Hegel is castigated as a totalitarian (p. 350); arguments justifying obligation are treated as motives for obedience (pp. 43-49, 265). Mr. Lucas' knowledge of political institutions seems a bit threadbare, too; his examples are confined almost entirely to the United Kingdom and the United States. He considers whether the Supreme Court of the United States is sovereign without mentioning that its composition, jurisdiction, and procedures are subject to statutory regulation (pp. 38-41); he treats parliamentary control of officials without distinguishing the effects of criticism by the opposition from the influence of the government's backbenches (pp. 208-12); he says that the legislature is supreme in Britain and subordinate in America, and refers particularly to deciding who shall be appointed to government posts (p. 213). Being a libertarian if not a liberal, Mr. Lucas writes much about freedom, but he never even hints that it might be endangered by contemporary methods of collecting, storing, and retrieving information; bugging, wire-tapping, and computers which provide full accounts of a person's financial history to government departments, prospective creditors, and possible employers are ignored in this book.

Finally, Mr. Lucas has done himself a disservice by not imposing a greater degree of order on his material; nevertheless, unlike the curate's egg, parts of this book are fine.

M. M. GOLDSMITH
Columbia University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives *edited by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan. New York, The Free Press, and London, Collier-Macmillan, 1967.—xvii, 554 pp. $9.95.*

In trying to review this learned collection of twelve separately important though related research papers, the easiest and probably most useful task is to summarize the contents. Eleven of the chapters are specialized treatments, by recognized authorities, of parties and voting in particular nations or groups of nations. Major attention is given to Western European nations (specifically Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Finland, and Norway), but there are also papers on New Zealand, Japan, Brazil, and West Africa. Moreover, the United States, Canada, and Australia (plus Britain) are discussed in a cross-national voting study. The editors provide a long synthesizing introduction that is an independently important contribution of insight, information, and imagination. They have tried, after most of the chapters were written, to establish a pattern to fit the findings of those chapters. Their pattern involves schemata derived from Talcott Parsons. A patient regard for such schemata is probably required for a complete grasp of the editors' intentions, but even without that regard there is still a great deal to be learned from the introductory essay as well as from the rest of the book. This surely applies to the useful "systematic index" based on the analytical distinctions of the introduction.

The hardest reviewing task in this case is to select only a few matters to illustrate the wealth of significant material in the book. Inevitably the selection depends on individual taste and interest, but one observation is stressed so tellingly in the introduction and then so often reinforced in the subsequent European chapters that it deserves special recognition. That is the way in which Western party systems of the nineteen-sixties generally reflect the cleavage structures of the nineteen-twenties, and so, along with many party organizations, are older than national electorates. Whether the enduring party alternatives will remain relevant to new electorates is an obvious question that we have not yet begun to answer. It is a great merit of the book that it raises the question even inferentially. The parties and the party systems to which we have become accustomed in Western democracies during the last half-century are certainly durable, but they may not be immortal. Parties based on anachronistic cleavage structures may have to transform themselves or be superseded.

Singling out a particular country-essay is difficult, but Juan Linz' chapter on Spain's party system catches the eye even in a volume of dis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tinguished papers. Not only is it novel to have such a wealth of scholarly detail on Spanish parties (chiefly of the pre-Franco period), but Linz adds a fascinating estimate of the present Spanish electoral division on the assumption that the existing Spanish social classes would vote for the same political party tendencies as do comparable Italian social classes. The result, incidentally, is a large Communist vote in Spain as in Italy.

Another national analysis of an especially innovative character is Joji Watanuki's chapter on contemporary Japanese voting patterns. In this instance, the novelty lies in the finding of a high degree of white-collar voting for the Left (notably the Left Socialists) that has no parallel in Western Europe, and in the author's ingenious explanations of why the Japanese voting pattern does not conform to the usual and expected relationship between income group and party choice. Separately noting this analysis as well as Linz' implies no relative depreciation of the quality and the usefulness of the other chapters. This is one anthology that cannot fairly be characterized as uneven. As the last volume of the *International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research*, it is a fitting climax for the series arranged by Heinz Eulau.

LEON D. EPSTEIN
University of Wisconsin

The Cold War as History *by Louis J. Halle. New York and Evanston, Harper & Row, 1967.—xiv, 434 pp., $6.95.*

The cold war may not yet belong to the ages, but it is old enough to need a biography. Of such recent attempts, the history by Louis Halle is not only the most comprehensive, it is clearly the best. In fact, it is superb.

Perhaps one reason for this is that Halle shares three qualities with Thucydides (whom he admires and imitates). Both, in early stages of conflict as policy-makers in the storm center of action, felt the blows of misfortune from their own compatriots. Both turned from a life of action to one of contemplation. Both became superb storytellers. Halle writes like a Greek, not a Roman.

A paradoxical theme pervades his judgments about the conflict. In discussing the problem of China, Halle remarks: "the fact remains, and it is central to this whole history, that the nominal is always more real to us than the real." There is no mistaking what he thinks is real: the national entities of Russia and America, the shifting power equations among states, and "common human nature." The rival ideologies are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nominal. Halle finds these global ideologies distasteful fictions; yet he still regards the cold war as inevitable and predetermined for "realistic" and quite unideological reasons. Russian behavior is Russian behavior, not Communist; Chinese behavior is the same. The cold war crucible was the power vacuum which preceded it in Central Europe. National insecurities and interests prompted the actions which reciprocally brought on the conflict. Quite clearly, Halle allows the fates wide room for maneuver; but if the confrontation was unavoidable, the ideological element in it clearly was puffed up to a point endangering civilized life. The fallacy of the Americans was their concern for a workable world system. American universalism, expressed in free world rhetoric, provided the antithesis to Marxism, making it possible for the cold war to be extended to Asia in the nineteen-fifties.

Despite Halle's own firm preference that the cold war was concerned with the balance of power and the future of Europe, other Thucydidean aspects of his study require this judgment to be modified. Few major conflicts remain true to their original purposes. One especially moving aspect of Halle's work is his ample documentation of the fact that one thing leads to another. Clearly it is not to Halle's taste that the cold war, for nominalist reasons, enveloped the Asian scene. Yet, as he notes, there were inexorable features of the situation which were by no means merely ideological. Speaking of Korea and Japan, he remarks: "The fact is that one cannot liberate a country . . . without involving oneself in continuing responsibility for its future." To defeat and occupy a country is also to inherit its strategic problems.

But such critical comments by this reviewer may serve to blur the reader's perception of the book. It is a humane and civilized interim report on a bleak phase of contemporary history and should be read, not reviewed.

PAUL SEABURY
University of California, Berkeley

Economic Nationalism in Old and New States *edited by Harry G. Johnson. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1967. —xi, 145 pp. $5.00.*

These studies, organized by a committee at the University of Chicago, exemplify the comparative approach to an economic problem, the relations between economic nationalism and economic development.

Together they form a variegated collection. Kahan doubts the effectiveness of protectionist policies in European countries in the nineteenth

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

century, although the link between nationalism and industrialization strengthened as nationalism intensified. Weiss reports that policies of economic nationalism were weakly executed in Britain in the nineteenth century and actual policy was often compatible with the welfare of the rest of the world. In fact protection would have served the country better than free trade. Dernberger sees the revolution in China as a struggle between nationalism and Marxist internationalism. But the resulting new government turned to highly nationalist policies to maintain itself in power and develop a viable nation. Nash, writing of Mexico since 1910, regards the first thirty years as having been devoted to transforming the social structure and value system, thus making an investment in human beings to transform the country into a modern working economic state prepared to seize economic opportunity when it appeared. Professor Harry G. Johnson regards the Canadian government since 1857 as having allowed preoccupation with economic nationalism to impel it into a vicious circle of inappropriate policies, thus demonstrating the folly of economic nationalism, at least in an industrially advanced economy. Finally Zolberg shows how Mali, starting after 1960 with a rational internationalist approach (of a Marxist sort), passed quickly to national extremism with an unattainable and irrelevant economic plan. It may be that the sacrifice of material benefits for psychic income in the form of national pride and puritanical arrogance was only apparent, as it is doubtful whether any economic plan could raise perceptibly the standard of living of the country in the near future.

Professor Johnson in a sophisticated concluding chapter on the ideology of economic policy in new states offers some suggestive generalizations regarding the effects of economic nationalism. Although it is a necessary means to the integration of a nation it stimulates efforts to follow the example of powerful nations, to bring production facilities under national control, and to sacrifice efficiency to autarchy. Industry is preferred to agriculture and relevance to defense suggests the industries to be preferred. Professor Johnson attributes the emergence of this ideology in new states to the peace settlement after World War I, the legacy of the great depression, the rise of political socialism, and the Keynesian revolution in economics.

Too few and narrow in scope, and too varied in their time aspect, these essays can reveal no simple relation between economic nationalism and development, but they uncover other factors affecting development, such as historical background (influenced by the general ideology of colonizing nations), economic structure, and the special nature of the economic problems of each country. Furthermore, its effect on development is not the sole criterion for judging nationalism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thus, in spite of the keen and scholarly work of the Chicago group, the causes and consequences of economic nationalism remain unclear, as do the conditions under which it may become self-destructive. In the light of the relations between nationalism and international instability, as well as its threat to the future of the human race, this conclusion is discouraging. But the group has provided a jumping-off point for further studies of the subject.

ARTHUR ROBERT BURNS
Columbia University

The Common Aid Effort: The Development Assistance Activities of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development *by Milton J. Esman and Daniel S. Cheever. Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1967.—xiv, 421 pp. $7.50.*

The bulk of economic and technical aid granted to underdeveloped nations throughout the world is dispensed on the basis of bilateral agreements. Tensions within the world community and the desire of donors to closely control their contributions make any immediate radical change in this pattern unlikely. In *The Common Aid Effort,* Milton J. Esman and Daniel S. Cheever describe and analyze the efforts made by a large number of non-Communist donor nations to coordinate their bilateral foreign aid programs. Coordination conserves limited aid resources so that they will yield maximum benefits for the several objectives which are important to donors, donees, and the world community at large. Consultation among donors decreases duplication of programs, reduces overemphasis on certain projects or countries, and fosters integrated development planning in the Third World.

As the subtitle indicates, the institution on which the book focuses primarily is the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The authors tell the history of this novel international body in detail, including its present organization and functioning. The techniques of confrontation diplomacy and capital representation—informal and unpublicized discussion meetings by development experts from donor countries—are depicted as promising avenues for insulating international cooperation efforts from disabling internal and external political pressures. The authors systematically analyze the strengths and weaknesses of DAC instrumentalities and operations; they suggest a host of innovations which might be beneficial at the present time.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Throughout, the discussion is broadly-gauged and practical. Problems are examined from many vantage points. This combination of the scholar's breadth of theoretical knowledge with the practitioner's experience and caution about the limits of feasibility in a world of multiple loyalties and pressures is the book's most rewarding characteristic. The combination is not surprising since the study is largely based on field research. Moreover, one of the authors has served as economic development adviser to the Malaysian government and both authors are distinguished members of the academic fraternity.

The book delivers a good deal more than its title promises. It contains an excellent analysis of the various purposes to be served by foreign aid and the split image of the role of foreign aid which plagues statesmen in the non-Communist world. It compares the different rationales for aid of such major donor countries as France, Britain, Germany, and the United States, and the domestic and international consequences of their various approaches. It singles out the creation of a strong desire among donors to help and cooperate as the most crucial prerequisite for stimulating aid programs which will match the Third World's rapidly rising needs and expectations. It suggests OECD lobbying, based on a well-developed, long-term strategic concept of aid, as a possible level to spur slackening interest and performance in foreign aid among developed non-Communist nations.

Students and practitioners of international administration in general, and foreign aid in particular, will find *The Common Aid Effort* a valuable and stimulating resource for academic and field work. They will probably regret that the authors failed to include a bibliography of related studies and that there are few footnotes to fill the gap.

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois, Chicago Circle

The Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the Caribbean *by William G. Demas. Montreal, McGill University Press, 1965.—xv, 150 pp. $4.50.*

For all the modification it underwent in the hands of economists from Marx to Keynes, the Ricardian model has until yesterday reigned supreme. Its dominance has perhaps been simply an intellectual manifestation of a political fact, the hegemony of North Atlantic "Seaborne Empire" with Britannia as top nation. Today the limitations of this special case are being exposed. As a multiplicity of new states emerge

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from behind the wall of empire, there is a marked—if largely unwitting —methodological drift toward the comparative study of economic *systems*.

The discipline is still stumbling toward formulation with a rigor and completeness comparable to that of Ricardo's model of early English industrialization. Among producers and consumers alike, the theory of economic development under which rubric most of the new work is being organized is still famous for its looseness. And for good reason. The demise of the English model has demanded a revision and a restatement of parameters so as to acknowledge the different structural, institutional, and behavioral *ceterae* of each economy. This has been a cause of necessary confusion in the relations between disciplines in the social sciences. Not less, this shift in the focus from proximate to ultimate cause as W. Arthur Lewis has described it has also made the conventional division of labor within the discipline largely obsolescent. "Structural and institutional specificity" has called for increased disaggregation and a new fit between the micro-theory of the firm and consumer, on the one hand, and the macro-theory of growth and development, on the other. As an essential part of this, both the theory of value and distribution within systems and the theory of trade and payments between them have needed drastic reorganization.

In this worthy book Demas offers a contribution to the *aménagement* in the form of an attempt to isolate the imperatives of size. Not unexpectedly, this factor is of crucial importance in the minute economies of the English-speaking Caribbean where he is a senior economic planner.

Broadly put, the argument runs as follows. Size governs the process of structural transformation. Small countries have skewed resources and diversified patterns of demand. They are neither well placed to have capital goods sectors nor to benefit from economies of scale. Their potential is circumscribed by their vulnerability in the face of larger political systems, multi-national corporations, and international trades unions, and by their consequent inability to escape being takers of technology and taste. As such, they have to be exceptionally adaptable and flexible to survive, but even so, they must export to live. They cannot ever become developed in the sense of being able to sustain continuing transformation on their own.

If the case is less than convincing, it is largely because of two methodological weaknesses. First, Demas begins with the conventional disclaimer by which he exempts himself from "dealing with the more fundamental, social, political and institutional parameters underlying the process of growth and structural change" (p. 4). This, in effect, is to invite us to assume the "Ricardian" framework which dominates the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

textbook and, from that, our minds. And much as the author's keen empirico-structuralist sense asserts itself in qualification, we are in the end caught in a methodological prison which reduces the argument to a tautology.

The institutional assumptions, in effect, standardize both aspirations and behavior. As takers of technology, organization, and taste, small countries are allowed precious little discretion or initiative since the already developed countries are in a position to manipulate them. Their freedom can lie only in "natural" variables such as their resource endowment. But then small countries are *defined* as ones which are likely to be unfavorably endowed (p. 22). Since "endowment" is itself meaningful only in regard to the "state of the arts," such a definition needs to be validated in terms of evidence showing that technology and taste-formation are necessary correlatives of small size.

Probably due to lack of data, Demas does not allow himself any real chance to test this implied hypothesis. When he refers to the Caribbean, he excludes countries which are "large"—on his own definition. In terms of institutional parameters, the region could include, according to Wagley and others, the North East of Brazil, parts of the United States "South," the Guyanas and probably Venezuela, and certainly the classic "plantation" societies of Cuba and the other islands of the Antilles. On this definition there is considerable scope for testing the significance of differences in size, *ceteris paribus*. The second major methodological weakness of a book which is rich in insight is that it misses this opportunity.

It follows that the validity of the major policy conclusions is suspect. First, Demas advocates the generation of local centers of decision-making; an increased share of local, in total investment; more encouragement to local entrepreneurs; and the exercise of a greater national discretion in monetary, financial, and commercial policy (p. 137). Secondly, regional economic integration is proposed as one solution to the problem of small size. But if, as some have suggested, the absence of local initiative, "underdevelopment," and regional fragmentation are related results of the current operations of multi-national corporations and to a lesser extent of international trades unionism, the options of these small countries may be quite different.

LLOYD BEST
McGill University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Notes

James M. Beshers has written a book entitled *Population Processes in Social Systems* (New York, The Free Press, and London, Collier-Macmillan, 1967; x, 207 pp., $3.75). One's first impression from the title is that of a book devoted to the field of population. It is not that. Rather, it is for the most part an attempt to incorporate some few statistics about fertility in the United States into a grandiose scheme of no particular value and having no explanatory powers. The author begins with important questions: "The gathering storm clouds of a world population crisis are now ominously visible to all. What is the nature of this crisis? What can be done to avert it?" (p. 1). He ends, 181 pages later, with "the population problem must be resolved within a broader problem-solving effort . . . ." The saddest part of this book is that the author believes that he is a pioneer, on a new track and undertaking new analyses beyond the abilities of his forebears. The truth of the matter is that the only possibly new items in the book are some new terminology, which in turn will be replaced in a few years. If he had read some of the literature produced in the last century, he would not have written this book. The Appendix on "Quantitative Methods" is particularly useless.—A. J. JAFFE, *Columbia University.*

A concise, readable book on past problems of the international gold standard—*The Money Question During Reconstruction* (New York, W. W. Norton, 1967; 127 pp., $4.50) by Walter T. K. Nugent—is bound to attract attention today. Professor Nugent's interest, however, was roused not so much by the present dollar crisis as by the persistence of the currency debate in late nineteenth-century American politics. Although it is no substitute for Robert P. Sharkey, *Money, Class and Party,* and Irwin Unger, *The Greenback Era,* in dealing with the whole of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

subject suggested by its title, this book does provide a valuable supplement to those works on the history and significance of the act demonetizing silver. The Populist conception of "the Crime of '73" as a secret plot to foist the bankers' gold standard upon an unsuspecting Congress has long been scorned by standard histories of the period, which have portrayed the act as simple legal recognition that undervalued silver was not being delivered to the Treasury for use as money. Nugent concludes: "neither legend—that of the agrarians or that of the orthodox—comes close to the facts." Seeing the bill's sponsors as "less than frank" with Congress, though not "malfeasant," he argues that the plunging price of silver threatened the whole fabric of the funded debt and specie redemption of the greenbacks to which the Republicans were pledged, unless bimetallism was abolished. Moreover, the measure stemmed directly from efforts of the great commercial powers, led in 1867 by France and the United States, to make their currencies freely interchangeable and all based on gold.—DAVID MONTGOMERY, *University of Warwick.*

The City of London is noted for combining enterprise and tradition. The last ten years have seen some remarkable changes and Richard Kellett's *The Merchant Banking Arena* (New York, St. Martin's Press, and London and Toronto, Macmillan, 1967; xvii, 182 pp., $6.00) is therefore particularly welcome. Highly readable, it gives a balanced and well-documented account of both past history and recent developments. The older dynasts have quietly retired and made room for new men but continuity has been maintained and the traditional merchant banking families have shown a remarkable capacity for producing men more than capable of holding their own alongside the talented newcomer. The City has room for both. The book proceeds by a series of case studies carefully selected to cover most of the key points without repetition. Beneath the light, gossipy, journalistic style is evidence of careful research (there are six pages of "notes on sources") and a deep understanding of the subject matter. Mr. Kellett appears to have projected a longer, more analytical book but then, through pressure of work, to have written a shorter, more anecdotal one. This is a bonus for the American reader who is given a short and painless but reliable introduction to one of the most important financial markets in the world. The inaccuracies tend to be in the irrelevant asides rather than in the main theme. For instance, American readers will be astonished to learn that "bids as practiced in Britain are largely unknown either in the U.S.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or on the Continent" (p. 42). But Mr. Kellett is only claiming to be an expert on London, and if he was a little out of date on tender offers he is right on top of his own subject.—JOHN CHOWN, *London, England.*

Tito's Separate Road: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics by John C. Campbell (New York and Evanston, Harper and Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1967; vii, 180 pp., $3.95) has a somewhat misleading title, because the main purpose of the book seems to be an attempt to convince the American public that our political attitude toward Yugoslavia of providing aid, favoring trade, and accepting her as a legitimate partner in pursuing our own interests is justified and may contribute to the goal of peaceful coexistence with the Communist world. The author considers the doubts of many congressmen and certain sectors of the public at large—whether it is morally right to deal with "a Communist dictator"—as irrelevant today, a most welcome approach which, however, is really nothing new among social scientists. The first four chapters describe the various stages of U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia after the break with the Soviet Union in 1948. The author returns to this topic in the concluding chapter with suggestions for the future. The other material deals with the foreign policy of Yugoslavia toward the Third World, the effect of Titoism on the satellite states after de-Stalinization, and the different phases of Tito's foreign policy after the emergence of Communist China. Sandwiched between is a chapter "Titoism, the Homefront," a brief and summary description of Yugoslavia's domestic development and conflicts. In fact, the book is a collection of essays, the common bond of which is Yugoslavia's role in world policy. But the themes are not bound together by any comprehensive analysis of the history of Yugoslavia in the postwar era, nor, for that matter, do they present the material covered in a systematic fashion. Nevertheless, taken individually, they reflect the author's thorough knowledge of the complexities of Yugoslavia's problems and provide some valuable glimpses of a variety of issues concerning foreign policy within the Communist orbit.—† KAETHE MENGELBERG.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Praeger Studies in Politics—urban, national, and international

SOVIET-AMERICAN RIVALRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Edited by J. C. HUREWITZ

Twenty leading authorities analyze the political, economic, and military situation in the Middle East today and offer knowledgeable projections for the 1970's. Contributors to this timely volume include Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Frederick C. Barghoorn, Charles Issawi, and Malcolm Kerr. Published for the Academy of Political Science. *ca. 224 pp.*
Cloth, $6.50; paper, U-677/$2.50

A NEW FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES

HANS J. MORGENTHAU

With the intellectual daring that is his trademark, the author of the classic *Politics Among Nations* presents a provocative reappraisal of such basic issues as foreign aid, nuclear power, and intervention. Dr. Morgenthau insists that we adjust our thinking to what *is* rather than what *has been*. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations. *268 pp., index.*
Cloth, $6.95; paper, U-645/$2.75

THE POLITICS OF URBAN EDUCATION

Edited by MARILYN GITTELL and ALAN G. HEVESI

The "politization" of urban education began with the 1954 desegregation decision and culminated in the demand for decentralization and community control. These carefully selected readings trace the major phases in this development, illuminating the political nature of education decision-making in urban centers. *ca. 400 pp., charts, index.*
Cloth, $8.50; paper, U-676/$3.50

THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE

Past and Prospects

REINHOLD NIEBUHR and PAUL E. SIGMUND

A renowned theologian-philosopher and a distinguished political scientist examine the prerequisites for the creation of democratic governments, and explore the problems of adapting such democratic institutions in countries with entirely different cultural, religious, and economic conditions. *194 pp., index.* Cloth, $5.95; paper, U-673/$2.25

FREDERICK A. PRAEGER, Publishers
111 Fourth Ave., New York, N. Y. 10003

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



THE STUDY OF POLICY FORMATION
Edited by Raymond A. Bauer, *Harvard University,* and Kenneth J. Gergen, *Swarthmore College*
Foreword by Robert C. Wood

Nine empirically oriented, previously unpublished papers present a synthesis of past approaches, a reference to contemporary techniques, and fresh ideas on both theoretical and empirical planes. The contributors show how developments in theories of decision-making, power structure, and formal organizations lend themselves to study, pointing out present limitations and signaling areas where additional knowledge is needed.
1968 400 pages $9.95

MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING
Community Action in the War on Poverty
By Daniel P. Moynihan, Executive Secretary, Council on Urban Affairs, and Assistant to the President for Urban Affairs

This volume is an examination and explanation of the causes, effects, and defects of the disputes associated with the requirement of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 that anti-poverty programs be carried out with the "maximum feasible participation" of all the residents of the communities involved. In concluding this spirited chronicle of the 1960s, the author presents a general statement on the role of social science in the formulation of social policy.
Just published 240 pages $5.95

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior
By Herbert Hyman
With a new Preface by the author

"the author has unearthed an impressive collection of research fragments which he has organized around his central theme with great skill.... He has... made effective use of a rather broad system of abstractions and has taken us a step forward in a research area which badly needs organization."—*The Annals*

Encompassing past research which treats political behavior as the product of learning and socialization, this volume includes an account of studies in which the idiosyncracies of political behavior do not fit into the learning-socialization pattern.
188 pages A Free Press Paperback, $1.95 tent.

The Free Press
A Division of The Macmillan Company
866 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

URBAN GOVERNMENT
A Reader in Administration and Politics
Revised Edition
Edited by Edward C. Banfield, *Harvard University*

The revised edition of *Urban Government* reflects the social and political developments that have affected urban government since 1961. With thirty-two of its sixty-eight selections newly added, the book presents an up-to-date picture of the field and includes articles on Negro politics, reapportionments of local government, riots, and other areas of current importance.
Just published 800 pages $9.95 tent.

THE POLITICAL IMAGINATION IN LITERATURE
A Reader
Edited by Philip Green, *Smith College,* and Michael Walzer, *Harvard University*

This stimulating reader supplements the standard materials of political science education with sixty-one selections that dramatically express the richness of political life and thought. Included are the works of Agee, Babel, Blake, Brecht, Dickinson, Diderot, Dostoevski, France, Giono, Goodman, Homer, James, Kafka, Kipling, Koestler, Maltz, Mann, Melville, Milton, Shakespeare, Sophocles, Swift, Twain, Warren, Williams, Wright, Yeats, and Zola.
Just published 528 pages paper, $4.95

BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
An Analysis of Organizational Change
By Louis C. Gawthrop, *State University of New York, Binghamton*

The first theoretical analysis of bureaucratic behavior in this area, this text examines its subject in terms of organizational responses to both internal and external change. The author develops an analytic model which can be used to examine top-level bureaucracy in the federal government, and presents a detailed analysis of key behavioral factors affecting organizations.
Just published *288 pages paper, $2.95

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Three volumes edited by James N. Rosenau, Rutgers University

LINKAGE POLITICS
Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems

Eleven original articles by distinguished contributors each apply the editor's linkage framework (presented in Chapter Three) to specific empirical systems to discover generalizations about linkage phenomena. In analyzing the points at which the functioning and structure of national and international systems are linked, this volume places special emphasis on linkages and comparative analyses in Latin America, Europe, Africa, China, Japan, U.S.A., U.S.S.R., and the underdeveloped world.

Just published 368 pages (approx.) $8.50 tent.

DOMESTIC SOURCES OF FOREIGN POLICY
Foreword by Samuel P. Hayes

Providing the first eclectic approach to this important area of investigation, this collection of articles includes 10 previously unpublished studies, and draws upon the conceptual and empirical insights of sociology and psychology as well as political science. The penetrating studies examine foreign policy in relation to such internal variables as individual personality and behavior, voting, mass media, interest groups, the community, and the nation's political systems.

1967 354 pages $8.50

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY
Revised Edition

This revised edition of *International Politics and Foreign Policy* provides a current and well-balanced presentation of readings on international relations and is particularly informative regarding the structure of international systems, strategic theory, and the sources of foreign policy behavior. Fifty-one of its fifty-seven selections are new to this edition and include five previously unpublished readings.

Just published 800 pages (approx.) $9.95 tent.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE MIGHT OF NATIONS

World Politics in Our Time **Third Edition**

JOHN G. STOESSINGER, *City University of New York*
Random House, 1969; 448 pages; $7.95

This new edition of a text which won the Bancroft Prize focuses on four themes: the East-West conflict; the struggle between nationalism and colonialism; the tension between the quest for power and the quest for order; and the divergence between the way nations perceive world affairs and the actualities of international relations. Within this framework, the author discusses the major problems of international politics from diplomatic, military, and economic viewpoints. The text has been updated to take into account the Vietnam and Israeli-Arab conflicts, the changes in NATO, the recent partial moves beyond the Cold War concept in East-West relations, and the increasing power of anti-colonial forces in Africa.

POLITICS AMONG NATIONS

The Struggle for Power and Peace **Fourth Edition**

HANS J. MORGENTHAU, *University of Chicago*
Knopf, 1967; 672 pages; $8.95

This classic textbook has become the standard against which all others in the field are measured. The fourth edition brings the organization and approach of the earlier editions to bear on the major events and issues of today: the United Nations, imperialism, prestige, nuclear war, alliances, and arms control.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE BIPOLAR WORLD

PETER J. FLIESS, *University of Massachusetts*
1968; 256 pages; $2.45 paperbound

THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE INTERWAR YEARS, 1919-1939

WILLIAM J. NEWMAN, *Boston University*
1968; 192 pages; $1.95 paperbound

THE ARROGANCE OF POWER

SENATOR J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT
288 pages; $1.65 paperbound

RANDOM HOUSE, Inc.
ALFRED A. KNOPF, Inc.
The College Department
201 East 50th Street, New Nork 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SCHOCKEN ADOPTION TITLES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

H. B. Acton
WHAT MARX REALLY SAID
158 pp./bibliog./index cloth $4.00

Eduard Bernstein
EVOLUTIONARY SOCIALISM
Introduction by Sidney Hook
256 pp. paper $1.95

Eduard Bernstein
CROMWELL AND COMMUNISM
Socialism and Democracy in the English Revolution
287 pp./index paper $1.95

C. A. R. Crosland
THE FUTURE OF SOCIALISM
380 pp./index cloth $5.00
paper $1.95

C. E. Ayres
THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS
A Study of the Fundamentals of Economic Development and Cultural Change. 2d Edition
346 pp./index paper $2.45

Maurice Bruce
THE COMING OF THE WELFARE STATE
With a Comparative Essay on American and English Welfare Programs. Revised Edition
332 pp./indexes cloth $8.95

Graham Wootton
WORKERS, UNIONS AND THE STATE
187 pp./indexes cloth $6.00

Philip Green
DEADLY LOGIC
The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence
New Preface by the Author
379 pp./bibliog./index
paper $2.45

Richard B. Gregg
THE POWER OF NONVIOLENCE
Second, Revised Edition
192 pp. cloth $4.50/paper $1.75

Alexis de Tocqueville
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
Unabridged edition in two volumes
Introduction to each volume by John Stuart Mill
606 & 496 pp. cloth, each $6.50/paper, each $1.95

For complete catalogs of Schocken titles write to . . .

SCHOCKEN BOOKS, 67 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA PRESS

Coming March 20th

THE KOREAN WAR AND AMERICAN POLITICS

The Republican Party as a Case History

By Ronald J. Caridi

A provocative discussion of how the Republican Party turned popular discontent with the Korean War into electoral victory in 1952 then proceeded to apply policies associated with the contemporary politics of force. *$10.00*

BOOK PIRATING IN TAIWAN

By David Kaser

The story of unauthorized reprints of copyrighted Western books emanating from Taiwan. *New $6.50*

Also remember....

THE KOREA KNOT, Revised Edition

A Military-Political History *by Carl Berger* $6.00

THE JAPANESE SEIZURE OF KOREA, 1868-1910

By Hilary Conroy $7.50

BUDDHISM IN JAPAN

By E. Dale Saunders $6.50

STAGES OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA

By Sung Jae Koh $12.00

UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA PRESS
Philadelphia 19104

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Politics and Government in the United States

SECOND EDITION

EMMETTE S. REDFORD, University of Texas
DAVID B. TRUMAN, Mount Holyoke College
ALAN F. WESTIN, Columbia University
ROBERT C. WOOD, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

A thorough revision of a distinguished introduction to American government.

National, State, and Local Edition: 964 pages. $9.50
National Edition: 835 pages. $8.50

An Instructor's Manual and a separate Test Booklet accompany the Second Edition.

The Chief Executive

REVISED EDITION

LOUIS W. KOENIG, New York University

A comprehensive analysis of the American Presidency and the men who have held that office, thoroughly revised and available now in a new paperbound edition. Paperbound. 466 pages. $3.95

Political Patterns in Today's World

SECOND EDITION

D. W. BROGAN,
Professor Emeritus, Cambridge University
DOUGLAS V. VERNEY, York University

A brief, comparative introduction to the two basic political patterns in today's world – liberal democracy and communism – revised and brought up to date in a Second Edition.

Paperbound. 278 pages. $2.95

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Major Foreign Powers

FIFTH EDITION

The latest edition of a classic textbook by GWENDOLEN M. CARTER, Northwestern University, and JOHN H. HERZ, The City College of The City University of New York.

701 pages. $9.95

Also available in separate paperbound editions

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
Second Edition
GWENDOLEN M. CARTER — 218 pages. $2.95

THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE
GWENDOLEN M. CARTER — 138 pages. $2.45

THE GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
JOHN H. HERZ — 172 pages. $2.75

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION
Second Edition
GWENDOLEN M. CARTER — 137 pages. $2.45

Documents of Major Foreign Powers

A new sourcebook on Great Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union, edited by LOUISE W. HOLBORN, Radcliffe Institute, JOHN H. HERZ, and GWENDOLEN M. CARTER.

Paperbound. 381 pages. $5.50

Western Political Theory

FROM ITS ORIGINS TO THE PRESENT

LEE CAMERON McDONALD, Pomona College

This distinguished textbook presents in one volume an analysis in depth of the works of some 21 major political theorists from Plato to the present. 653 pages. $9.50

HARCOURT, BRACE & WORLD, INC.
New York / Chicago / San Francisco / Atlanta

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New and Forthcoming Texts from HRW

AMERICAN POLITICS: *A Systems Approach*
Stephen V. Monsma, Calvin College
This brief introduction to American government uses systems analysis to integrate and analyze the key features of American politics. It views the political system as a social system which makes authoritative decisions and allocates advantages and disadvantages for an entire society. The basic decision-making institutions and processes of American politics are described from a behavioral-theoretical perspective and the functions they perform are analyzed. March 1969/ 416 pages/ $5.95 (tent.) *Instructor's Manual.* STUDY GUIDE to accompany AMERICAN POLITICS: A Systems Approach by Morley Segal, American University, and Carl Kalvelage, Minot State College. May 1969/ 256 pages/ $3.95 paper (tent.)

AMERICAN POLITICS: *Research and Readings*
Edited by Stephen V. Monsma, Calvin College, and Jack R. Van Der Slik, Southern Illinois University
The organizing concept for this reader is the political system model as it has been developed by a number of contemporary theorists, especially David Easton. May 1969/ 416 pages/ $4.95 paper (tent.)

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ANALYSIS
David V. Edwards, The University of Texas
Professor Edwards uses an open-ended approach to international politics to lead the student through the analysis required to develop and test theory to explain, predict, and recommend policy. *Instructor's Manual.* Casebooks. March 1969/ 384 pages/ $8.50 (tent.)

READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ANALYSIS
Edited by David V. Edwards, The University of Texas
Articles by political scientists and individuals from related disciplines focus on the problems and methods of theory-building in international politics. June 1969/ 512 pages/ $5.95 paper (tent.)

ARMS CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
David V. Edwards, The University of Texas
The conditions conducive to arms control in the next decade and the ways in which nations can contribute to this control are examined in this concise, important study. December 1968/ 208 pages/ $3.50 paper/ $7.50 cloth

GREAT POLITICAL THINKERS, *Fourth Edition*
William Ebenstein, University of California, Santa Barbara
In a balanced combination of history, critical analysis, and readings from original sources, Professor Ebenstein traces the evolution of political philosophy with an emphasis upon the relevance of the great political problems throughout history to problems in the twentieth century. March 1969/ 992 pages/ $9.95 (tent.)

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, *Fourth Edition*
Marshall E. Dimock and Gladys Ogden Dimock
This introduction to public administration has been completely rewritten and refocused to develop a rounded and unified theory, to reflect current behavioral emphases, utilize comparative analyses, and investigate economic factors and policy-making decisions. April 1969/ 608 pages/ $8.95 (tent.)

CASEBOOK IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
R. Joseph Novogrod, Long Island University, Brooklyn Center, Marshall E. Dimock, and Gladys Ogden Dimock
This casebook related principles of public administration to actual administrative situations at the city, state, and federal levels of government by presenting problems and programs with which today's public officials must contend. Summer 1969/ 352 pages/ $4.95 paper (tent.)

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: *A Simulation with Readings*
Marvin G. Weinbaum and Louis H. Gold, both of the University of Illinois
Designed for five class sessions of 45 or more students, this teaching simulation exercise provides simplified nonmathematical models of complex political processes that allow player-interaction and collective problem-solving. March 1969/ 320 pages/ $3.95 paper (tent.)

HOLT, RINEHART and WINSTON
383 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10017

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Angolan Revolution Volume I: The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962)
by John A. Marcum
In 1961, a rebellion suddenly flared up in Portugal's African colony of Angola with an intensity that even took the rebels by surprise. Although suppressed by Portugal and in the long run deserted by a world opinion that was superficially sympathetic, the rebel cause withdrew to the natural sanctuary of the jungle to persist rather than to die, to settle in for a long struggle.

The rebellion and its background and consequences are the subjects of this authoritative volume. (A second volume will be published later, carrying the story from 1962 to 1968.) The author here describes the action in Angola and in Lisbon, and also the world-wide diplomatic responses, including those of the United Nations, the United States, and Brazil. Especially valuable is the detailed picture Marcum presents of the rebel organizations and their leaders.
$12.50

Survey Research on Comparative Social Change: A Bibliography
edited by Frederick W. Frey with Peter Stephenson and Katherine Archer Smith
This bibliography contains approximately 1500 original annotations of articles in English-language journals reporting the results of sample survey research in developing countries and cross-national research in developing and developed countries, dealing with the general topic of social change.

All issues of approximately 260 English-language journals were searched. The annotations attempt to describe fully the methodology employed by the author of the article, and a brief statement of the substantive findings is also included.
$12.50

Force and Folly: Essays on Foreign Affairs and the History of Ideas
by Hans Speier
Most of the papers collected here were written in the last ten years, and the book may be regarded as a sequel to the author's *Social Order and the Risks of War: Papers in Political Sociology*, first published in 1952 and reissued by the M.I.T. Press in 1964. The papers in *Force and Folly* reflect Hans Speier's professional concerns over the past decade as a charter member of the Research Council of The RAND Corporation. About a third of the papers have never been published before in any form.
$12.50
Now in paperback:

Social Order and the Risks of War: Papers in Political Sociology
by Hans Speier

Limited War and American Defense Policy: Building and Using Military Power in a World at War
by Seymour J. Deitchman
$3.95

The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From Harper & Row

PETER H. ODEGARD'S

THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
Its Government and Politics, Second Edition

With HANS H. BAERWALD and WILLIAM C. HAVARD

A rigorous, comprehensive description and analysis of institutions and political practices at all levels of American government. Without sacrificing the richness of the historical and comparative analysis characteristic of the first edition, the Second Edition has been thoroughly revised and reorganized, incorporating original research, both institutional and behavioral. Instructor's Manual by David Barney available. Tentative: *872 pp.; $9.95.* Handbook of American Government by David Barney—In preparation.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
Readings and Documents, Second Edition

PETER H. ODEGARD

An authoritative and wide-ranging collection of readings which may accompany any standard text in American government, including THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC. Headnotes give historical, constitutional, and political perspective to the documentary materials. *640 pp.; $5.50 paper*

THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY SYSTEM

THOMAS E. CRONIN and SANFORD D. GREENBERG

For the first time, two recent White House aides focus specifically on the presidential advisory system through essays and research papers by political scientists as well as former science, economic, budget, and foreign policy advisors. *Tentative: 359 pp.; $6.95 cloth; $3.95 paper*

CONGRESS: TWO DECADES OF ANALYSIS

RALPH K. HUITT and ROBERT L. PEABODY

Brings together six of Dr. Huitt's landmark articles on the U. S. Senate and the executive-legislative process, together with an original introductory essay by Dr. Peabody, who comprehensively assesses Congressional research since World War II. Selective bibliography. *241 pp.; $3.50 paper*

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES

WILLIAM C. HAVARD

246 pp.; $3.50 paper

Harper & Row, Publishers, 49 E. 33d St., N.Y. 10016 *1817*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Distinctive List

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY in World Perspective

WILLIAM EBENSTEIN, C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, HENRY A. TURNER, and DEAN MANN

A comprehensive analysis of American government from the perspective of other democratic systems, contrasting democratic principles and practices with authoritarianism and totalitarianism. *748 pp.; $8.50.* Student's Guide: $3.95. American Democracy–State and Local Government (by Henry A. Turner): 148 pp.; $3.95

CHALLENGE AND DECISION
Political Issues of Our Time, Second Edition

REO M. CHRISTENSON

Up to date and forward looking, this presentation of the major domestic political issues facing this generation provides a detailed study of their genesis and legislative experience through the Eighty-ninth Congress. *306 pp.; $3.95 paper*

NATIONS IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

CECIL V. CRABB, Jr.

The author examines and analyzes the basic data needed to understand present-day relations. Recognizing that the field of international relations is vase and diverse, he utilizes several approaches or principles to make the subject matter meaningful, intelligible and relevant. *702 pp.; $11.00*

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MAKING

ELEANOR LANSING DULLES

Provides an analysis of the apparatus and history of American foreign policy since the end of World War II and puts into historical perspective the aims of that policy and its degrees of success and failure. *370 pp.; $3.95 paper*

POLITICAL CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

PETER H. MERKL

Explores the continuity of Western political tradition in terms of some of the seminal concepts of the great political philosophers; examines political institutions and processes of modern government through comparison with the systems of various Western and non-Western countries; considers processes of revolutionary change as they have affected the West and today's developing nations. *606 pp.; $8.50*

A METHODOLOGY FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH

GIDEON SJOBERG and ROGER NETT

This original work places research procedures in a theoretical context and systematically works out a methodology for research in the social sciences. *355 pp.; $9.95*

Harper & Row, Publishers, 49 E. 33d St., N.Y. 10016

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Second Edition...

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE

W. W. KULSKI, Duke University

This thoroughly revised, completely reset edition of professor Kulski's widely accepted text provides an up-to-date examination of every important aspect of relations between contemporary states: political, military, economic, ideological, legal and diplomatic.

742 Pages **$7.95**

POLITICS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Edited by ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, Jr., University of Pennsylvania

The selections in this collection are representative of the thought of leading contemporary and traditional analysts, and reflect their diverse and sometimes conflicting viewpoints on the major problems and areas of concern to the student of international relations.

528 Pages **Paperbound** **$4.50**

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION

An Introductory Reader

Edited by RICHARD A. FALK, Princeton University, and WOLFRAM F. HANRIEDER, University of California, Santa Barbara

Fourteen selections together with the editors' commentaries provide students with an introduction to the important questions that bear on the character of contemporary international order. The distinctive features of a decentralized legal system are stressed.

346 Pages **Paperbound** **$3.95**

THESE LIBERTIES

Case Studies in Civil Rights

ROCCO J. TRESOLINI

Unlike many existing casebooks intended for advanced students and specialized audiences, this brief book—a virtual text in civil liberties—is designed for students at freshman and sophomore levels. Particular stress is placed on recent and emerging problems.

306 Pages **Paperbound** **$2.25**

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY

College Department

East Washington Square *Philadelphia, Pa. 19105*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

look for these books this spring:



• **INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY** American Society of International Law/*in clothbound and paperback editions* • **STATISTICS IN POLITICAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE** Dennis J. Palumbo, Brooklyn College of The City University of New York/*with separate workbook* • **APPROACHES TO MEASUREMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A Non-Evangelical Survey** Edited by John E. Mueller, University of Rochester • **POLICIES, DECISIONS AND ORGANIZATION** Edited by Fremont J. Lyden, George A. Shipman, and Morton Kroll, all of the University of Washington • **OGG AND RAY'S ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 10th Ed.** and **OGG AND RAY'S ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, 10th Ed.** William H. Young, The University of Wisconsin/*with instructor's manual*

appleton-century-crofts
educational division
meredith corporation
440 park ave. south, new york 10016

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New Titles from F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc.

COOPERATION AND CONFLICT: Readings in American Federalism

Edited by Daniel J. Elazar, Temple University
R. Bruce Carroll, Middlebury College
E. Lester Levine, Florida State University
Douglas St. Angelo, Florida State University

This is a comprehensive anthology of materials dealing with the several aspects of American federalism. Federalism is treated as an institutional system of political bargaining. Within this system of bargaining there has been and continues to be extensive intermingling of functions among government levels. This shared federalism is viewed historically, theoretically, fiscally, administratively and politically.

It is oriented toward delineating empirical realities but in a manner that synthesizes theory and practice in a meaningful way. The book's underlying premise is that federal principles and processes so permeate the American system of government that an understanding of federalism is the key to the study of American government.

March 1969 c. 650 pages $9.50

FEDERALISM: Infinite Variety in Theory and Practice

Edited by Valerie Earle, Georgetown University

In a seven essay presentation, the first three examine American federalism, the next three federalism in Canada and Australia, West Germany and Latin America. The concluding essay discusses the future of federalism. The essay contributors, in addition to Valerie Earle, are Alpheus Mason, George Carey, William S. Livingston, Karl H. Cerny, Harry Kantor and Henry Teune.

1968 241 pages $3.75

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS:

Edited by Richard B. Gray, Florida State University

The intent of this book is to examine actual and theoretical models of international security systems. The organizing concept is, broadly speaking, General Systems Theory. Each of the contributors to this volume examines processes, concepts, institutions and models, past, present and future that have international security as the central purpose in the building of a stable system.

The systems described may be gobal or regional. All have in common three identifying characteristics: they are international, their objective is security, and they are systematic in operation.

Contributors: Richard J. Barnet, Kenneth E. Boulding, Inis L. Claude, Jr., Herbert S. Dinerstein, Richard A. Falk, Stanley H. Hoffman, Morton A. Kaplan, Charles A. McClelland, Saul H. Mendlovitz, and Richard N. Rosecrance.

May 1969 272 pages $4.50 paper

F. E. PEACOCK PUBLISHERS, INC.
Itasca, Illinois 60143

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OPEN SYSTEMS:
Arenas for Political Action

By Henry S. Kariel, University of Hawaii

This is Professor Kariel's exciting analysis of the problems of closure in contemporary society and American political science. His argument is that "politics *at its best* (not *all* politics) is a kind of play, of agonistic exertion, of free and self-delighting action."

April 1969 c. 160 pages $3.50 paper

PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC MANAGEMENT:
Cases and Learning Designs

Edited by Robert T. Golembiewski, University of Georgia

This unique approach to Public Administration contains 13 cases selected to illustrate some managerially-relevant process. Each case is preceded by a "learning design," i.e., suggested ways of using the case to highlight what is known about managerial processes and behavior.

1968 263 pages $4.95

VIETNAM:
Anatomy of a Conflict

Edited by Wesley R. Fishel, Michigan State University

Useful in courses in Politics of Southeast Asia or American Foreign Policy, this is a cogent, authoritative and balanced presentation of the Vietnam frustration. It contains 81 selections with various points of view. It sets forth background, history and contemporary analyses.

1968 879 pages $5.95 paper

PUBLIC BUDGETING AND FINANCE:
Readings in Theory and Practice

Edited by Robert T. Golembiewski, University of Georgia

An extraordinarily comprehensive collection of readings (47) emphasizing behavioral materials relevant to budgeting as well as technical and institutional features.

1968 592 pages $9.50

METROPOLIS IN CRISIS:
Social and Political Perspectives

Edited by Jeffrey K. Hadden, Case Western Reserve Univ.
Louis H. Masotti, Case Western Reserve Univers'y
Calvin J. Larson, Purdue University

The 44 selections in this reader are organized into five parts.

Part I, The Challenge of Metropolis, is a brief introduction to the problems and prospects of urban life. Part II, From Mudhuts to Megalopolis, traces the historical development of cities and elaborates the process and consequences of urbanization.

Part III, Ideological Perspectives, delineates the way man thinks and feels about the city. Part IV, Dimensions of the Crisis, looks at specific urban problems: race, housing, poverty, education, crime, transportation, air pollution and finance. Part V, Adaptation, Innovation and Reform, examines the ability of the urban community to organize itself to meet the urban crisis.

1967 521 pages $8.00

F. E. PEACOCK PUBLISHERS, INC.

Itasca, Illinois 60143

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Van Nostrand / Reinhold Co.

Texts on Government and Politics

Authoritative . . Comprehensive . . Up To Date

AMERICAN POLITICS
Quentin L. Quade and Thomas J. Bennett, Marquette University. Spring 1969, 224 pages, $3.00, paper.
A provocative critical analysis of contemporary American political institutions in terms of effectiveness and responsibility. The authors devote special attention to the role of the American political party.

CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, Third Edition
Edited by William G. Andrews, State University College, Brockport, New York. 1968, 224 pages, app. $1.95, paper.
The third edition includes a new statistical appendix and the first English translation of the 40-odd 1966 amendments to the Statutes of the CPSU. The texts of the French, West German, and Soviet constitutions incorporate all amendments enacted by April 15, 1968. Provides a valuable supplement to courses in comparative government and law.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
Earl R. Kruschke, Chico State College. 1968, 250 pages, $3.95, paper.
Designed for introductory courses in American history and government, this text reprints the entire Constitution, along with an article-by-article analysis, chapter summaries, questions for review, historical background, and a wealth of additional illustrative material.

THE FABRIC OF DEMOCRACY: Readings in American Government, Second Edition
Charles P. Blackmore and Abraham Yeselson, Rutgers, The State University. Spring, 1969, 448 pages, $4.50, paper.
An imaginative and relevant series of readings that examine the functions and operations of the various elements that comprise our national government.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS: A Reader
William J. Moore, Walter C. Schuiling, Aram M. Sogomonian, George K. Zaharopoulos, all of San Bernardino Valley College. 1967, 400 pages, $4.75, paper.
Comprehensive readings in the processes of American government through an institutional approach, emphasizing vital areas of change in concept and structure.

ESSENTIALS OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, Second Edition
Jewel Cass Phillips and Henry J. Abraham, University of Pennsylvania; and the late Cortez M. Ewing, University of Oklahoma. 1966, 480 pages, $4.95, paper.
This text examines the basic principles and functions of American government at the national level, balancing traditional areas of study with major contemporary concerns.

Send for your on-approval copies. Write College Department,

Van Nostrand/Reinhold Co.
300 Pike Street
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New

Revised, Enlarged Edition

Ideology and Organization in Communist China

Franz Schurmann

In a 100-page supplement focusing on the Cultural Revolution, Mr. Schurmann advances new theses on the ideological and political splits in China, on the separation of politics and administration, and on the student movement which, through the Red Guards, assaulted the highest levels of Communist Party power.

LC: 68-26124 540 pages illustrations $12.50

Back in Print, with a new Preface

Prejudice, War, and the Constitution

Causes and Consequences of the Evacuation of the Japanese Americans in World War II

Jacobus tenBroek, Edward N. Barnhart, *and* **Floyd W. Matson**

The World War II evacuation and detention of the Japanese Americans remains today one of the darkest chapters in U. S. history. This comprehensive work describes the myths and suspicions about Orientals on the West Coast, advances a theory to account for the administrative and legal decisions which initiated and concluded the calamity, and analyzes the principal constitutional issues involved in the evacuation and their implications for the future.

LC: 54-11247 408 pages cloth, $7.50; paper, $2.25

The Politics of the Barrios of Venezuela

Talton F. Ray

Throughout Latin America, great numbers of peasants are migrating to cities. Poor, uneducated, untrained, these are the builders and occupants of sprawling new shantytowns, which today house one-half the population of many principal cities. In this first book-length study to focus directly on the subject, Mr. Ray, who spent three years in Venezuela on the staff of ACCIÓN, describes the development of a vigorous new style of politics in the barrios there and surveys the influence of the new politics on the nation as a whole.

LC: 69-12844 map, illustrations $7.50

from California

University of California Press · Berkeley 94720

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COLUMBIA COLUMBIA

CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN MING TIMES: Seven Studies

Edited by Charles O. Hucker

These essays on seven aspects of government during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) stem from a conference on Ming Government sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies and the Association for Asian Studies, held in August, 1965. The contributors are Lien-sheng Yang, Romeyn Taylor, Jung-pang Lo, Ray Huang, Tilemann Grimm, John Meskill, and James B. Parsons. There is a glossary of important terms.

One of the Studies in Oriental Culture. $12.00

HOW COMMUNIST CHINA NEGOTIATES

Arthur Lall

"Mr. Lall's book deals with the 14-nation Foreign Ministers Conference on Laos of 1961-1962....he has combined his personal knowledge of the inner workings of the Conference with available records and published materials to produce an immensely detailed account of the negotiations.... With the same interest in theory which he displayed in his *Modern International Negotiation,* Mr. Lall tends to stress the similarities in basic principles of negotiations between Peking and all other nations." —*New York Times Book Review*

This paperback edition includes a new chapter on North Vietnam at the negotiating table. paper, $2.95

THE FIRST VIETNAM CRISIS: CHINESE COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT, 1953-1954

Melvin Gurtov

"...an illuminating account of the military and diplomatic context in which the [Geneva Conference of 1954] took place." —*New York Times Book Review*

"I think Melvin Gurtov's *The First Vietnam Crisis* makes a solid contribution to better public understanding of the morass into which we permitted ourselves to become engulfed, and performs a national service in avoiding similar pitfalls in the future." —General Matthew B. Ridgway

paper, $2.75

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

440 West 110th Street,
New York, N.Y. 10025

COLUMBIA COLUMBIA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Oxford University Press PAPERBACKS

GB 274

The Unfinished Revolution

Russia, 1917-1967

By ISAAC DEUTSCHER. "Brilliant attempt to put the Russian revolution in its historical perspective."
— *The Economist* $1.25

GB 273

Obstacles to Change in Latin America

Edited by CLAUDIO VELIZ. The viewpoints of eleven eminent Latin Americans on the complex questions facing their countries. $1.95

GB 272

Obligation and the Body Politic

By JOSEPH TUSSMAN. Provides a contemporary "framework within which most of the traditional problems of political theory find their place."
— *American Political Science Review* $1.50

GB 271

Politics in Brazil 1930-1964

An Experiment in Democracy

By THOMAS E. SKIDMORE. "The most important book on the politics of modern Brazil that exists."
— *The Economist* $2.50

GB 268

The Democratic Civilization

By LESLIE LIPSON. The workings of democratic political systems, their histories, values, prospects, discussed with "breadth and sweep of learning."
— ANDREW HACKER $2.95

GB 265

The Tweed Ring

By ALEXANDER B. CALLOW, JR. The full story of the infamous city machine, "told with shrewdness and insight." — RICHARD D. HEFFNER, *N.Y. Times Book Review* $1.95

GB 255

Poor Richard's Politicks

Benjamin Franklin and His New American Order

By PAUL W. CONNER. "Enables us to see the new American order . . . that Franklin had in view."
— *The Reporter* $1.65

GB 254

Defender of the Faith

William Jennings Bryan, The Last Decade, 1915-1925

By LAWRENCE W. LEVINE. "Eminently fair to his protagonist and his ideas while legitimately questioning both." — *American Historical Review* $2.25

At all bookstores

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Oxford University Press

United Nations Peacekeeping
Documents and Commentary
THE MIDDLE EAST

By ROSALYN HIGGINS, *Chatham House.* In the first of three volumes of documents and commentary on United Nations peacekeeping operations, covering all U.N. forces and military observer groups, Dr. Higgins has provided commentaries on each action covering legal and political matters, and analyzing the significance of the events, positions, and decisions referred to. Volume I deals with U.N. peacekeeping in the Middle East—the Truce Supervision Organization of the Arab-Israeli Armistice agreements, the Emergency Force in Egypt, and the Observer Groups in Lebanon and Yemen. $15.50

Essays on Socialism

By J. K. NYERERE, *President of Tanzania.* This volume, of which there will also be a Swahili edition, is a short selection of major speeches and articles specifically on socialism by President Nyerere including the text of the Arusha Declaration, education for self-reliance, and other policy statements on African socialism. *Paper,* $2.40

Modern China's Search for a Political Form

Edited by JACK GRAY, *University of Glasgow.* The product of a 1965-66 symposium that examined the historical antecedents of the Communist revolution in China, this volume brings into closer relationship research in progress on a number of supporting subjects, thus providing for each separate line of research the broad background which, until now, has not existed in a published work. The contributors are Jerome Ch'en, Mark Elvin, Martin Bernal, Jean Chesneaux, John Gittings, Sybille van der Sprenkel, James MacDonald, and George Moseley. *(Royal Institute of International Affairs.)* $10.50

The Liberal Party and the Jameson Raid

By JEFFREY BUTLER, *Wesleyan University.* The book examines the factors behind the Jameson Raid and why the South Africa Committee of 1897 failed to properly investigate it. Butler uses the private papers of front Benchers, defines the problems of the Liberal leaders and describes the conflict between personal and political motives that led up to the inquiry which appeared so bogus to contemporaries. $7.00

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Oxford University Press

The Land Office Business

THE SETTLEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC LANDS, 1789-1837

By MALCOLM ROHRBOUGH, *University of Iowa.* "A major contribution to American history. This book will fill a long-felt need, and fill it admirably. The research is thorough, the writing lively, the subject engrossing."—RAY A. BILLINGTON, Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery. "An interesting and useful book indeed. It will be the standard work on the subject for a long time to come."—ALLEN G. BOGUE, University of Wisconsin. *6 maps, endpapers.* $8.75

Democrat and Diplomat

THE LIFE OF WILLIAM E. DODD

By ROBERT DALLEK, *University of California, Los Angeles.* "A warm, careful, readable portrait of a fine historian and significant public figure."—FRANK FREIDEL, Harvard University. "I read Mr. Dallek's book with increasing interest and fascination. As biography, it is a work of art. As history, it is first-rate, particularly about his career as Ambassador to Germany."—ARTHUR S. LINK, Princeton University $8.50

Boss Cox's Cincinnati

URBAN POLITICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

By ZANE L. MILLER, *University of Cincinnati.* "Zane Miller's study of Cincinnati is the clearest account we have of a revolution that transformed the nineteenth-century city into the twentieth-century urban center."—ROBERT WIEBE, Northwestern University. "An enlightening study of a city in transition and of its encounter with modern urban problems."—OSCAR HANDLIN, Harvard University. *8 maps (Urban Life in America series.)* $7.50

"The Best Men"

LIBERAL REFORMERS IN THE GILDED AGE

By JOHN G. SPROAT, *Lake Forest College.* "Mr. Sproat's solid, literate analysis helps greatly at last to place into perspective that long-puzzling shift from Radical to Liberal Republicanism."—HAROLD HYMAN, Rice University. "His dissection of the so-called liberal mind of the late 19th century is the fullest and most insightful that I know. . . . It throws light not only on the period directly discussed but also on the problems of our own day."—JOHN A. GARRATY, Columbia University $7.50

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DOUBLEDAY ANCHOR BOOKS

the first name in quality paperback publishing

DOUBLEDAY & COMPANY INC.
Garden City, New York

Our Laidlaw division, River Forest, Illinois, serves the textbook needs of today's schools.

BEHIND THE SHIELD
The Police in Urban Society

Arthur Niederhoffer. A former member of the New York City police force, now a professor of sociology, analyzes the role of the big-city policeman in America today. "Interesting, well-written book dealing with a variety of police activities."—*Choice.* $1.45

CHOU EN-LAI
China's Gray Eminence

Kai-yu Hsu. The only biography of Chou in English—"highly readable . . . draws on information from people who knew Chou at different times and from Chinese and non-Chinese source materials."—*Foreign Affairs.* $1.75

SOCIAL POLICIES FOR AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES
Nine Divergent Views

Edited by Robert Theobald. Nine experts probe the nation's economic and social problems, and present challenging, individual approaches to their solution, ranging from bonuses for the poor to the government as employer of last resort. $1.95

GOVERNING EDUCATION
A Reader on Politics, Power, and Public School Policy

Edited by Alan Rosenthal. Drawn from the best recent studies of the politics of education, this timely collection concentrates on the community's role in school policy, desegregation, and the new strategies for power. $1.95

THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

Robert L. Crain. The first genuinely scientific analysis of the political process by which school sytsems have been and can be desegregated. This book analyzes desegregation, decentralization, and busing in fifteen representative American cities—seven southern cities (including New Orleans and Montgomery), and eight northern urban centers. $1.75

And a Doubleday Paperback of Special Interest . . .

AGENDA FOR THE NATION

Edited by Kermit Gordon. Clark Kerr, Henry Kissinger, Kenneth Clark, and fifteen other leading observers of public affairs present significant "guideline" statements on all major policy areas confronting the new administration. *A Brookings Institution publication.* $3.50

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chandler Publications in Political Science

NEW **United States Government and Politics**
by Jon A. Yinger, State College at Fullerton, and George K. Zaharopoulos, San Bernardino Valley College
Attempts to make government and the political process explicable to the general student. The authors avoid an overemphasis on the institutions and formalities of the political process and confine their discussion of these matters as nearly as possible to facts and issues.
360 pages 5½ x 8¼" paper © 1969
List $3.75

NEW **Dimensions of Freedom in America**
edited by Fredrick M. Wirt, Denison University and Willis D. Hawley, University of California, Berkeley
Represents an in-depth examination of the effect that recent laws and decisions pertaining to civil rights and civil liberties have had upon public policy at both the state and local level.
304 pages 5½ x 8¼" paper © 1969
List $3.25

Electing the President, 1968 Edition
by Daniel M. Ogden Jr., Colorado State University, and Arthur L. Peterson, The American Institute for Foreign Trade
Describes the process of choosing the chief executive and reports the experiences of the two major parties in the election of 1960 and 1964. Includes discussions of history and constitutional and legal determinants needed to support its practical emphasis.
335 pages 5½ x 8¼" paper © 1968
List $3.25

Ideology and Electoral Action
A Comparative Case Study of the National Committee for an Effective Congress
by Harry M. Scoble, University of California, Los Angeles, with a foreword by David B. Truman, Columbia University
Recommended as a supplementary text for courses on parties, politics, and pressure groups, this book analyzes group internal behavior relations between the members and the organization, and the place of both group and members in the political system.
298 pages 5½ x 8¼" cloth © 1967
List $5.75

From the Chandler Publishing Co.,
San Francisco
Distributed by:

SRA

Science Research Associates, Inc.
259 East Erie St., Chicago, Ill. 60611

A Subsidiary of IBM

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS ON INDIAN NATIONALISM.

Siraramayya, B. Pattabhi :	HISTORY OF THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS Vol I pp 690 Index Cloth Bound 1969	₹ 17.00
	Vol II (1935-1947) pp 1103, Index Cloth Bound 1969	₹ 20.00
Rao, M. V. Ramana : A SHORT	HISTORY OF INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS pp 356, Bound (Forwarded by Shrimati Indira Gandhi)	₹ 3.50
Ghosh, P. C.	MAHATMA GANDHI AS I SAW HIM pp 236, Index, Delux Bound 1968	₹ 7.00
Ranga, N. G.	FIGHT FOR FREEDOM — An Autobiography. pp 560, Index Cloth Bound 1968	₹ 10.00
Sharma, Jagdish Saran	JAWAHARLAL NEHRU - A Descriptive Bibliography, Brought Uptodate-1968 pp 421, Index, Cloth Bound 1968	₹ 10.00
,, ,, ,,	MAHATMA GANDHI — A Descriptive Bibliography Brought uptodate 1968. pp 650, Index Cloth Bound 1968	₹ 17.00
,, ,, ,,	INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS-A Descriptive Bibliography. pp 816 Index Cloth Bound	₹ 13.50
,, ,, ,,	INDIA'S STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM Select Documents & Sources Vol. I pp 897, Index Cloth Bound	₹ 15.00
	Vol. II, pp 814+xiv, Index Cloth Bound	₹ 15.00
	Vol. III, pp 647+xxii, Index Cloth Bound	₹ 15.00

S. CHAND AND COMPANY, Ram Nagar, New Delhi-55 (India)

This advertisement issued by Chemical & Allied Products Export Promotion Council, Calcutta, INDIA.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Journal of International Affairs

Announces its winter 1969 issue

POLITICAL CONFLICT:
PERSPECTIVES ON REVOLUTION

Hannah Arendt	Reflections on Violence
Manfred Halpern	A Redefinition of the Revolutionary Situation
Franz Schurmann	On Revolutionary Conflict
Douglas Chalmers	Crises and Change in Latin America
Ali A. Mazrui	Violent Contiquity and the Politics of Retribalization in Africa
Charles V. Hamilton	Conflict, Race and System-Transformation in the United States

Book Reviews: Dankwart Rustow, Mark Mancall, E. Victor Wolfenstein, Bruce L. R. Smith, and George A. Lanyi.

One Year $3.75 Two Years $7.00 Single Issue $2.00

School of International Affairs, Columbia University

622 West 113th St., New York, N.Y. 10025

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mathematical Applications in Political Science, IV

Edited by JOSEPH L. BERND, *Chairman of the Department of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute. Summer. 6 x 9¼. S.B.N. 0139-0262-2. L.C. 67-28023. Pages and price to be announced.*

The emphasis of this, the fourth volume of a series devoted to the analysis of the uses of mathematics in political science, is on methodology. Richard A. Brody analyzes the nature and uses of simulation in the study of political affairs and shows that this systematic approach is particularly applicable to international relations research. The uses and criticisms of formal models are examined in detail by Otto A. Davis. James F. Herndon demonstrates that techniques borrowed from economics are useful for the study of legislative conflict. Donald E. Stokes discusses Leo Goodman's notion of "ecological regression," attempting to determine whether Goodman's techniques are an adequate response to W. S. Robinson's attack on ecological correlation. In the opinion of editor Joseph L. Bernd, Stokes's study "merits the widest attention from students of empirical social studies."

Also of interest:

Virginia: Bourbonism to Byrd, 1870-1925

By ALLEN W. MOGER, *Professor of History, Washington and Lee University. ix, 397 pp., illus., index. 6¾ x 9¾. S.B.N. 8139-0182-0. L.C. 68-8538. $7.50*

Harry Byrd and the Changing Face of Virginia Politics, 1945-1966

By J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, *student, School of Law, University of Virginia; former Scholar of the House, Yale University. xvi, 403 pp., frontis., illus., tables, maps, index. 6 x 9¼. S.B.N. 8139-0239-8. L.C. 68-22731. $6.75*

Old Virginia Restored: An Interpretation of the Progressive Impulse, 1870-1930

By RAYMOND H. PULLEY, *Assistant Professor of History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. x, 207 pp., illus. 6 x 9. S.B.N. 8139-0199-5. L.C. 68-8539. $6.75*

University Press of Virginia **Charlottesville**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NEW BOOKS FROM McGRAW-HILL

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS, Second Edition

Charles R. Adrian, University of California, Riverside, and **Charles Press,** Michigan State University. Off Press. An Instructor's Manual and Study Guide are also available.

A renewed dedication to crucial issues (i.e., politics of poverty and political participation) and to relevant empirical research with a distinct political action focus characterizes the revision of this important text. For this edition, the authors have incorporated all recent research reports and updated extensively their data and illustrations. Because 1968 has been particularly important in its dramatic political impact, the events of that year have been included and oriented to the design and purpose of the text. Such topics as urban problems, the ghetto, black aspirations, summer riots, recent assassinations, President Johnson's withdrawal, and the November elections are fully covered.

THE AMERICAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, Tenth Edition

John H. Ferguson, The Pennsylvania State University, and **Dean E. McHenry,** University of California, Santa Cruz. Off Press.

An up-to-date, factual account of the structure, institutions and functions of the national government.

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, Tenth Edition

John H. Ferguson and **Dean E. McHenry.** Off Press

While the approach is the same as that in the Federal edition, the coverage includes the entire range of government–national, state and local.

CHILDREN IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: Origins of Political Legitimacy

David Easton, University of Chicago, and **Jack Dennis,** University of Wisconsin. *McGraw Hill Series in Political Science.* Off Press

An important and original contribution to the literature on political socialization, this empirically based work investigates the development of political attitudes, ideas, and feelings among 12,000 American school children.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: Anarchy and Order in the World Society, Seventh Edition

Frederick L. Schuman, Portland State College. 832 pages, $9.50

A comprehensive, up-to-date survey of world affairs placed within an historical perspective. As in previous editions, judgments are offered and predictions made on the basis of an analysis of national politics and of diplomatic military history.

McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY,
330 West 42nd Street, New York, N. Y. 10036

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BLACK POWER . . . IT REVOLT . . CIA
INDUSTRIAL-MILITARY COMPLEX . . . . . .
NAT HENTOFF . . . MARCUSE . .
"WHICH WAY AMERICA?" . . . EL BARRIO . .
CHARLES V . . . VIETNAM . . . . .
WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY . . . THE NEW MORALITY
CREDIBILITY GAP . . . OLUTION

A NEW TITLES ON URGENT SOCIAL ISSUES

SECOND 4 IN 1969

Black Power: The Radical Response to White America (Thomas Wagstaff)
Order Code 47885 $2.25S 160 pages
The black militant response to white America as voiced by spokesmen from 1792 to 1968.

The Politics and Anti-Politics of the Young (Michael Brown)
Order Code 47364 $2.25S 160 pages
Political activism and the drop-out philosophy as viewed by young leaders as well as over-thirty analysts.

Urban Racial Violence in the Twentieth Century (Joseph Boskin)
Order Code 47378 $2.25S 128 pages
Race riots and protest riots from Springfield, 1906 through Newark and Detroit, 1967. With commentary by the author.

Postwar America: The Search for Identity (Donald G. Baker and Charles H. Sheldon)
Order Code 47384 $2.25S 128 pages
The search for a new identity in areas of change—literature, politics, economics, civil rights, foreign policy.

FIRST 10 IN 1968

American Anti-War Movements (Conlin), Order Code 47403, $1.95 S

The Welfare State: Who Is My Brother's Keeper? *(Krinsky and Boskin), Order* Code 47604, $1.95 S

Problems of American Foreign Policy (Hickman), Order Code 47480, $1.95 S

Opposition Politics: The Anti-New Deal Tradition (Boskin), Order Code 47377, $1.95 S

Is American Democracy Exportable? (McGrath), Order Code 47635, $1.95 S

The Politics of Religion in America (Krinsky), Order Code 47602, $1.95 S

Protest From the Right (Rosenstone), Order Code 47725, $1.95 S

The Oppenheimer Affair: A Political Play in Three Acts (Boskin and Krinsky), Order Code 47376, $1.95 S

Ferment in Labor (Wolf), Order Code 47915, $1.95 S

Democracy and Complexity: Who Governs the Governors? (Krinsky), Order Code 47603, $1.95 S

THE INSIGHT SERIES: STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
Fred Krinsky and Joseph Boskin, University of Southern California

Ask your Macmillan representative for examination copies or write to:

Glencoe Press
A Division of The Macmillan Company
8701 Wilshire Boulevard, Beverly Hills, California 90211

GL-A-81-2

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From

SCHENKMAN

Just Out

The Relevance of International Law

A Festschrift *for Professor Leo Gross*

Edited by Karl W. Deutsch and Stanley Hoffman

"The lawyer, like the chaplain, often must serve his client not only as counsellor but as keeper of his conscience. In one way or another, he must remind his client of his many and enduring interests which must not be sacrificed to the one or the few interests that seem pressing at the moment. As a lawyer who has a habit of keeping his head at times of international crisis, and as a gentle and honest man who has been uncommonly hard to fool, Leo Gross has kept this trust. He has served as a wise and faithful counsellor to the entire community of all those interested in international law, and thus, in the end to all mankind." So write the distinguished Editors of this *Festschrift*, Professors Karl Deutsch and Stanley Hoffmann.

A *Festschrift* is an old international university custom of honoring a leading scholar by putting together a volume of essays in his honor. The contributors to this present volume are:

Quincy Wright, Stanley Hoffmann, Hans J. Morgenthau, Karl W. Deutsch, Hans Kelsen, John H. E. Fried, Richard A. Falk, Rupert Emerson, Julian R. Friedman, Norman J. Padelford, Louis B. Sohn.

This unique collection of papers is of great value, and will interest all who wish a deeper insight into the complexities of international politics and law.

$10.00

Coming Spring 1969

in collaboration with Peace Research Society (International)

Vietnam: Some Basic Issues and Alternatives

edited by Walter Isard

"Though these papers are the work of scholars from several social science disciplines – economics, sociology, government, regional science, psychology, operations research and applied mathematics – they nonetheless are woven into a fabric of interrelations which has considerable strength and flexibility for use by policy makers.... They represent both fresh contributions and reformulations."

$5.95

SCHENKMAN PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC.

ONE STORY STREET, HARVARD SQUARE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COLUMBIA COLUMBIA

THE RESISTANCE VERSUS VICHY: THE PURGE OF COLLABORATORS IN LIBERATED FRANCE

Peter Novick

This is the first full account of the purge which followed the Liberation in France after World War II. The author discusses and evaluates the purges of the Roman Catholic Church and the literary establishment; the assumption of control by the Resistance press of the collaborationist newspapers; the removal from politics of the majority of prewar deputies; the role of the purge in the Communist takeover of the trade union movement; and the trials of thousands of Vichyites and collaborators.

A Clarke F. Ansley Award winner. $7.50

TRADE AGREEMENTS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Gilbert P. Verbit

This book, developed under the auspices of Professor Wolfgang Friedmann's Program of International Legal Studies in the School of Law, Columbia University, points up the problems and procedures of negotiating trade agreements with highly industrialized nations by nations that are underdeveloped. The book will be of especial interest to officials and economists of underdeveloped nations working directly in governmental ministries and those members of the national missions to the United Nations fostering trade between developed and underdeveloped countries.

April $8.50

COMMUNISM IN CHINA: AS REPORTED FROM HANKOW IN 1932

O. Edmund Clubb

This is an offset reproduction of a confidential voluntary report submitted to the U. S. Department of State on April 30, 1932, by the author, who was then a vice consul in the U. S. Consulate General at Hankow. The report deals with Communism in China as essentially an indigenous armed rebellion. Based on primary source material, much of which is no longer available, including Russian materials, missionary reports, and Chinese and Western publications, the report is a unique historical document of great importance to anyone interested in modern China. $7.50

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

440 West 110th Street
New York, N.Y. 10025

COLUMBIA COLUMBIA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED